Analyze

By Scott G. Knowles: As part of the STL Anthropocene Field Campus the research team visited the Wood Refinery Refinery History Museum on March 9, 2019. This museum is located on the grounds of the Wood River Refinery, a Shell Oil refinery built in 1917 and today owned by Phillips 66. The site is Roxana, Illinois, just upriver from Granite City, and just over two miles from the convergence of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Sitting on the actual grounds of the refinery, the museum is an invitation to think across the micro, meso, and macro scales of the Quotidian Anthropocene, in terms of geography and also in terms of time. This refinery was built at the crux of the WWI, at a time when United States petrochemical production was entering an intensive phase of production, invention, corporate structuring, and global engagement. The museum is an invitation to think across temporal scales, backwards to the start of the refinery--through the individual lives of the workers and engineers whose lives defined the refinery--and forward to indeterminate points of future memory. This photo captures a key moment in an informal interview we did with one of the history guides. He had worked in the museum for decades before retiring. He explained to us that the museum sits in the former research facility of the refinery--and the glass plat he is showing reveals a beautiful artifact, a photograph made of the complex when it was built. Our guide only showed us this collection of slides after our conversation had advanced, perhaps after he was sure we were truly interested in his story, and the deeper history of the refinery. The pride in the place, the community of workers, and the teaching ability of the museum was manifest. The research team felt impressed, but also concerned about the health impacts (and naturally the environmental impacts as well) of the refinery. There was a mismatch in the scales--the memory of the individual tied to emotions of pride and knowledge of hard work done there--and the Anthropocene, global scale of petrochemicals. How do we resolve this mismatch? The glass plate is somehow a clue.

It was reported, that one worker at the industrial park was suffering from eye irritation, following the release of hydrogen chloride. He had to be treated at the outpatient clinic of the industrial parks' Occupational Health Center, and could go home afterwards. There is no further information of long-term effects the worker might have suffered from to be found on the internet, according to my search. However, eye irritation induced by chemical exposure can lead to effects such as increased eye pressure and a following reduction of vision, as well as chronic pain.

I am wondering, how this worker got hurt, as this was not reported in the article. Usually, workers need to wear proper protective equipment in areas in which one risks exosure to airborne chemicals that can cause corrosion, including protective goggles. As can be read in a follow-up article (https://www.fnp.de/frankfurt/frankfurt-gas-trat-aus-weil-ein-rohrleitun…), a pipeline malfunction had been found as the reason for the release, possibly in an area where no protective equipment is required? I can only speculate on this, but the worker seems not have been informed about the incident.

Missing information seems to be a common theme in this case, in the aforementioned article it is also reported that the smartphone application that is supposed to warn residents about such incidents, released a warning only 50 minutes after the sirenes had been going off. Also it is written in the article, that after the incident the citizen telephone line was busy, such that some callers could not get the information they required, and that many residents are not familiar with the meaning of the different signals released by the warning sirene. In case this or similar incidents happen in the future, they therefore pose a grave health risk to the surrounding population.

In this setting, several stakeholders are to be identified:

- Citizens living in Hoechst and surrounding areas and workers at the industrial park: Necessitate information to ensure their safety.

- Infraserv and companies at industrial park: Bad press is bad for image of industrial park, whcih might lead to political or financial consequences; Centralization of information flow on website "ihr-nachbar.de" to create narrative?

- Fire department Frankfurt: Responsibilities as first responders to incidents include information release to public and combat incident.

- Public media/ press: Information of the population as well as economic pressure to release notions that are of interest to public (to gain clicks/sell magazines and newspapers); Need to report correctly to gain/keep trust of potential information consumers.

- Local politicians: Need to take political measures to protect citizens to gain/keep trust of potential voters; Possibly also require good relationship with Infraserv and companies, as many high-profile companies are located at industrail park bringing in tax money.

