Analyze

I've found myself returning to thinking about/around/within interstitial spaces of care, particularly within hospital settings, interested in how viral activity unsettles the ideas we have around space and boundaries, both biological and infrastructural. In COVID-19 pathology and response, the inbetween, the interstitial, become sites challenge and possibility. With COVID-19, we see an acknowledgment of once forgotten spaces quite obviously, with hospital atria and hallways being reconfigured into patient care spaces, makeshift morgues established in refrigerated trucks, and hospitals spilling out into neighboring streets and parks. More than ever, we see how hospitals are simultaneously bounded and unbounded--the most stable and unstable sites for care. Along this line of thought, what might thinking through hospitals as heterotopia of crisis and deviation afford?

Foucault outlines six principles for heterotopic spaces

The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible

Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time—which is to say that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies. The heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time. This situation shows us that the cemetery is indeed a highly heterotopic place since, for the individual, the cemetery begins with this strange heterochrony, the loss of life, and with this quasi-eternity in which her permanent lot is dissolution and disappearance.

Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place. Either the entry is compulsory, as in the case of entering a barracks or a prison, or else the individual has to submit to rites and purifications.

I'm currently based in Troy, NY where I recently completed a PhD in Science and Technology Studies.  I'll soon be living in NYC to attend medical school. I can be reached at amorgan14[at]gmail[dot]com

I've long been interested in the disaster of routine medical care in the U.S. healthcare system. As far as COVID-19 is concerned, I'm particularly interested in how the long-term health impacts of intensive care are conceptualized and communicated (including Post Intensive Care Syndrome (PICS)) and the tensions between acute and chronic illness, broadly. 

How is the aftermath of COVID-19 crisis being imagined in different settings? How is this shaping beliefs, practices, and policies?

I agree that Newark had terrible water but a big issue is the funding to fix the problem... and the artical goes into all the research about the water but neglects to talk about federal and local funding. 

1: Crowding is shown to be common in displaced populations, and local overpopulation/crowding often facillitates the transmittion of disease

2: Natural disasters that do not cause a displacement of a population are rarely associated with disease outbreaks

3: There is little or no evidence that dead bodies, as some believe, pose a epidemic risk for a population of survivors after a disaster has struck

"The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires communities located within 10 miles of nuclear power plants to develop emergency plans. In New York, the four counties within 10 miles of Indian Point—Westchester, Rockland, Putnam and Orange—have taken such measures. But the Disaster Accountability Project, a nonprofit organization that monitors disaster response programs and the author of the report, cited the commission’s response to the 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, in which it recommended that U.S. citizens within 50 miles evacuate."

"NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan said the Fukushima site isn’t comparable to any in the U.S. 'Quite frankly, we don’t have any nuclear plant complexes where you have so many reactors packed so closely together.'"

"Those communities are exempt from the NRC’s emergency planning zones, so most haven’t developed such plans or conducted studies. According to several of them, they couldn’t without help from the federal government."

I did further research into what the Disaster Accountability Project is and what they are trying to accomplish. I also looked into the NRC and how they are focused on safety of nuclear power in the US, and what some of their differences are with the DAP. Finally, I looked up the Indian Point Energy Center, in order to find out the size and scope of the plant and some of the concerns people have about nuclear power in their area

The main findings of the article are that the relationship between natural disasters and communicable diseases is not as much due to dead bodies or high trauma as it is to population displacement and a lack of preparredness of the local governing body for the disaster and the crowding of survivors that follows a disaster as this

This article has been referenced in a wide variety of emergency medicine journal articles, ranging from flood protocols, use of cell phones in disaster enviroments, earthquakes and medical complications, to the costs of disaster consequences. Many of the articles referencing this paper appear to go into greater depth for some of the epidemics and diseases that were touched on in the research article. These include hepatitis E, Leptospirosis, cholera, and tetanus.

This article shows how some communities that, in the opinion of the Disaster Accountability Project organization, are within an effective radius of a nuclear incident at Indian Point and have little or no emergency plan for this kind of event. This is primarily due to these communities not having the knowledge that they could be effected by an event of this nature if they are over 10 miles away from the plant. Also, many of the communities that said they had not undergone any studies in relation to the plant's effects on their own community or developed any emergency plans because they cannot without federal aid. These counties and towns are not well-enough informed and are lacking the funding from the government in order to provide for their own safety if a nuclear accident were to occur

Emergency response is addressed in a broad sense of the major risk factors associated with a natural disaster and epidemics. The main points they make are that preparedness, with a focus on availability of safe water and primary healthcare services, along with surveillance for the beginnings of an epidemic, are necessessay for a strong response to a disaster situation