Analyze

Piecemeal approach to self-regulation forecloses more sweeping structural change as well as an actual check on power thru independent control over corporations

No real audit and no punishment for violating something like the UN Global Compact.

Since the CSR initiatives align with some of the infrastructure/development and personal goals of the village elites, it forecloses resistance to the mine and in fact has spawned violent defense of the mine by local people. 

Mistrust of the NGOs, who come in and out, and who the corporations have carefully targeted with smear campaigns, forecloses certain kinds of alliances that could have put a check on corporate power, but perhaps not improved the lives of the villagers in the way they wanted.

They see their environmental training as enlightening the backward locals who eat turtle eggs or fish in the reefs - so here they are helping the charismatic environment and helping the unknowing locals to preserve natural beauty. They wanted to provide waste management - they believe it’s helpful to the locals and it also would help with their distaste for trash at the beaches. The other CSR initiatives are portrayed as being forcefully demanded by the village elites and given as concessions to improve security, so the narrative of “help” to the locals is less prominent.

Their scientists have neutralized the environmental damage their practices do - defining tailings as nontoxic 

Enviro-rituals - (Gusterson) - -Flamboyantly lick, eat, bathe in the tailings - for media, on road shows… Rituals demonstrate but also produce their belief in the harmlessness - cites Geertz 1973 and Althusser 1971. This is also a kind of diversion - because maybe the tailings are not toxic to a human’s licking them, but they destroy the marine life the way they are dumped into the ocean, and they may react with other things in such a way that the end result is extremely toxic to humans, not to mention that it is certainly extinguishing a staggering amount of marine life by nature of crushing, before anything else 

Charismatic species - they hand-release sea turtles near a resort, very publically, a very feel-good moment that “Feels like social action”, and produce narratives of unenlightened locals being the ones bad for the environment because they eat turtles and turtle eggs - criminalize subsistence - attribute to poverty and ignorance, so they spend corporate $ on environmental education, and tell the kids that what their families do is bad. (The subsistence activities are often social - so people do them even if they can afford to buy food differently)

In-house corporate anthropologist - debunking the idea of the “ecological noble savage” as something first world activists made up - of course there are different ways to be ecologically-minded… 

Things that compete with mining corporations for resources or charismatic cases that are easily blamed on the mine are the environmental issues they talk about and they work to address - missing is greenhouse gas, for example. 

Claim they focus on Western corporations to get Western funding - claim they’re not transparent whereas corps have annual reports to shareholders. Various defaming of the NGOs - saying they are in the hands of “international anti-development” NGOs, that they infiltrate and only create illusion of local resistance, say their clear goal is “to bring international mining companies to their knees” - [which is almost funny]

Clandestine strategies: instead of suing, put the NGO on a watch list of bad/ non transparent NGOs, use the NGO as a workshop case study of bad NGO, held by a different cooperative and influential NGO that allies with the corporation secretly; op-eds “placed” into newspapers calling for regulation of NGOs

Basically turning transparency and accountability against the NGOs

Control of information flow - circulating the inaccurate NGO bulletin to rile up anger at the NGO - 

They define themselves as “environmentally friendly,” “good”, “moral”, “responsible” mining corporation, and their moral narrative is defined against these other groups in different ways: they have healthy competition with the backward mines (also “dinosaur”, will go extinct, they do blatant pollution and human rights violation), patronizing superiority for the poor Indonesians, and they straight up vilify the activist NGOs

Mine managers are proud of the mine and the environmental/ social/development projects, which they raise as evidence 

A lot of local groups want to take credit for attacking the activists - attacking the activists and defending the mine becomes morally sensible to many of these actors

Interestingly the narrative here is that village elites have used tactics, including violence, blocking roads, etc., to force the mining corporation to act as the state and provide patronage, goods, development in the material/infrastructural sense. The corporations use the CSR to quell their protesting. 

State gets demoted to one player of “multi-stakeholder” process in these voluntary self-monitoring/ self-regulating situations. Corps are rhetorically also just one player, but come to these events in force and drive the rhetoric, and in fact it’s all up to them what they actually do

In remote areas, the state doesn’t provide infrastructure and services so the mining companies become de-facto state in the provision of these things.