"Considering that citizen activism evokes a negative image, and that some of the earliest citizen groups measuring radiation, including the Citizen Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo), have strong ties to antinuclear activism, “antinuclear” is a label many organizations initiated in the wake of Fukushima try to avoid. Disasters such as the Fukushima nuclear accident trigger different publics into action (Hasegawa, 2004, Leblanc, 1999). These citizens are not solely—or even necessarily—antinuclear activists, but primarily concerned citizens, whose main driver is to protect (in Japanese “mamoru”) and serve their community, as conventional information sources failed to do so (Morita et al. 2013). By publicly distancing themselves from activism, these organizations may gain credibility within their community. Born out of a sense of necessity (Morita et al. 2013, Kimura, 2016), these groups should therefore not be labeled as activists as such, but rather as active by default. Even if personal convictions lean towards antinuclear feelings, the organizations as such avoid taking a polarizing position, rather focusing on gathering the “right” data." (p.5)

I oppose this techno-optimistic approach and the expectation that data that is "right" will speak for itself. I would argue that data can and must be used for negotiations on social contracts, but the negotiations need be conducted actively. I can very much understand the necessity to not phrase political claims in a radical manner, if situated in a society in which activism evokes a negative image, but am not convinced that change can occur if no claims are being made in the first place?

"Albeit subjected to the same standards of general scientific enquiry (Morris-Suzuki, 2014, Coletti et al. 2017, Brown et al. 2016, Kuchinskaya, 2019), the scientific facts and evidence produced by these citizen groups serve the needs of the community, allowing them to gain control over their lives: "Citizen science connects directly to our lives: is the dose of my meal okay, is the school where my child goes to contaminated?"." (p.5)

I interpret this as the need to take individual action as well as individual responsibility to combat disaster. Is it possible to combat disaster in an individualized rather than a collective manner though?

In the text, the 2015 White paper of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports Science and Technology (MEXT) is quoted as: "When it comes to the creation of innovation that changes society, ‘citizen science’ (shimin kagaku), which embrace ideas from daily life, is important, because the possibility that innovation is created, increases as new venues where experts and citizens collaborate, are developed. Moreover, the knowledge, skills and desires that citizens possess, sometimes surpass that of the expert. If we can bring this knowledge to an efficient use as ‘the wisdom of crowds’ under the banner of open science, then around the year 2030 we can increase the amount and the quality of innovation activities in technology and science, including research activities, even if the number of scholars in our country will decrease.”

The authors state that this notion were to introduces “citizen science” within the globally expanding science and policy fields of open science and open innovation and further that by this MEXT was targeting an increased contribution of citizens to benefit formally institutional science rather than being concerned with the question of how science can contribute to society. I tend to agree with the latter, but am left with the question how the underlying narratives are constructed when talking about creation of innovation, increasing new venues, and bringing knowledge to an efficient use under the banner of open science? These terms seem to be very much informed by neoliberal thought, but social relations do not seem to be an analytical framework the authors are working with.

Towards the end of the film, the ongoing situation of workers at Honeywell/Metropolis is introduced. One workers union, the USW (United Steels Workers), is protesting working conditions and exposure to toxic materials at the plant. They report that workers were locked out after protesting working conditions. They organize protests on the streets in proximity to the plant and march together at the parade on labor day. USW representatives report difficulties of processing complaints of residual contamination because documents were missing, of the processed claims mentioned in the film only 124 were approved while 205 were denied. One health physisist reports about the entrenched bureaucratic culture and that doctors were trained to testify against workers who made health claims, he seems to be very concerned about this as it exposes workers to dangerous working conditions. I think that unionizing as collborative action is a very powerful and effective approach, and think it would be important for health physicists and plant workers to organize together rather than fighting on their own (as it seems to be the case currently).

Denise DeGarmo, associate professor of political science at University of Illenois, took camera team on tour through Weldon Springs. She explained that instead of undergoing remediation, the site at Weldon was turned into a natural reserve after the initial cleanup (at which workers received scarce information about dangers of the materials they were working with). Deniese reports that this way one did not have to do another cleanup, but she further reports that material has migrated into ground water of surrounding areas. Another stakeholder reports that people go there for recreational purposes and children are playing in the area. I find it difficult to distinguish emergency responders in this situation (except for the initial cleanup laborers), as toxic waste sweeps out slowly, and thus body burden only shows up over time. I was very surprised about the possibility to circumvent action and removal of toxic wastes by turning a site into a natural reserve and would have liked more information about this policy in the documentary.

Multiple stakeholders are introduced in this film, such that either directly worked at the plant or had family who worked there, such that were academically interested in the matter, or such that were concerned about their community.

Paul Mitchell was a former electrician at Mallinckrodt, he was not informed about potential dangers and states that "no one there knew what uranium was". Further, he talks about noticing how colleagues got cancer, at beginning he did not find this unusual but then became weary after one colleague who had been very young and fit also was diagnosed with cancer.

