Analyze

In 2019, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed a law identifying particle pollution (also called particulate matter, PM) as a “social disaster” (Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety 2019). It was a response to nationwide attention to particle pollution from 2017, when apocalypse-like particle pollution occurred. It is not uncommon to characterize pollution as a disaster. Pollution is often described in damage-based narratives like disasters because environmental pollution becomes visible when a certain kind of damage occurs (Nixon 2011). PM is a mixture of extremely small particles and liquid droplets (EPA 2023). An established method for assessing the health risks associated with PM is the utilization of government or World Health Organization (WHO) air quality indices. These indices reflect the potential harm to human health based on PM concentrations. However, due to the limitations of the available monitoring data and the assumption of a certain normality according to the air quality index, its utility is diminished for bodies that fall outside this assumed range of normality. The existing practices and knowledge in pollution control had individualized pollution by presuming certain states of normalcy and excluding others. To challenge this, the anti-PM advocates in South Korea have defined, datafied, perceived, and adjusted the toxicity of particulate matter in various ways. They refer to the air quality index given by the WHO or the government, but they also set their own standards to match their needs and ways of life. They actively measure the air quality of their nearest environment and share, compare, and archive their own data online. The fact that the severity of air pollution is differently tolerated by individuals challenges the concept of the toxicity index that presupposes a certain normalcy. Describing pollution as a disaster contributes to environmental injustice by obscuring the underlying context and complexities of pollution. With the values of care, solidarity, and connectivity, capturing different perspectives of living with pollution and listening to stories from different bodies can generate alternative knowledge challenging environmental injustice. Drawing upon the stories of different bodies and lives with pollution, we can imagine other ways of thinking about the environment and pollution that do not externalize risks nor individualize responsibility. 

Kim, Seohyung. 2023. "Beyond the Index: Stories of Otherized Bodies Crafting Resistant Narratives against Environmental Injustice in South Korea." In 4S Paraconference X EiJ: Building a Global Record, curated by Misria Shaik Ali, Kim Fortun, Phillip Baum and Prerna Srigyan. Annual Meeting of the Society of Social Studies of Science. Honolulu, Hawai'i, Nov 8-11.

The text doesn’t really go there because it seems to be taking CSR at face value - so it’s saying the corporation isn’t really doing CSR. Author isn’t arguing that CSR forecloses anything but that the corporation’s actions foreclose any “real” social responsibility.

They rename the things that people accuse them of, even as they acknowledge the accusation. They keep using the term “biosolids” instead of “hazardous waste” or “toxins”. They produced reports that denied each allegation. From their Our Environmental Values 2003 report: “In our opinion, the balance of evidence including testing and analysis by independent laboratories and the Indian government shows that the allegations against Coca Cola have not been substantiated.” They also tried to show progress against the accusations with their CSR initiatives - including reduction of water use ratio, rainwater harvesting, HIV AIDS projects - cooperating with USAID and UN. They also build up an image of corporate philanthropy with sponsoring sports, especially the Olympics and FIFA, and just branding by having their vending machines on college campuses. 

They tried to suppress a report that shows how toxic their waste is, and that it is useless as fertilizer (I did like the “extraordinary practice of distributing toxic wastes to the farmers as fertilizers” quote on 108). 

There’s no exploration of what corporate actors are thinking. Or really the villagers either. The corporation here is portrayed as willfully and knowingly destroying the lives and livelihoods of the marginalized people of India. The CSR reports are mostly empty and incorrect responses to the accusations coca cola faced, so they don’t really claim any help.

The corporation really denies its responsibility here… simply refusing to put on their labels the chemical makeup of their product. They do perform an extent of responsibility about the water usage, though they twist the words of the report commissioned by High Court of Kerala to make it seem like it’s really just the low rainfall that’s making a water shortage, and that the court endorses their continued use of the groundwater. The author says “independent study” in quotes - but doesn’t get into to what extent and the study was compromised. 

The article points out the differences in how Coca Cola behaves in the US and UK versus in India - the US products don’t contain pesticides and do comply to laws about levels of toxic materials in beverages. In the UK, complaints about the product led to recalls. In India they deny that the consumer has the right to know what poison chemicals are in the beverage even though Indian law does grant this right to consumers, even after the court has found there to be harmful and illegal levels of toxins in the beverages.