Three features described for CSR - 1) voluntary self-regulation, 2) articulating the value to the profit of doing CSR, and 3) strong ties to development industry 

Differing beliefs about what is development - the Infrastructure -centered development is out of style - now it’s about self-help, participatory, bottom-up - the former is associated with slow state and new is associated with certain types of CSR - tho not the wins that the village elites got in this case 

US foreign policy logic - applied to corporations - get security by giving aid/CSR boons to people - Security guards perform human rights training intensely - laminated cards around necks. → new and different forms of violence

Taking the offensive with PR firms that are doing CSR consulting plus clandestine research and “strategies for destroying NGOs” - with naked instrumentalism in their reports, not using words like “vulnerable, marginalized, underrepresented” - get personal dirt on people in NGOs - use words like “vocal, emotional, aggressive, passive, proactive, and cooperative but unclean” - p158 - also offers contract of clost to $1M for a big secret smear/boost campaign. Advise against suing because of “david and golaith” image. 

“The Project Green Shield report recommended turning public opinion against LOH (NGO that accused Newmont) by using Indonesian movements for NGO transparency and an NGO Code of Ethics.” 

Giving loans to their critics - it may not silence them fully but it discredits and makes them seem complicit/ hypocritical

While I found the article illuminating (I did not read the book), I am frustrated by, what I found, to be the hegemonic visions of political theory and climate change. Is there no space for feminist epistemological stances when imagining future forms of governance? Even their presentation of Climate X--what seemed to me like a quest for a unifying theory of opposition that is neither realistic nor reflects the how resistence movements however stuttering they may be are also a source of possibility and hope.

I wonder about global corporations and how they might relate to the described US-UN-Western-Elite Climate Leviathan verus Behemoth on the Capitalist side. They already operate beyond nation-state territorial scope. Just from where I'm situated, I've heard a lot of people praising tech companies in the US for being the first to call for work-from-home. Facebook's Data for Good COVID mapping that Tim sent around also looks like a start of a global panopticon that already has the capacity to be monitoring a huge number of people's travel and symptoms, beyond state divisions, in fact explicitly in part because Facebook does not trust state data, and it does not need buy-in at a UN kind of event. People are already consenting in degrees to have Facebook "collect" and aggregate their data for the fun, validation, convenience, etc. of being on social media. As the Western Elite governments go to Behemoth, are the corporations of those elite places the ones to carry on the idea of Leviathan? 

This article also brought to mind a haunting story that I first heard from a fancy robotics professor of a "Noah's Ark" for Elon Musk. I haven't quite figured out how that fits yet with the chart of possibilites offered in the article.

I second Prerna's frustration about citation and writing like one is the first person to think of something. 

I admire Mann and Wainwright for taking on the impossible task of coming up with a political theory for climate justice. Their strength lies in how they inadvertently reveal the stubbornness of Leviathan, or liberal democracy. But I must question when abstractions turn into reifications. Like any political theory, it would of course rouse passions and frustrations, so here are mine.

(1)  The political theory of the state that Mann and Wainwright build on follows the tradition(s) of Hobbes, Hegel, Marx, and Walter Benjamin. If we are to limit ourselves in these traditions, there is a still a lot of space to talk about them that Mann and Wainwright keep open. I am intrigued by the phrases "a world without sovereignty is no world at all", and "democracy undoes the very possibility of rule", which reveal how stubborn our political imaginations are. In the construction of these phrases, a world without sovereignty and democracy is not recognizably a world. I think they are quite right here. I hope to explore in my own project the tensions they point out, that this moment reinforces in such a monstrous way: "Leviathan, whether in the Old Testament or in even oldermyths, was never a captive of its conjurer’s will, and remains at large today, prowling between nature and the supernatural, sovereign and subject." (1)

(2) The most obvious critique I have is their lack of imagination for where learning can come from. Their four climate scenarios assume a bipolar world of Asia and United States. Take for example, this quote: "In contrast to sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, for example, only in Asia—and only with some revolutionary leadership from China—do we find the combination of factors that make climate Mao realizable: massive and marginalized peasantries and proletariats, historical experience and ideology, existing state capacity, and skyrocketing carbon emissions." (10)

The phrase in contrast leaves Africa and Latin America as places without coordinational capacity. We have to remember that the Haitian Revolution  happened in the Caribbean in 1791, a successful proleteriat revolution against a colonial state which had degraded both ecology and humanity. Admittedly the challenges are different in scale and scope today, but we have to be careful about the biases we reveal when we abstract. 

(3) So, where can learning come from? As I write in my annotation on the T-STS COVID project: "The question of political organizing and mobilizing in times of crisis therefore needs to build on movements and organizing that have resulted out of long histories of exclusion. How does movement-building look like to those who have learned to organize in a state that was to them mostly oppressive and withdrawn? Corinna Mullin and Azadeh Shahshahani (2020) reflect on what a transnational perspective on movement-building and organizing looks like. Their excellent article points to early Black radical internationalism and organizations, indigenous internationalism, the international peasant and ecological movement of Via Campesina, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement, Black for Palestine and The Red Nation movements, for example. In short, we have much to learn from responses by ongoing anti-imperialist movements during COVID-19 which have called for cancellation of neocolonial debt, land repatriation, reconfiguration of gig and hustle economies, just to give a few examples." Where else can we find examples to build on?

