Analyze

META: Water seems to be one important medium through which NOLA envisions the “impacts” of the Anthropocene—scarcity, abundance, temporalities and spatial distributions, management of, and hazards that emerge in its context. Less is said about the causal or attributional aspects of the Anthropocene. How might water function as an entry point into the assemblages of local anthropocenics?

I found the NOLA Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2018, which frames the impacts of the Anthropocene as an intersection of weather extremes amid climate change and evolving vulnerabilities of its people. Four of seven items in the executive summary note water as central to local interventions: flood awareness, flood repair, flood mitigation, flood infrastructure. Too much water or water in the wrong places and the aftereffect of water on infrastructure and lives. One expression, then, is preparedness.

MACRO: Mitigation is an interesting analytic for the Anthropocene. In the US mitigation plans are shaped by the 1988 Stafford Act (which amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act). Constraints on communities come through rules, regulations, policies, (dis)incentives, and surveillance by state and federal authorities. Much of this is bound by economic and administrative discourses.

Goals are set in this document—broken out by timelines, activities, priorities, and capabilities. Another expression is classification of anthropocenics by subfields and accounting metrics. How do we measure progress and what is deferred to the future, 5-10 years out from today, a goal that has no tangible accountability but is named and acknowledged. What are the practices of naming, responsibility, and making (in)visible in the Anthropocene?

BIO: One new initiative, Ready for Rain, in particular is of interest to me as it highlights the more neoliberal vision for how the public should self-regulate risk and mitigate harm. I hear this as an extension of a government agency program to make the nation Weather Ready. Other bullets highlight “green” buildings, energies, and infrastructures. These could be examples of how the city envisions the Anthropocene feedback loop of humans changing/planning for climate alterations, which is a fairly typical lens.

Some questions: What does the water do? What does the water know? If we trace water in all its instantiations (e.g. historical water, flow of water, chemistry of water, application of water, temperature of water), what do we learn about the future imaginaries of what NOLA will / could / ought to become?

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

Emily Goldmann, PhD, MPH: assistant research professor of Global Public Health at NYU College of Global Public Health. Previous research includes work within several public health consulting firms and employment in the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in the Bureau of Adult Mental Health; this work included surveillance of psychological distress, metal illness, hospitalization, and rapid assessment of mental health conditions following hurricane Sandy. 

Sandro Galea MD, MPH, DrPH: a Canadian/American board-certified emergency medicine physician and epidemiologist, Dr. Galea is the current dean of the BU School of Public Health and former chair of Epidemiology at Mailman School of Public Health (Columbia University). His research primarily centers on social production of health within urban populations, including mental health disorders such as mood-anxiety and substance abuse; extensive publications exploring health inequalities, epidemiology, and health within vulnerable populations. Dr. Galea has served on numerous boards and committees analyzing the consequences of mass traumas, including 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and numerous international conflicts. 

1) Attawapiskat: This First Nation region is described in the article as one of the most isolate and remote. Further research indicates not only is it geographically isolated, but it lacks significant resources, resulting in a high cost of living and a scarcity in certain goods. Moreover, the region is serviced by a nursing clinic (no physicians) and a team of 8 paramedics-- truly an under-served medical region.

2) Aboriginal Healing Foundation: Our Catholic high school curriculum involved an ethics class, which debated the mistreatment aboriginals in the name of evangelicalism. I chose to research the foundation and determine what made this special-- why were they able to be cited as making such progress, despite losing funding in a few years.

3) Sheridan: A young girl who came to symbolize the suicide epidemic in Attawapiskat, she was 1 of over 100 who attempted to commit suicide within the span of 7 months. The Vice article describing her life and circumstances shows hints of an adolescent wise beyond her years, quoted as saying "if there's no resources, there's not going to be any change" in her suicide recording. 

The article focuses more on the fallacies of our current approaches to medicine. Dr. Kramer contends that the public would benefit from physicians melding their current factual approaches with anecdotal methods as well. Particularly, the field of psychiatry, which dabbles in processes of the brain not yet understood. While Dr. Kramer acknowledges it is necessary to have a well-defined approach, using "stories" allows for a more enriched judgement and remind practitioners of the vast differences in human experience. 

As the data is from 1998, I would sincerely hope that the data has already encouraged responses. Nonetheless, at the very least, the data should be able to serve as a marker for progression in traumatic event services. While sexual assault is markedly different from other traumatic events, the data could also be extrapolated to other events with community ties. More pointedly, data from this study demonstrated where some of the gaps came between victims with the "best" service outcomes and those with the "worst". The primary difference between the "best" group and those in latter tears was in the legal system. These shortcomings appeared to emerge early on, with a discrepancy in whether their reports even made it to the desk of the prosecution from the police department. This indicates a shortcoming in the system, and a point which should be investigated to better victim outcomes moving forward. Sexual assault cases are rarely black and white, thus some detectives may be inclined to create personal judgments about the merit of a case before passing it along, thus leading to its exclusion. This is one of several differences in victim encounters leading to less desired outcomes.

This report provides a detailed analysis of international response to nuclear emergencies. In addition to reviewing historic nuclear emergencies and their responses, it examines current nuclear policies. Initial reactions to previous nuclear emergencies (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, ect.) focused on preventing future incidents. Yet,  Dr. Schmid argues increased safety measures and rigorous regulation cannot possibly safeguard against all emergency scenarios. She emphasizes the need to create an international organization to serve as an emergent response team, and explores several candidates such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and World Association of Nuclear Operators. However, Dr. Schmid concludes none of these suggested organizations currently have the fiscal capability or internation authority to act in this role.

As I mentioned in earlier answers, at the peak of the crack-cocaine epidemic, BSVAC was founded (1988). It took outside EMS agencies an average of 30 minutes to reach patients with Bed-Stuy, a time that is far too costly for major trauma patients. This causes the current Commander (formerly referred to as Captain) "Rocky" Robinson to begin a volunteer EMS agency within the city itself. Placing the agency in the city decreased response time significantly, with BSVAC now averaging a response time of less than 4 minutes. 

Paul Farmer: American anthropologist and physician best known for his work combating tuberculosis in developing countries. Co-founder of Partners in Health, an organization dedicated to establishing and developing health care systems in under-served areas.

Bruce Nizeye: Engineer who works with Partners in Health directing the building program. Rwandese by birth and survivor of the Rwanda Genocide.

Sara Stulac: Associate physicain in Global Health Equity at Brigham and Women's hospital. Clinical Director for PIH in Rwanda

Salmaan Keehavjee: Associate professor of global health and science medicine at Harvard Medical School. Specializes in tuberculosis research and proliferation.