The corporation just doesn’t listen to the court demands that the state courts rule in India. The High Court of Rajasthan ruled that coca cola had to test the beverages and disclose on the labels the full composition, including chemicals that were found in the drink. Coca Cola just refused - they said it was not required by law, and didn’t even brand their action as CSR. Elsewhere they claimed that their levels complied with the law or were better. (Even though it was just not true in this case). “Not bound by law to make such a disclosure, and that if the water it uses does contain pesticides, the company could hardly be held responsible for it… ...Divulging information with regard to the presence or absence of DDT from its beverages was not relevant to the debate. It even went so far as to question the material relevance of such information imparted to the consumers, denying that the consumers had any right to an informed choice before selecting, buying, and consuming the products…. Refused to comply…” p114. They just complained this was part of trade war

Author says CSR rises alongside end of “golden age of capitalism” - and along with “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003). knowledge/discourse of CSR: corporation qualifies itself as a citizen to “live down the crises of legitimation/ confidence” p106.

Page 157: ".. it is much easier to develop an anticapitalist critique of climate change than it is to develop a theoretical and practical vision of postcapitalist social relations that might be adequate to the warmer planet on which we will have no choice but to live."

Page 158: "Similarly, our contradictory yes-but-no stance regarding global climate politics—structured entirely on the basis of sovereign territorial nation-states, which are taken as the natural and only viable building block for the struggle— has prevented us from taking on the nation-state, both analytically and practically. Of course, movements for climate justice all over the world have bravely confronted particular nation-states’ elites and institutions of governance. But the question of the legitimacy and naturalness of the modern nation-state as the base unit of global political life is rarely raised, at least way to sustain a livable planet. Beyond some “realist” argument based in path dependency, however, there is no reason to think so, and many more reasons to suggest that the state is likely one of our biggest obstacles…. “But the question of the legitimacy and naturalness of the modern nation-state as the base unit of global political life is rarely raised, at least partly because we too are convinced that (at least at present) interstate “global cooperation” is the only way to sustain a livable planet.”

Page 162-3: "In other words, as Horkheimer says, we cannot leave open the question of what we believe in with the mute hope that it will get worked out as the movement progresses. Neither, as Adorno cautions, can we paint a picture of a positive utopia, the unworldliness of which is no more helpful than when Marx and Engels admonished against it in the original manifesto more than a century and a half ago. Adorno suggests that what is required is not an account of a perfect world we can hold in our minds like a dream that can be realized merely because we can dream it, but instead an account of the possible (futures we can come to identify as potential outcomes of our present) in which things can (not will) “come right in the end.” Adorno seems to think this will entail the emergence of a radically new form of political authority, for which we might attempt to “formulate some guiding political principles.” We propose at least three such principles as fundamental to any presently emergent or future Climate X. The first is equality….  This leads to the second guiding political principle: the inclusion and dignity of all. This is a critique of capitalist sovereignty and the thin form of democracy upon which it has come to rely. Democracy is not majority rule and has little to do with the vote. Rather, democracy exists in a society to the extent that anyone and everyone could rule, could shape collective answers to collective questions. No nation-state today meets this criterion. This demands a struggle for inclusion The third principle is solidarity in composing a world of many worlds. Against planetary sovereignty, we need a planetary vision without sovereignty.”

Climate Leviathan is largely a critical discussion of various ways of envisioning and organizing the Macro level including sovereignty, the nation-state, capitalisms, geopolitics, the world system, geo-engineering, etc. However, by rooting the discussion in “the political,” besides the obvious recognition of carbon emissions (and a few others) as toxic, the primary toxin discussed in this text is all the way down at the Nano level of ideology. The main problem isn’t fossil fuels, our dependency on them, or the corruption of the politicians in their pockets, it is in our incapacity to recognize how the tools we resort to (capitalism and the nation-state) are fully incapable of addressing the problem at hand. Indeed, they argue that addressing climate change without a critical theory of both capitalism and the state “would be like trying to model hurricanes without a theory of thermodynamics or an understanding of the effects of changing ocean temperatures on cyclone dynamics” (2018, 66).

