Analyze

 In 1991, the Public Health Service articulated a vision for primary prevention in Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning, a departure from previous federal policy focused on finding and treating lead-poisoned children. This publication detailed a 15-year strategy for primary prevention and offered a cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate the monetized benefits of this approach. A strong national effort to follow this strategy developed but was eventually abandoned.

The organized campaign against universal screening began in California, where letters questioning the reported prevalence of elevated BLL began appearing in pediatric journals and newspapers. These letters acknowledged receiving editorial assistance from Kaiser Permanente Foundation Hospitals and argued that money spent on screening, treatment and abatement would be harmful to more worthy public health efforts. The AAP president took up this attack on universal screening as well, and efforts for universal screening were gradually eroded. 

Needleman identifies racism and the belief that lead poisoning “is a product of poor mothering, not of environmental pollution” as a driving factor shaping lead detection and prevention efforts (or the lack thereof) … “this weighting of personal choice or behavior over environment is a tool used to shift responsibility away from health authorities or polluters and onto the victim” (1875).

Characterization of loss from Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development (2018) within the Evaluation report on 10-year implementation of the national policy for ‘agriculture-farmer-rural’ development [ not available for public view] 

• “ Aquaculture households have lost 503.2 million VND (21,665 USD) per household, then fishing households 231.3 million VND (9958 USD) per household, and coastal service households 102.0 million VND (4392 USD) per household. Note that both fishing and fish farming households lost similar por- tions of their total income, around 98 percent, even as fish farmers earn twice that of fishers on average. In a country where the average yearly income of rural households is 130 million VND or 5600 USD (MARD, 2018), losing an average of 11,000 USD per household is significant.” (Truong et al., 2021, p 8). 

Characterization of the compensation schemes adopted by Vietnam’s government:

• “According to a report by the Ministry of Finance in 2018, the government was able to provide direct cash compensation to those identified as being impacted across the four provinces. This is because of the settlement with Taiwan Formosa Plastics for 500 million USD. In addition to cash, the Vietnamese government gave over 19,000 tonnes of rice to impacted households in the months following the fish kill. The government also monitored the safety of the ocean environment. As the government switched from emergency relief to recovery support, more programmes were introduced including loan access, scholarships for students, health insurance, and livelihood training pro- grammes. The government also worked with the Fisheries Department and other relevant agencies to build environmental monitoring systems, provide consistent water testing, engage in food safety monitoring, and work towards ecological rehabilitation of aquatic stocks” (Truong et al., 2021, p 10). 

“Environmental disasters have a tendency to further increase work precarity, particularly in places that are highly dependent on eco- logical resources (Marschke et al., 2020). Livelihoods, as such, may need to transform rather than persist in the face of crises (Alexander, 2013).” (Truong, 2021, pg 3)

“ Vietnam has struggled with ineffective environmental regulatory programmes or insufficient enforcement capabilities to ensure adequate protection of the environment as Vietnam develops (Fortier, 2010). Environmental impact assessments (EIA), in general, are viewed as bureaucracy rather than as an important aspect of the development approval process (Wells-Dang et al., 2016).” (Truong, 2021, pg 4)

The narrative of the text highlights the following key points extrapolated from survey responses and interview participants:

• Impacts of the Formosa disaster on households vary by livelihood strategies, and were particularly amplified for poorer households, women, and households without diversified livelihood strategies. 

• Coping mechanisms of households primarily involved reducing household expenditures, accessing loans, adopting a new livelihood strategy, and expanding existing livelihood strategies. However, adoption rates of these coping mechanisms vary across households with livelihoods across the service, fishing, and fish farming enterprises. 

• Compensation, though cited to have ignited protests from parties not qualified for restitution, did offer substantial help to those who were able to receive compensation. Additionally, compensation delivery was delayed (between one to two years after the incident was reported), further escalating impacts across families without savings. 

• Economic recovery of household income 30 months after the Formosa incident indicates that the majority of households have recovered their livelihood activities. However, this does not take into account families who are no longer in the region (out migrated following the disaster prior to the inception of this study).

Authors of the publication have affiliations to the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry and the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada. The funding for this study comes from the Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development.

In the article, the authors used data from the 2011-2015 American Community 5-Year Estimates by the U.S. Census, 2010 U.S Census, and George C. Galster, “The Mechanism(s) of Neighborhood Effects: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications.”. They looked at data follwing children under 18,  and followed poverty trends such as census tracts for concentrated areas of high poverty. They used the number of children in Essex County Cities and compared it to the the amount of children in poverty in those cities, for the years of 2000 and 2015. Henceforth, they created an arguement stating that Child Poverty rates have risen within those 15 years, and even by 50% in some areas. The only issue I have with some of this data is that in some cities, we see a decrease in child population - and while there is an increase in child poverty in those areas, I feel like the reduced number of children in that area plays a big part in the so called "Increased Child Poverty Rates".

The main argument in this artical is children poverty in newark has  increased by 19 percent  in the last 15 years. In newark over 40% of chlidren live in poverty. 

Vulnerability and resilience in this artifact are defined by the high concentration of child poverty in Essex County. They are measured using the Census from 2000 and 2015 which show how there is a trend in the percentage of children who expereince poverty within the county. Majority of the children living in poverty are currently living in heavilyu concentrated poverty neighborhoods like Newark, Irvington, and the Oranges. Although the affluent town of Milburn is nearby, it is unclear how these children continue to live below the poverty line in Newark even though the towns are only 6 miles apart. 

As a sesearch from the Rotgers University, the students or researchers support:

- The child poverty in becoming more concentrated. With the numbers next to us, we can say that a 52.5% of the poorest childs live in census were the concentration is above a 40%

- Inner-ring suburbs of Orange, East Orange, and Irvington have seen the largest increases in child poverty.

- Essex County’s smallest municipalities have very low child poverty, although many have seen their child poverty rates increase by more than 50 percent since 2000