Analyze

The information used to produce and support the arguments made in the article comes from a number of articles and reports, as well as interviews. For example, the author communicated with the former scientific director of Spetsatom and used that information to form a better image of the situation post-Chernobyl. This information could then be contrasted to other disasters and the organizations formed in the aftermath. The author could then use research papers as a source for statistical data, as well as scientific reports as a basis for the disaster’s existence and its implications. These all together are used to form an interdisciplinary view of disaster relief, and the steps needed to prevent and respond to another nuclear disaster.

“More than 20 years ago, social scientists Harry Otway and Brian Wayne cautioned that accident prevention (safer designs, better operator training, etc. , but even more so emergency planning, faced significant economic and managerial hurdles.”(p199)

“Nuclear accidents have tended to trigger organizational reform with regard to nuclear emergency response, but not on an international level. In considering this problematic ground, where might we start to develop a global approach to nuclear disaster mitigation?”(p200)

“The specific kinds of highly specialized knowledge involved with operation nuclear reactors however may not be accessible to broad public debate to the same degree as, for example, evacuation policies. But in the interest of sustainable, socially legitimate solutions, arguably decisions about even the technical responses to disasters should not be left to scientists and engineers alone, whether they are based within the nuclear industry, a regulatory bod, or a nongovernmental organization.”(p196)

“For all its undeniable flaws, the nuclear industry worked for several decades- in Japan and elsewhere. That is also the truly frightening realization after Fukushima: this disaster was not ‘waiting to happen’, but occurred in a system that had been functioning reasonable well for quite some time.”(p198)

“…The Way Forward is embedded in a technocratic rationality that seeks an effective ‘technical fix’ for reducing the risk of a nuclear disaster to manageable proportions. That misses the less tangible social expertise and improvisational skills inevitable involved in any successful disaster response.” (p206)

The shift in thought from prevention to response is well supported as a necessary move. This can obviously be seen by the occurrence of these accidents despite adequate regulation. Nuclear energy is a promising, but dangerous thing, and can quickly become disastrous despite efforts to maintain control. This was seen in the accident at Fukushima, following the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the region. Despite preparation for such an event and the existence of backup generators and batteries, responders were rendered useless in the efforts as they could not access the area. This is where the need for a prepared system of nuclear response is needed. Historically, such emergency response groups have been poorly resourced and short-lived, such as the Soviet Spetsatom developed after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. This group, which focused on preserving lessons learned and developing response systems, was absorbed by a larger ministry with the goal of integrated disaster response.

Additionally, the author cites a number of factors that played a role in creating the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster, such as “environmental, social, and technical systems” that, due to their complexity and separate protocol, resulted in lack or preparedness for the disaster. Following the disaster, the response efforts were delayed by this lack of preparation, and the media called out TEPCO and the Japanese government for this. STS analysis is important in this aftermath as much as in the creation of the initial plan. By utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the media (and the people) can be heard and used to reform existing policies, or create new ones. This establishes a continuously evolving system of response that can adapt and take into account many different view of disaster relief. 

I did an initial google search of “international emergency response team” and found an article from IAEA about the establishment of RANET. This network was made operational by Finland, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and the US in 2008. I found this interesting as, aside from the US, none of these countries were what I thought of in terms of nuclear energy production. Upon further research, I learned that Mexico has two reactors supporting 4% of their electricity and Finland has four reactors providing 30% of the total electricity. At the time of the article, Sri Lanka had no future in nuclear power, but in 2015 signed a deal with India to jointly create a new power plant. 

The main arguments brought up in this article are the shift in thought from nuclear disaster prevention to disaster response and the importance of the STS community in providing input for policy. From these arguments, another is proposed in the form of the need for an international nuclear disaster response team. 

The author likely read through the referenced articles to find where they could be appropriately cited, and then conducted first hand interviews with select people (as mentioned in the notes) to put the information into context. Together, the multiple forms of media allow for a well-rounded point of view in writing the article, with various angles being well-represented throughout. 

The author, Sonja D Schmid, is an assistant professor at Virginia Tech. She specializes in knowledge of the nuclear industries in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. She uses this knowledge to analyze energy policy and nonproliferation efforts. She is well versed in disaster response, having interviewed a number of members from the Soviet nuclear industry, using their first-hand accounts of the response efforts in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster to guide her. 

Aside from being discussed on the Disaster STS Network, this reading has been mentioned other places. For starters, it is a chapter of a larger book, “Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi: Social, Political and Environmental Issues.” This book is a collection of writings by international STS scholars. Additionally, this piece has been referenced in several other writings, including the book “The Fukushima Effect: A New Geopolitical Terrain” and the article “Nuclear disaster in Taiwan: a multidimensional security challenge.” 

Emergency response is discussed in the context of a world post- Fukushima and the lessons learned from the incident. The article brings to discussion the pros and cons of an international nuclear emergency response team, which currently is non-existent. The paradigm has long been to focus on accident avoidance and regulation to prevent such disasters. The author cites several existing agencies (internationally) and the Nuclear Regulatory Comission as possible sources of knowledge and resources for the development of an internationally united response team, specializing in nuclear disaster relief.

They also emphasize the need for an interdisciplinary effort in creating and maintaining such a team. Researchers, operators, and policy-makers alike have a stake in the success of relief efforts, and thus should all be involved in creating the team. And not only does the effort have to be multidiscplinary, but international, which brings about questions of funding, protocols, and jurisdiction. Also, who will join, and where will they receive the necessary training needed for specific response? These are all challenges that need to be addressed prior to the creation of the team.