Analyze

Narrowed critique just to be of sincerity of CSR claims, not ideology of CSR. Consensus enforcing (above) silences any kind of dissent.

Enforcing consensus: Credibility and viability to compete for funding of your NGO is gone if you protest or dissent → performed consensus by silencing “stone throwing” NGOs or irrational opposition because you’re “actually trying to do something”, so the new unethical is the NGO who is just being stubborn or petty; 

Creating ads to educate consumers or communities on how to live responsibly [responsibilization]: flow of ethical expertise, from business/govt thru media to community/consumer 

Awards for CSR accomplishment is like moral capital; it also is ritualized like gift giving, reciprocal gratitude; circuit of exclusive events generates and legitimates this discourse, celebrity speakers, positive vibes

Confession of past sins plus highly visible partnerships with well-known NGOs, a very branded activity

To the extent that corporations genuinely believe that market access is going to end poverty... They seem to genuinely believe that the “third world” governments are corrupt and incompetent, in the way like in Orientalism colonialists seemed to genuinely believe that they were saving the nonwhite people from themselves. And they genuinely believe their resources are better and greater and their distribution networks etc. are better. 

NGOs have their back against the wall - they have to silently accept the language of the corporations and do it their way because they depend on the corporations for funding. So they may not see it as helpful but have to participate anyway

Redefined: New unethical is the NGO who doesn’t support CSR - they are bitter, unprogressive. Legitimate action - ethical - “partnership with business for the common cause”; Illegitimate action - unethical - “misguided, anti corporate campaigning” p17

Proof of the ethical is in rigorously calculated indices of corporate responsibility and awards presented by orgs that supposedly represent civil society

Money funneled thru well-known NGOs who have to do what they say

blame/displacement of scrutiny onto “Southern” i.e. previously colonized governments; pretty blatant language of colonialism (needing to save people from their own corrupt and incompetent governments) cast as “good governance” that corporations can do to lift people out of poverty with market access/inclusion

“Market comes to stand for social system as a whole” -p12

Business-led development becomes development orthodoxy

Reconfigured to appear as a double market competition - corporations competing for awards/ moral capital with their CSR actions, and NGOs as enterprises competing for corporate money to execute social good programs (but of course here the power is with corps to drive what is a social good program)

Public-private partnerships, defining development as market access, making it about scrutiny of “3rd world” government incompetence instead of corporate irresponsibility

The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.

Several leaders from various New York State agencies convened to outline plans for this policy. This included Governor Andrew M Cuomo, State Health Commissioner Dr. Howard Zucker, State Police Superintendent Joseph D'Amico, Port Authority Executive Director Pat Foye, and representatives from health care centers and agencies around the state.

The policy applies to New York state citizens, health care workers, EMS personnel, and leadership within health care centers. Additionally, the policy has parts that effect transportation agencies and their employees. In many ways, due to Ebola's nature and the nature of New York as a major metropolitan area, these policies will also have a global effect.

As described by Governor Cuomo, Dallas was the first major US city to see an Ebola case. This, in turn, allowed New York leadership to have some semblance of what methods did or did not work when trying to contain the disease. Moreover, the policy was implemented in response to the major Ebola outbreaks occurring at this time. This included those within Africa, Europe, and cases seen in Dallas. Moreover, the policy follows the city's "Safe-than-sorry" methodology discussed by Governor Cuomo; he, along with other state and city leaders, believed assuming an Ebola outbreak would occur within the state would give them the best chance of mitigating its effects and minimizing disease spread.