In terms of an overview, I thought that the event was a good review and summary of the international offenses of Formosa Plastics. As a researcher, I would like to know more about the different panelists' views on what can be done in each setting, as many have stated a lot of the historical offenses but left out their answers to the lead organizers' questions posed in the beginning of the event.
The concept of accountability was repeatedly brought up throughout this event. Lawyer Larochelle has stated, "There is no clear path for someone to hold accountability for what happened; there is a gap, accountability gap that exists all over. People need to organize, lawyers, academics."
Philippe Larochelle, a lawyer that works out of Montreal Canada but has been working on international criminal law cases and class action on environmental matters, which has led to his work now with Nancy Bui on Formosa.
Larochelle did his best to address a few of the questions posed by the lead organizers in the beginning of the event:
What are the main injustices happening with Formosa Plastics Corporation?
What do you think should be done?
Out of many of the panelists, I found Larochelle to be one of the few that really attempted to address these questions and answer to best of his expertise on the legal matters surrounding the Formosa case in Vietnam and Taiwan. Many Zoom attendees wanted him to expand on his statement of how Taiwan's stance as "not completely a country" making it challenging to operate in that environment when it comes to international law. Later on, he answered via Zoom chat that there is a disconnect between Taiwan and international law as there is no access to UN special procedures, but it is "very possible to sue Formosa there".
Diane Wilson: advocate in Calhoun County, Texas
Paul Jobin: a sociologist, academic at a university in Taiwan
Ta Du’c Tri: mayor of the city of westminster, Vietnamese-American
-The mayor spoke about the importance of this event to Vietnamese-Americans and the community in Westminster.
Nancy Bui: spoke on what she’s observed in the Formosa-Vietnam Case
-In April 2016, Formosa dumped chemicals, metals, into Vietnam waters and because of the delay in recognizing the problem, the Vietnamese government took over 3 months to recognize this issue. Two law companies; 800 something victims are to sue he Formosa in Taiwan and the U.S.
This event was held at the University of California, Irvine in-person on campus and over Zoom. "This seminar will focus on harms caused by the operations of Formosa Plastics Corporation in Taiwan, Vietnam and the United States, focusing on coastal communities. Panelists include people who have spent years working to address these harms in different ways." (DisasterSTS). The lead organizers include Tim Schutz and Kim Fortun.
The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.
Several leaders from various New York State agencies convened to outline plans for this policy. This included Governor Andrew M Cuomo, State Health Commissioner Dr. Howard Zucker, State Police Superintendent Joseph D'Amico, Port Authority Executive Director Pat Foye, and representatives from health care centers and agencies around the state.
The policy applies to New York state citizens, health care workers, EMS personnel, and leadership within health care centers. Additionally, the policy has parts that effect transportation agencies and their employees. In many ways, due to Ebola's nature and the nature of New York as a major metropolitan area, these policies will also have a global effect.
As described by Governor Cuomo, Dallas was the first major US city to see an Ebola case. This, in turn, allowed New York leadership to have some semblance of what methods did or did not work when trying to contain the disease. Moreover, the policy was implemented in response to the major Ebola outbreaks occurring at this time. This included those within Africa, Europe, and cases seen in Dallas. Moreover, the policy follows the city's "Safe-than-sorry" methodology discussed by Governor Cuomo; he, along with other state and city leaders, believed assuming an Ebola outbreak would occur within the state would give them the best chance of mitigating its effects and minimizing disease spread.
The Ebola outbreak is, by its very definition, a matter of public health. The outbreak presented a danger to the global health community and resulting policies dealing with this epidemic were public health policies. That being said, the policy in place mostly served as a protocol mostly for agencies of New York in the event the epidemic spread. It focused on standardizing the practices of health, transport, and government agencies in the event of an outbreak; it did not focus on individuals already effected with the disease, but more so on preventing the spread of the epidemic.