Analyze

It was reported, that one worker at the industrial park was suffering from eye irritation, following the release of hydrogen chloride. He had to be treated at the outpatient clinic of the industrial parks' Occupational Health Center, and could go home afterwards. There is no further information of long-term effects the worker might have suffered from to be found on the internet, according to my search. However, eye irritation induced by chemical exposure can lead to effects such as increased eye pressure and a following reduction of vision, as well as chronic pain.

I am wondering, how this worker got hurt, as this was not reported in the article. Usually, workers need to wear proper protective equipment in areas in which one risks exosure to airborne chemicals that can cause corrosion, including protective goggles. As can be read in a follow-up article (https://www.fnp.de/frankfurt/frankfurt-gas-trat-aus-weil-ein-rohrleitun…), a pipeline malfunction had been found as the reason for the release, possibly in an area where no protective equipment is required? I can only speculate on this, but the worker seems not have been informed about the incident.

Missing information seems to be a common theme in this case, in the aforementioned article it is also reported that the smartphone application that is supposed to warn residents about such incidents, released a warning only 50 minutes after the sirenes had been going off. Also it is written in the article, that after the incident the citizen telephone line was busy, such that some callers could not get the information they required, and that many residents are not familiar with the meaning of the different signals released by the warning sirene. In case this or similar incidents happen in the future, they therefore pose a grave health risk to the surrounding population.

In this setting, several stakeholders are to be identified:

- Citizens living in Hoechst and surrounding areas and workers at the industrial park: Necessitate information to ensure their safety.

- Infraserv and companies at industrial park: Bad press is bad for image of industrial park, whcih might lead to political or financial consequences; Centralization of information flow on website "ihr-nachbar.de" to create narrative?

- Fire department Frankfurt: Responsibilities as first responders to incidents include information release to public and combat incident.

- Public media/ press: Information of the population as well as economic pressure to release notions that are of interest to public (to gain clicks/sell magazines and newspapers); Need to report correctly to gain/keep trust of potential information consumers.

- Local politicians: Need to take political measures to protect citizens to gain/keep trust of potential voters; Possibly also require good relationship with Infraserv and companies, as many high-profile companies are located at industrail park bringing in tax money.

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.

1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.

2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU

3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.

“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”

“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””

Research for this article comprised of interviews and recorded statements of dozens of police and fire personnel present at the towers and other officials who were tasked with investigating the response.