Analyze

"An EJ approach could provide new and different tactics to prisoner advocates and their allies.  If we understand death row inmates to be a particularly vulnerable population, could the EPA itself become more involved in monitoring conditions, and if so, what are the benefits or risks of such an approach? " (219)

"Instead of environmentally invisible spaces, death row should be viewed as involuntary state homes and therefore particularly deserving of attention and regulation. " (220)

"the EPA’s unique powers can be characterized as (1) information gathering, and (2) enforcement actions.93  The EPA’s tools apply to carceral facilities as they would any other business or agency.  By statute, the EPA has the authority to enter and inspect facilities, to request information, and assist facilities in developing or remedying violations." (220) ...  "Individual EPA offices have at times attempted to examine the conditions of incarceration at several federal facilities, primarily through information gathering.  For example, under an agreement between the EPA and the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in 2007, over a dozen facilities were audited for environmental hazards.100  These consent arrangements can promote environmental improvement by limiting the potential sanctions for discovered violations." (221)

"Through an environmental justice lens, we may see patterns that were previously hidden.  Unlike traditional prisoner advocacy tools, environmental assessments include cumulative impacts over time and in context, rather than single isolated acts." (224) ... "A pattern-based approach may help to discern the underlying factors that result in diagnoses like Glenn’s. " (225)

"An EJ approach fundamentally centers the voices of the impacted and allows for contextual reasoning.  Although carceral facilities, and death row in particular, are externally perceived as sites of punishment, incarcerated people may have a different view.  Glenn Ford’s cell, where he was confined days at a time, was his involuntary home.  Viewing jails and prisons as homes illuminates the humanity of the people who live there.  Understanding these spaces as homes underlines the need for carceral facilities to be safe and for individuals to be protected from all types of harm, environmental and otherwise.124 " (225)

"Based on Glenn Ford’s experience, the conditions on death row in Louisiana can be grouped into the following environmental hazards:  indoor air pollution, water pollution, hazardous waste, and exposure to lead." (217)

"Glenn’s story of the conditions on death row is a story about environmental justice.  His accounting forces us to see prisons as involuntary homes, where residents are held captive to environmental harms.  Yet, the experience of Glenn and others sentenced to live on death row are largely excluded from environmental justice conversations.10" (207)

"The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) itself has acknowledged that carceral facilities present environmental challenges.11  In 2007, the EPA noted that “[p]otential environmental hazards at federal prisons are associated with various operations such as heating and cooling, wastewater treatment, hazardous waste and trash disposal, asbestos management, drinking water supply, pesticide use, and vehicle maintenance.”12  Yet, the EPA, which is the lead federal agency for environmental justice, completely excluded jails and prisons from its 2011 planning document for addressing environmental justice through 2014.13  Similarly, the EPA’s 2020 Action Agenda for environmental justice does not even mention carceral facilities, much less recognize prisons and jails as environmentally “overburdened communities.”14 " (207)

"Data on conditions within carceral facilities is generally not available,53 and even when it is available, the data is rarely complete." (214)

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.

1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.

2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU

3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.

“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”

“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””