The main argument of this article is that the emergency response to 9/11 could have been more efficient and effective. The article cites a lack of communication between fire chiefs and firefighters in the towers, minimal cooperation between police and fire, as well as the determination of responding units to save as many people as possible even against orders to evacuate.
Research for this article comprised of interviews and recorded statements of dozens of police and fire personnel present at the towers and other officials who were tasked with investigating the response.
“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”
“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””
The article mentioned a database the Times was using to track the location of firefighters throughout the incident, I looked at that system. It is not publicly available but was interesting in that it entirely depended on the news footage, personal videos and eyewitness accounts.
The article mentioned helicopters were being considered for rooftop evacuation, which surprised me due to the smoke. I looked into the visibility in the airspace directly surrounding the World Trade Center, while the smoke was so severe as to be captured by the International Space Station the wind did clear the smoke sufficiently for a clear line of sight between the helicopters and portions of the towers.
The firefighters were climbing the stairs, and reportedly would take hours to reach the top. The article also mentioned several groups of resting firefighters, so I researched the weight each firefighter would have been carrying which added up to 45 pounds of gear and at least an additional 20-30 pounds of tools.
The article discusses the response to 9/11, focusing on the many issues that prevented hundreds of firefighters from evacuating when the towers fell. Although the article states that cooperation and even the firefighters desire to help more people can be blamed for the tragedy, the article presents communication as the primary reason so many firefighters failed to evacuate. The radio issues that prevented the evacuation order from being heard were well known, and the repeater that was installed to solve those issues did not function properly. While technical issues cannot always be anticipated and remain a potential problem, the lack of communication between police and fire prevented the police from passing information to firefighters who did not hear the evacuation order. The incident command system has been created and modified several times to create a system of cooperation between responding units, which will hopefully prevent such communication issues in the future.
The article refers to dozens of police and fire officers, including Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer the first chief at the towers, Assistant Chiefs Callan and Burns who faced radio communication issues, and Lt. Dan Williams form Ladder Company 16 where off duty firefighters disobeyed his direct orders to go home. Many other officers are quoted in the article. Two of the significant actors included are Thomas Von Essen, the fire commissioner and Police Commissioner Kelly, who acted as the public faces of the departments during the subsequent interviews and investigation.