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1) Current INPO activities and chain of command, an organization that seems to be morphing from a quiet regulator of US nuclear industry to a proponent for international organization.

2) Further research into Three Mile Island incident, which is widely recognized as being a significantly smaller nuclear emergency. Yet, the aftermath of the incident highlighted tensions between public information, environmental concerns, and the need for more nuclear regulation.

3) France is noted by Dr. Schmid as being an international leader in nuclear power, a major surprise to me. I chose to explore this topic more, to see whether this has had any impact on French culture and environmental regulation.

1) Fukushima's nuclear safe guards followed the current accepted nuclear regulations. In addition to having back-up generators and short-term batteries to support the reactors during power failure, ownership had extensive emergency plans for tsunamis. These were executed and creative solutions were utilized with necessary. This then begs the question as to how such a well-prepared facility experience massive devastation.

2) Japan is known to be a first-world nation constantly innovating and exploring new technology, with an advanced economy and high emphasis on education. Dr. Schmid refers to members of the Japanese government as "scientifically trained, technologically savvy elites." While Dr. Schmid acknowledges nuclear energy to still be a murku field, Japanese officials represent the individuals most capable of making informed, knowledgeable decisions about nuclear facilities. This only further emphasizes her assertion that a set, elite organization needs to be created to handle nuclear emergencies.

3) While several organizations exist to discuss nuclear power on an international level, there is no entity which serves as a governing body over nuclear facilities. Nuclear emergencies very quickly spread from single-nation disasters to international events. Although there are many internationally recognized policies and guidelines, there is no body to ensure these are followed. Moreover, no single nation or organization at the present time has the fiscal capabilities or specialized knowledge to aid during nuclear disasters. 

Dr. Schmid's fourteen-page report includes an additional four pages of references. These references date from mid-twentieth century (1961) to mid-summer 2012 (publication of the book was 2013). The list includes studies, reports, policies, review articles, and publications, spanning from radiation absorption of Strontium to overarching reviews of nuclear energy to organizational reliability studies. These sources, if nothing else, indicate Dr. Schmid has crafted her report from multiple angles, and is not simply re-hashing Fukushima reviews. 

This report provides a detailed analysis of international response to nuclear emergencies. In addition to reviewing historic nuclear emergencies and their responses, it examines current nuclear policies. Initial reactions to previous nuclear emergencies (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, ect.) focused on preventing future incidents. Yet,  Dr. Schmid argues increased safety measures and rigorous regulation cannot possibly safeguard against all emergency scenarios. She emphasizes the need to create an international organization to serve as an emergent response team, and explores several candidates such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and World Association of Nuclear Operators. However, Dr. Schmid concludes none of these suggested organizations currently have the fiscal capability or internation authority to act in this role.

The report comes within a much larger book edited by Richard Hindmarsh focused on the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The book as whole explores social, environmental, and political issues in the aftermath of the incident. It appears to be available at multiple collegiate libraries including Boston College, Williams College, Harvard University, MIT, and Cornell University.

Sonja D. Schmid, Ph.D., works as an assistant professor of STS (science and technology studies) at Virginia Tech. Her expertise includes history of technology, social studies of risk, and energy policy with a concentration on nuclear industry and proliferation. Dr. Schmid appears to have an extensive list of publications following the Fukushima incident, including a book on the development of the Soviet Nuclear industry (MIT 2015). 

Emergency response is literally the main focus of the entire article. While it seems to be only a short chapter in a much larger collection of similar essays, the report fully analyzes past and present responses to nuclear emergencies. Moreover, Dr. Schmid builds a case for how future emergencies should be handled by an international team built on expertise. This includes expertise of nuclear energy, disaster response, and nuclear policy/regulation. While she refrains from commenting fully on whether the response mounted for Fukushima can be classified as "good" or "bad", her assertions indicates a need to shift focus from preventing emergencies to how nations respond to nuclear emergencies.

Much of the data gathered by Dr. Schmid comes from reports occuring in the aftermath of Fukushima. Additionally, Dr. Schmid appears to use multiple reviews of past nuclear emergencies and protocols. She uses these articles, international statements, policies, and current treaties to build her argument.

"The deputy chief of Russia's nuclear operator, Rosatom's Nikolai Spassky, suggested that international law should force countries operation nuclear plants to abide by international safety standards. This proposal amounts to a recognition of the international character of the nuclear energy industry, but it remains unclear as to who would enforce such rules and how-- as of this writing, no international agency has such powers." Schmid, 199

"What knowledge should nuclear safety be based upon, where the science is still contested? And how useful is the notion of transparency in a context where the operation of nuclear power plants is considered an "inalienable right", as the text of probably today's single most important nuclear treaty states (IAEA 1970)? Nuclear specialists around the world are still discussing the existing emergency response organizations and the reasons they ultimately failed." Schmid, 200

"Anthropologists who have studied nuclear workplaces consistently find that the 'culture of control' (that is, attempts to regulate every last action of the operating staff) is too rigid to account for all imaginable situations." Schmid, 201