Analyze

The article is supported by additional articles that examine the constitutionality of Critical Infrastructure Bill in Louisiana. The article is supported in its claim that the statute can be argued as legislativley motivated as the critical infrastructure bills arose after the Dakota Acess Pipeline protest and the Lousiana revised Bill came after the Bayou Bridge Pipeline protest. The article is additionally supported in analysis of additional critical infrastructure bills from other states, such as Texas, Dakota, etc. 

The author compares existing and previous nuclear regulation/safety/etc committees, analyzing differences between them and various shortcomings. This information is used to develop the author's idea of a more effective and safe oganization to enforce regulations and train an emergency response team.

The author also looked at how previous emergencies were handled and what new regulations stemmed from each, as well as how those have worked since their implementation, and what more can be done.

1. The article analyzes the existing international nuclear regulatory groups and determines their capabilities and possible shortcomings in organizing such a group.

2. The article analyzed how nuclear emergency response has been handeled in the past and how goverments have prepared for future disasters.

3. The article outlined some requirements a nuclear emergency response agency would need to meet and some chalenges it would face.

This argument is supported through discussion of Soviet Russia and how Chernobyl was handled and the legislation that came after the disaster to prevent/treat further meltdowns. Through discussion of Fukishima and how no one knew what to do (the US, Russia or Japan) despite that people in all these countries have experienced nuclear disasters in the past. The discrepancy of international discussions of safety, security and education, but lack of preparation if something would happen. Discussion of doing this internationally has been talked about, but no steps have been made to accomplish this goal.

The main argument is supported primarily with a detailed description of the events surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi plant disaster on March 11th, 2011 as an example of the need for a specilized group to respond to nuclear emergencies. Schmid also supports the effectiveness of such a group by tracing the recent shift in opinion away from an accident prevention mindset to the idea that nuclear disasters are a risk in the nuclear industry and therefore plans for the effective response to future nuclear disasters must be made in order to mitigate the damage caused. Several other works addressing similar problems in risk management, such as Risk Society by Ulrich Beck, as also cited to support the main argument.

1) Fukushima proved current standard ineffective. Fukushima was the worst nuclear accident since the Chernobyl incident over 25 years ago. Hundreds of thousands of people had to be relocated due to the radiation leaks—many to this day. The effects of the hundreds of thousands of gallons of radiation contaminated water released into the ocean are still not fully known.

                2) International groups called for agency to enforce as no current candidate is feasible. IAEA is large enough but not fully trusted to be the host as it promotes nuclear use and appeared to praise TEPCO and the handling of the Fukushima incident. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is a better candidate but still faces the problem of appearing as a secretive organization keeping its member companies confidential. WANO also currently lacks the size and resources to build an international nuclear disaster strike team.

                3) The author stresses that good communication and cooperation are required for success of such an organization. For a response team to work at the international level, sharing of different countries’ reactor designs and other various trade secrets would be crucial. The expertise from operators, responders, and other professionals who have had hands-on experience from Fukushima and other nuclear disasters. It would take a sizable amount of funding for such an organization and maintain the capabilities as the author described. 

1. Schmid discusses the aftermath of Fukushima and how the workers at the plant lacked expertise in handling this type of disaster, and as a result, retreated. This is an example of the lack of knowledge among workers and lack of an action plan in case a disaster such as the one that occured happens.

2. Schmid points out how world leaders are recognizing the need for a unified and consice nuclear emergency response plan. One of the leaders include Russian nuclear operator, who suggested that international law should force countries operating nuclear plants to abide by international safety standards. 

3. She also points out how executives in the nuclear industry create many rules in order to control the workers. They don't necessarily analyze when, why, and by whom rules are broken, but instead implement more rules. When rule-beinding or judgement calls are made, executives try to conceal them instead of learn from them, which is part of the issue at hand. Improvisation is very important. Especially when it emphasizes the expertise of the executives. During an emergency, improvisation would show what experts have experienced and how well they can lead and cooperate. 

The article is supported through the use of numerous examples and educated points made by the author. First, the author supports her arguments by going through the events that transpired that day at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. She uses the details of the events in Japan to support her argument that a global emergency nuclear response team is necessary. Schmid also cites other areas in the world where this was an issue and protocols were not clear. Ultimately which caused the incidences at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, all of which would have benefited from a response team equipped and specially trained to deal with this type of situation. The author cites that incidences at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were the result of systems that were too complex, tightly coupled  and technical, ultimately not allowing broad policy changes when needed. The author also cites that this occurred in one of the world's most advanced areas in the world, both technologically and economically. She states that having scientists and the elite left to make decisions about responses to disasters alone further proves her point and supports her arguments. She also notes that current organizations have little international authority and often suffer when attempting to include or talk to the public in terms of these situation which doesn't allow for full integration with the public. She notes the importance of this integration, but also that world leaders are attempting to do so and see how beneficial this is. She compared the way previous situations similar to that in Japan was handled and she mapped out new regulations that arose based off each of those incidences in order to see what can further be implemented as a blanket response globally for all nations in a situation like this.

1: Crowding is shown to be common in displaced populations, and local overpopulation/crowding often facillitates the transmittion of disease

2: Natural disasters that do not cause a displacement of a population are rarely associated with disease outbreaks

3: There is little or no evidence that dead bodies, as some believe, pose a epidemic risk for a population of survivors after a disaster has struck

The shift in thought from prevention to response is well supported as a necessary move. This can obviously be seen by the occurrence of these accidents despite adequate regulation. Nuclear energy is a promising, but dangerous thing, and can quickly become disastrous despite efforts to maintain control. This was seen in the accident at Fukushima, following the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the region. Despite preparation for such an event and the existence of backup generators and batteries, responders were rendered useless in the efforts as they could not access the area. This is where the need for a prepared system of nuclear response is needed. Historically, such emergency response groups have been poorly resourced and short-lived, such as the Soviet Spetsatom developed after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. This group, which focused on preserving lessons learned and developing response systems, was absorbed by a larger ministry with the goal of integrated disaster response.

Additionally, the author cites a number of factors that played a role in creating the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster, such as “environmental, social, and technical systems” that, due to their complexity and separate protocol, resulted in lack or preparedness for the disaster. Following the disaster, the response efforts were delayed by this lack of preparation, and the media called out TEPCO and the Japanese government for this. STS analysis is important in this aftermath as much as in the creation of the initial plan. By utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the media (and the people) can be heard and used to reform existing policies, or create new ones. This establishes a continuously evolving system of response that can adapt and take into account many different view of disaster relief.