Further, Brooks Davis tells her family story, she is the daughter of former plant workers (I think the father worked there for about 15 years, while the mother worked there for 1 year). Her father had been working in "hot areas" and was shifted to other areas in the plant whenever his exposure to radioactivity had been exceeding permitted levels for some time, and then was moved back after a short period of "cooling down". He got lung cancer at age 40, and was struggling with the disease for years, which caused him much bodily and emotional pain, finally he died in 1978. Her mother, who lived in poverty as a result of losing her husband so early and having to provide for her children, tried to claim to be entitled for compensation but was denied this repeatedly for bureucratic reasons until she wrote a letter explaining her situation.

Clearance Schneider was a health and safety inspector at Weldon Spring, he explains that one had to wear a badge and a white uniform when working at the plant, and if something was not right with the badge (that recorded nuclear exposure), it was taken off. He reports an incidence with a hydrochloric acid cloud that was released into the air and hovered over the neighborhood. He had skin cancer, but you could not confide this to anyone as he was afraid to lose his job, and when the company closed he reports that one was not allowed to leave the country for 3 years.

Obie Young was a chemical operator and reports that when his job was eliminated, he got several months of pay such that he would not need another job for a while, because if he had started a new job they would ask for tissue samples and find out that radioactivity was much too high in his body.

Another stakeholder is the organization "St. Charles County against hazardous waste" with his president Dr. Michael Garvey. They were concerned about contamination at Weldon Spring site, and demanded that the voice of concerns were heard at citizen meeting.

Gary Ferguson, a laborer who was involved in the cleanup of the site, reports that Geiger counters went through the roof but "they told us it was not dangerous". Further, he reports that containers with stored chemicals were disintegrating. Every day he worked at the cleanup, he had a bloody nose, but when he told his supervisor this person respondet that he should not talk to anybody about it, because otherwise he would get fired. He therefore decided not to confide in anybody, because he "had to pay his bills".

Gerald Kleba, a priest in the community, who noticed that many children in his precinct were sick and died, went on a Weldon Spring "tour". He was surprised that people on the other side of the fence concerned with the cleanup had moon clothes on, but people on the tour on the other side of the meshed fence were wearing everyday clothes and not informed about potential dangers. This shocked him, and encouraged him to engage in communal activities to raise attention to the danger of chemical and nuclear waste in the neighborhood.

META: Water seems to be one important medium through which NOLA envisions the “impacts” of the Anthropocene—scarcity, abundance, temporalities and spatial distributions, management of, and hazards that emerge in its context. Less is said about the causal or attributional aspects of the Anthropocene. How might water function as an entry point into the assemblages of local anthropocenics?

I found the NOLA Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2018, which frames the impacts of the Anthropocene as an intersection of weather extremes amid climate change and evolving vulnerabilities of its people. Four of seven items in the executive summary note water as central to local interventions: flood awareness, flood repair, flood mitigation, flood infrastructure. Too much water or water in the wrong places and the aftereffect of water on infrastructure and lives. One expression, then, is preparedness.

MACRO: Mitigation is an interesting analytic for the Anthropocene. In the US mitigation plans are shaped by the 1988 Stafford Act (which amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act). Constraints on communities come through rules, regulations, policies, (dis)incentives, and surveillance by state and federal authorities. Much of this is bound by economic and administrative discourses.

Goals are set in this document—broken out by timelines, activities, priorities, and capabilities. Another expression is classification of anthropocenics by subfields and accounting metrics. How do we measure progress and what is deferred to the future, 5-10 years out from today, a goal that has no tangible accountability but is named and acknowledged. What are the practices of naming, responsibility, and making (in)visible in the Anthropocene?

BIO: One new initiative, Ready for Rain, in particular is of interest to me as it highlights the more neoliberal vision for how the public should self-regulate risk and mitigate harm. I hear this as an extension of a government agency program to make the nation Weather Ready. Other bullets highlight “green” buildings, energies, and infrastructures. These could be examples of how the city envisions the Anthropocene feedback loop of humans changing/planning for climate alterations, which is a fairly typical lens.

Some questions: What does the water do? What does the water know? If we trace water in all its instantiations (e.g. historical water, flow of water, chemistry of water, application of water, temperature of water), what do we learn about the future imaginaries of what NOLA will / could / ought to become?

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good?