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Characterization of loss from Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development (2018) within the Evaluation report on 10-year implementation of the national policy for ‘agriculture-farmer-rural’ development [ not available for public view] 

• “ Aquaculture households have lost 503.2 million VND (21,665 USD) per household, then fishing households 231.3 million VND (9958 USD) per household, and coastal service households 102.0 million VND (4392 USD) per household. Note that both fishing and fish farming households lost similar por- tions of their total income, around 98 percent, even as fish farmers earn twice that of fishers on average. In a country where the average yearly income of rural households is 130 million VND or 5600 USD (MARD, 2018), losing an average of 11,000 USD per household is significant.” (Truong et al., 2021, p 8). 

Characterization of the compensation schemes adopted by Vietnam’s government:

• “According to a report by the Ministry of Finance in 2018, the government was able to provide direct cash compensation to those identified as being impacted across the four provinces. This is because of the settlement with Taiwan Formosa Plastics for 500 million USD. In addition to cash, the Vietnamese government gave over 19,000 tonnes of rice to impacted households in the months following the fish kill. The government also monitored the safety of the ocean environment. As the government switched from emergency relief to recovery support, more programmes were introduced including loan access, scholarships for students, health insurance, and livelihood training pro- grammes. The government also worked with the Fisheries Department and other relevant agencies to build environmental monitoring systems, provide consistent water testing, engage in food safety monitoring, and work towards ecological rehabilitation of aquatic stocks” (Truong et al., 2021, p 10). 

“Environmental disasters have a tendency to further increase work precarity, particularly in places that are highly dependent on eco- logical resources (Marschke et al., 2020). Livelihoods, as such, may need to transform rather than persist in the face of crises (Alexander, 2013).” (Truong, 2021, pg 3)

“ Vietnam has struggled with ineffective environmental regulatory programmes or insufficient enforcement capabilities to ensure adequate protection of the environment as Vietnam develops (Fortier, 2010). Environmental impact assessments (EIA), in general, are viewed as bureaucracy rather than as an important aspect of the development approval process (Wells-Dang et al., 2016).” (Truong, 2021, pg 4)

The narrative of the text highlights the following key points extrapolated from survey responses and interview participants:

• Impacts of the Formosa disaster on households vary by livelihood strategies, and were particularly amplified for poorer households, women, and households without diversified livelihood strategies. 

• Coping mechanisms of households primarily involved reducing household expenditures, accessing loans, adopting a new livelihood strategy, and expanding existing livelihood strategies. However, adoption rates of these coping mechanisms vary across households with livelihoods across the service, fishing, and fish farming enterprises. 

• Compensation, though cited to have ignited protests from parties not qualified for restitution, did offer substantial help to those who were able to receive compensation. Additionally, compensation delivery was delayed (between one to two years after the incident was reported), further escalating impacts across families without savings. 

• Economic recovery of household income 30 months after the Formosa incident indicates that the majority of households have recovered their livelihood activities. However, this does not take into account families who are no longer in the region (out migrated following the disaster prior to the inception of this study).

Authors of the publication have affiliations to the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry and the School of International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada. The funding for this study comes from the Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development.

The text left me with a question that I actually often find frustrating in the process of research. On page 6, the authors take up the criticism of a Fukushima resident who says: “[W]hat you call research does not give benefits to local people” (Miyamoto and Ankei, 2008, cited in Ankei, 2013, p.24). The authors here suggest adopting or borrowing terms from the field that are used by citizens to create a more “socially robust science” (Bonhoure et al. 2019, Nowotny, 2003). From the authors' point of view, this can be achieved above all by paying closer and careful attention to the language of citizen organizations and the contexts these groups work in. After further elaboration, the authors call for citizen science terms and concepts developed by, for and with citizens to better reflect the values, priorities, and stakes of its main agents and of all concerned parties. But I am not sure that this approach alone would be sufficient to adequately address such expressed criticism. Perhaps one should ask about the expectations of people one is researching with/about in order to enter into a conversation and to be able to understand this criticism. Perhaps the authors will address this point again in further publications. I think to ask oneself how to deal with this criticism methodically and ethically could also be very fruitful for empirical research in general.

This text argues that the umbrella term citizen science has come to describe a variety of organizations and structures that function in a very different way. Not only does the notion of citizen science cover a wide variety of situations, but the term itself makes references to different types of organizations and is not neutral. Japan had forms of "citizen science" which pre-existed the introduction of the English term, as heirs to the development of more engaged scientific practices by politically inclined scientists in the 1970s.

The tensions within the use of the term citizen science and its diverse embodiments take the form of the following: basically, the concept of citizen science in Japan is mostly used in the context of top-down participatory approaches. The organizations that emerged after the Fukushima disaster are much more varied than this and exist within a framework that had been previously developed in Japan. This framework included visions of participatory and democratic science making by citizens, for citizens, and of citizens. They are mostly local organizations that are sometimes but not always affiliated to a network. Some of them cooperate with more formal institutions, while others steer clear of any collaboration with formal science or governments, partly because there is a lot of distrust towards these institutions in Japan, especially since the Fukushima accident.

One of the pitfalls of the reputation that citizen science projects have in Japan is that they are associated with the anti-nuclear movement and are therefore associated with the far left. This causes a need for distantiation from any political association, which some of the organizations studied use.

"Considering that citizen activism evokes a negative image, and that some of the earliest citizen groups measuring radiation, including the Citizen Nuclear Information Center (Tokyo), have strong ties to antinuclear activism, “antinuclear” is a label many organizations initiated in the wake of Fukushima try to avoid. Disasters such as the Fukushima nuclear accident trigger different publics into action (Hasegawa, 2004, Leblanc, 1999). These citizens are not solely—or even necessarily—antinuclear activists, but primarily concerned citizens, whose main driver is to protect (in Japanese “mamoru”) and serve their community, as conventional information sources failed to do so (Morita et al. 2013). By publicly distancing themselves from activism, these organizations may gain credibility within their community. Born out of a sense of necessity (Morita et al. 2013, Kimura, 2016), these groups should therefore not be labeled as activists as such, but rather as active by default. Even if personal convictions lean towards antinuclear feelings, the organizations as such avoid taking a polarizing position, rather focusing on gathering the “right” data." (p.5)

I oppose this techno-optimistic approach and the expectation that data that is "right" will speak for itself. I would argue that data can and must be used for negotiations on social contracts, but the negotiations need be conducted actively. I can very much understand the necessity to not phrase political claims in a radical manner, if situated in a society in which activism evokes a negative image, but am not convinced that change can occur if no claims are being made in the first place?

"Albeit subjected to the same standards of general scientific enquiry (Morris-Suzuki, 2014, Coletti et al. 2017, Brown et al. 2016, Kuchinskaya, 2019), the scientific facts and evidence produced by these citizen groups serve the needs of the community, allowing them to gain control over their lives: "Citizen science connects directly to our lives: is the dose of my meal okay, is the school where my child goes to contaminated?"." (p.5)

I interpret this as the need to take individual action as well as individual responsibility to combat disaster. Is it possible to combat disaster in an individualized rather than a collective manner though?