Their “cure” to ideology is a Gramscian strain of absolute historicism. Take for example their discussion of progress. They quote Gramsci:

“‘…progress has been a democratic ideology.’ … [However] Progress has lost its democratic aspect because ‘the official ‘standard bearers’ of progress’ (the bourgeoisie) have ‘brought into being in the present destructive forces like crises and unemployment, etc., every bit as dangerous and terrifying as those of the past,’ and it is clear that these forces are as much a result of ‘progress’ as technology and scientific knowledge.” (2018, 94).

In this discussion, progress transforms from ideological tonic to ideological toxin based upon its associated deployments within a new historical context. Under the rule of monarchy, the ideology of progress enabled the establishment of liberal democracies. But under liberal capitalism, this ideology underwrote the “production of a separation in the social world between the political and the rest and a consequent neutralizing onslaught on the political that attempts to proceduralize and depoliticize domination, that is, the continual production of freedom for some and unfreedom for others” (2018, 83). These facts notwithstanding, the authors do not recommend an outright denial of progress: “A blanket rejection of progress confuses the idea and its standard bearers, who are now in fact part of the ‘natural order’ in crisis” (2018, 95). The same goes for the current stand-in for the ideology of progress, adaptation: “adaptation is becoming the “progress” of our time. Adaptation is to the ideology of Climate Leviathan what progress was to bourgeois liberalism in the nineteenth century” (2018, 95). Which, once again, does not mean we are to get rid of the concept of adaptation “as if a revolutionary social movement for climate justice can somehow decide against adaptation. The question, rather, is how—how to reshape a conception of the political in a very hot world.” (2018, 95).

What this discussion suggests is that it is that toxicity, as it pertains to ideology and social structure, is not a simple binary relation. To argue this would amount to “blanket rejection” of the ideology of progress as toxic to democracy. Rather, the authors’ example demonstrates how toxicity entails a triadic relation to a relation. It is how the ideology of progress relates to the historically evolving relationship between the dominant and the dominated that determines whether or not the ideology of progress is toxic to democracy or not.

The political and economic fallout that has emerged with the COVID-19 pandemic fits the criteria of events that Mann and Wainwright specify as likely to engender the planetary Leviathan: “Processes are more likely to drive the creation of Leviathan if [a] they present an existential threat; [b] they are large scale (global); and [c] they pose challenges for the existing political order” (2018., 142). However, the history enfolding before our eyes doesn’t look like the birth of a new global sovereignty. Given that nothing close to either a Leviathan or Climate X alternative to the nation-state presented itself, citizens are left with no choice than but to rely on adapting extant public institutions, infrastructures, and state directives. At the national level, the US government responded by blaming the symbol of global public health, the World Health Organization, among its other political rivals, China and Iran. This is in keeping with the “Western” world’s tactic of pointing the carbon-emission finger elsewhere as well:

“Unfortunately, in discussions of climate politics, China is usually considered only a problem, an amoral polluter. How often are we in North America or western Europe told our efforts to slow climate change are meaningless because whatever ‘good’ we do, ‘China’ will ultimately render it futile? Sometimes this is a product of ignorance, sometimes of racist Eurocentrism, sometimes both” (Wainwright and Mann 2018, 116).

Both the Chinese and Iranian governments have returned condemnations along with supporting conspiracies. Thus, rather than leviathan, we seem to be witnessing a Behemoth scenario in which “one or more of these competing powers will continue to compete with the United States” (Wainwright and Mann 2018, 143). And perhaps we should take heed the warning that “History would seem to suggest this will lead to war, and it may well” (2018, 143). Currently these Behemoth-like counter hegemonies are merely struggling to win a rhetorical war of self-righteousness and self-preservation. What is uncertain is whether or not these responses to COVID-19 are indicative of a schismogenetic pattern developing in the contemporary geopolitical order. As Wainwright and Mann comment:

“The implication is that the management of the planet would unfold in the context of a world system that is neither democratic (since the vast majority of nation-states and peoples would have no real involvement in the important decisions about the Earth’s management) nor clearly dominated by one hegemonic power. Planetary governance would unroll on a lumpy, conflictual geopolitical terrain upon which elites continue to seek “adaptations” that meet their needs—political stability, continued accumulation, and so on” (2018, 143).