As I am part of the group working on the Librizol Fire in Rouen, France, I find it very interesting to see and compare how social and cultural structures shape people's actions and options. e.g.: (Non-)knowledge and power hierachies, as well as infrastructures like universities, and environmental organizations; official/governmental actions (top-down) and citizen-le actions (bottom-up), and blurred lines and spaces inbetween.
1) Culling animals to control disease outbreak. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D2704.PDF)
2) Main bio-threats to US national security. Department of Homeland Security (DHS): (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_biological_fact_sheet.pdf)
3) Main bio-threats to developing countries. The National Academies Press: (https://www.nap.edu/read/12596/chapter/5#48)
The NYS Ebola Preparedness Plan was criticized by the public and other agencies, primarily for its strict quarantine protocols, which have been called "overzealous" by some. In addition, the policy was criticized for its inconsistency with Federal and international guidelines which may have created confusion for the public.
“From the first moments to the last, however, their efforts were plagued by failures of communication, command and control.” This main point is supported in several ways. The police helicopters said that the collapse of the towers was “imminent” a full 20 minutes before the south tower fell and an hour and 29 minutes before the north tower. Most firefighters in the north tower did not even know that the south tower had fallen. Most fighter fighters did not recall ever hearing the dispatch to evacuate the north tower despite multiple broadcasts. The chain of command and orderly response also failed. First responders ignored and disobeyed orders to wait to respond until called upon. Some self-dispatched taking taxis, driving themselves, and hoping on other departments’ rigs. “Discipline Broke Down In Eagerness to Help”. The police commissioner, Bernard B. Kerik, did not even know that there were any serious communication issues between the agencies. Assistant Chief Joseph Callan ordered an evacuation of the north tower at 9:32 am, almost a full hour before it fell, but few ever received this command. These failures resulted in the needless loss of life and a response that could have been far better.
Dr. Emily Goldmann, PhD, MPH, is an Assistant Research Professor of Global Public Health at New York University's College of Global Public Health. She received her Master's and Doctorate's degrees in epidemiology from the University of Michigan. She has worked as an epidemiologist at the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in the Bureau of Adult Mental Health, where she conducted surveillance of psychological distress, serious mental illness, and psychiatric hospitalization among New Yorkers and assisted in designing and implementing a study of patients for psychiatric illness following Hurricane Sandy.
Dr. Sandro Galea, MD, MPH, DrPH, is a physician and epidemiologist. He is also the Robert A. Knox Professor and Dean at the Boston University School of Public Health. He has also previously held academic and leadership positions at the University of Michigan and at the New York Academy of Medicine. He has been involved in numerous research efforts and publications. His research focuses on the social production of health in urban populations, with a focus on brain disorders, mood-anxiety disorders, and substance abuse. He also maintains a strong interest in the consequences of mass trauma and conflict worldwide, including as a result of the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.