(4) So, the world that I live in is not polar, nor is it confined to territorial nation-states. Does it still make sense to speak of the US as representative of liberal democracy? And does liberal democracy mean rule without terror? Mann and Wainwright contrast "Euro-American liberal hegemony" to the "necessity of a just terror" that climate Mao asserts (9). Further, they distinguish the mechanisms of "neoliberal contagion" from global climate change, as if the two operate on separate floating spheres (3). However, as Inderpal Grewal argues in Saving the Security State (2017) and Jasbir Puar argues in The Right to Maim (2017), the security state cannot be separated from the transnational parastatal humanitarian complex that has emerged to address global climate change, among other things. These parastatal organizations work within the contradictions of neoliberalism: benefiting from withdrawing of the state and the increased capacity of the state to surveil (as the COVID19 pandemic sadly shows too) and make citizens which see themselves as exceptional liberals if they participate in that complex. They maintain the US empire and benefit from it. Is there space to talk about present-day imperial projects in political theory about climate activism?

(5) I wished they would have cited and learned from other people who have been saying these things for a long time. Is my wish for them to "talk about everything"? No, my wish for them is to stop speaking as if they are the first ones to speak about this. A footnote would have sufficed. And that is my frustration. 

"Leviathan, whether in the Old Testament or in even oldermyths, was never a captive of its conjurer’s will, and remains at large today, prowling between nature and the supernatural, sovereign and subject." (1) [I like this quote because it displays what I think is fundamental about how we think about governance: mapping nature/supernatural onto sovereign and subject. Do different mapping exist?]

"Yet far more than the neoliberal contagion of financial crisis and market disorders, it is global climate change that has produced the conditions in which “the paradigm of security as the normal technique of government” is being solicited at a scale and scope hitherto unimaginable." (3) [In what ways do Mann and Wainwright view neoliberal contagion as different from global climate change?]

"Do we have a theory for revolution in the name of climate justice? Do we have a theory of how capitalist nation-states are transforming as a consequence of planetary change?" (3) [They argue that the answer to both is negative, necessitating a political theory]

"We posit that two variables will shape the coming political-economic order. The first is whether the prevailing economic formation will continue to be capitalist or not... The second is whether a coherent planetary sovereign will emerge or not. The question here is whether sovereignty will be reconstituted for the purposes of planetary management" [This is their argument: linking sovereignty to planetary management. The planetary sovereign would not inly act at the scale of Earth's atmosphere, but for the sake of life on it.]

"Our central thesis is that the future of the world will be defined by Leviathan, Behemoth, Mao, and X, and the conflicts between them... To say the least, the continuing hegemony of existing capitalist liberal democracy cannot be safely assumed." (5) 

"Climate Mao is marked by the emergence of a non-capitalist Leviathanic domestic authority along Maoist lines" [what does "domestic authority" mean here?]

 "In contrast to sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America, for example, only in Asia—and only with some revolutionary leadership from China—do we find the combination of factors that make climate Mao realizable: massive and marginalized peasantries and proletariats, historical experience and ideology, existing state capacity, and skyrocketing carbon emissions." [positioning Africa and Latin America as places of lack, from where learning cannot take place. They mention the Cochabamba revolution but I do not get why they think it cannot be a model?] (10)

"The contrast with religion provides an important way to conceptualize the challenge presented by climate Leviathan, since X could be seen as an irreligious movement in place of a religious structure. Climate X is worldly and structurally open: a movement of the community of the excluded that affirms climate justice and popular freedoms against capital and planetary sovereignty" (17)

"For Hegel, the monarch or the sovereign is "political consciousness in the flesh"... for Schmitt, it is constituted in the act of decision.. the political cannot pre-exist sovereignty. A world without sovereignty is no world at all" (18) 

"Hegel and Schmitt are right—democracy undoes the very possibility of rule. For them, of course, this is democracy’s great failure; for Marx, and for climate X, however, it is its great promise." (18)

"The politics Benjamin impugns here—faith in progress; confidence in mass basis; servile integration into apparatus—are precisely those of our three opponents in the struggle ahead: Leviathan’s ethos is the faith in progress; Mao’s is confidence in the masses; Behemoth is the integration into the security apparatus of terror" (19) [summary of what each of three scenarios stand for]