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ciera.williams
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Aside from being discussed on the Disaster STS Network, this reading has been mentioned other places. For starters, it is a chapter of a larger book, “Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi: Social, Political and Environmental Issues.” This book is a collection of writings by international STS scholars. Additionally, this piece has been referenced in several other writings, including the book “The Fukushima Effect: A New Geopolitical Terrain” and the article “Nuclear disaster in Taiwan: a multidimensional security challenge.” 

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Andreas_Rebmann
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"This realization (of having to face Nuclear disasters) marks a major shift in our thinking about nuclear risk, away from accident prevention, and toward accident mitigation and more rigorous emergency preparedness."

"Severe nuclear accidents may thus require international instiutions to coordinate their mitigation."

"...the 'culture of control' (that is, attempts to regulate every last action of the operating staff) is too rigid to account for all imaginable situations... it would appear to be in the interest of voerall nuclear safety to log and learn from these incidents, rather than conceal them."

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Andreas_Rebmann
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I read through some information about the Bhopal disaster that was referenced, as well as some other articles on Nuclear Emergency Response. I also found some protocol for Radiation Sickness. (Potassium Iodide, Prussian Blue, DTPA, Neupogen)

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ciera.williams
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The information used to produce and support the arguments made in the article comes from a number of articles and reports, as well as interviews. For example, the author communicated with the former scientific director of Spetsatom and used that information to form a better image of the situation post-Chernobyl. This information could then be contrasted to other disasters and the organizations formed in the aftermath. The author could then use research papers as a source for statistical data, as well as scientific reports as a basis for the disaster’s existence and its implications. These all together are used to form an interdisciplinary view of disaster relief, and the steps needed to prevent and respond to another nuclear disaster.

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ciera.williams
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“More than 20 years ago, social scientists Harry Otway and Brian Wayne cautioned that accident prevention (safer designs, better operator training, etc. , but even more so emergency planning, faced significant economic and managerial hurdles.”(p199)

“Nuclear accidents have tended to trigger organizational reform with regard to nuclear emergency response, but not on an international level. In considering this problematic ground, where might we start to develop a global approach to nuclear disaster mitigation?”(p200)

“The specific kinds of highly specialized knowledge involved with operation nuclear reactors however may not be accessible to broad public debate to the same degree as, for example, evacuation policies. But in the interest of sustainable, socially legitimate solutions, arguably decisions about even the technical responses to disasters should not be left to scientists and engineers alone, whether they are based within the nuclear industry, a regulatory bod, or a nongovernmental organization.”(p196)

“For all its undeniable flaws, the nuclear industry worked for several decades- in Japan and elsewhere. That is also the truly frightening realization after Fukushima: this disaster was not ‘waiting to happen’, but occurred in a system that had been functioning reasonable well for quite some time.”(p198)

“…The Way Forward is embedded in a technocratic rationality that seeks an effective ‘technical fix’ for reducing the risk of a nuclear disaster to manageable proportions. That misses the less tangible social expertise and improvisational skills inevitable involved in any successful disaster response.” (p206)

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ciera.williams
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The shift in thought from prevention to response is well supported as a necessary move. This can obviously be seen by the occurrence of these accidents despite adequate regulation. Nuclear energy is a promising, but dangerous thing, and can quickly become disastrous despite efforts to maintain control. This was seen in the accident at Fukushima, following the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the region. Despite preparation for such an event and the existence of backup generators and batteries, responders were rendered useless in the efforts as they could not access the area. This is where the need for a prepared system of nuclear response is needed. Historically, such emergency response groups have been poorly resourced and short-lived, such as the Soviet Spetsatom developed after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. This group, which focused on preserving lessons learned and developing response systems, was absorbed by a larger ministry with the goal of integrated disaster response.

Additionally, the author cites a number of factors that played a role in creating the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster, such as “environmental, social, and technical systems” that, due to their complexity and separate protocol, resulted in lack or preparedness for the disaster. Following the disaster, the response efforts were delayed by this lack of preparation, and the media called out TEPCO and the Japanese government for this. STS analysis is important in this aftermath as much as in the creation of the initial plan. By utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the media (and the people) can be heard and used to reform existing policies, or create new ones. This establishes a continuously evolving system of response that can adapt and take into account many different view of disaster relief.