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It is clear from the bibliography as well as the notes, that Schmid is very educated in this field. She has done immense amounts of research (including citing herself), which shows that this is being written by an expert, and not a random scientist with an opinion. She provides information within her notes that help point someone seeking further information in the right direction. She also cites multiple sources form the same author, showing knowledge of other colleagues or experts within the field who may provide good insight and information.

Schmid works to analyze the course of events that occured at Fukushima as well as outline what a nuclear emergency response group needs in order to be successful. She specifically addresses the knowledge and expertise that would be necessary. She also highlights the lack of international authority and the implications that holds. 

"The Fukushima Effect: A New Geopolitan Terrain", edited by Richard A. Hindmarsh, Rebecca Priestley. 

The author's name is Sonja D. Schmid. She is an associate professor at Virginia Tech teaching primarily STS courses. She does research pertaining the history and organization of nuclear industries in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. One of her areas of specialization include nuclear emergency response, which makes her a good source for information regarding Fukushima. 

Emergency response is addressed in this report. Responses from various outlets to the Fukushima nuclear disaster are outlined and critiqued to prove the end point of Schmid, which is that an international nuclear emergency response plan is necessary. 

Sonja D. Schmid uses data pertaining international response to the disaster that occurred in Fukushima. She uses references and information gathered that has to do with the reactions of various leaders. She uses past situations and opinions in order to formulate her conclusion and claim that there is a need for an international nuclear emergency response plan. She pulls from examples that show that many organizations that tried in the past to create a plan failed due to the lack of international authority. 

1. "But with every explosion that shook the Japanese plant it became clearer: there was nobody -- not in Japan, nor Russia, nor the United States -- who had the relevant know-how, equipment, or strategy to handle a nuclear disaster. No international nuclear emergency response group exists today." pg 194

2. "But in the interest of sustainable, socially legitimate solutions, arguably deisions about even the technical responses to disasters should not be left to scientists and engineers alone." pg 196

3. "While national and international disaster relief organizations have refined their response techniques over the past decades, nuclear emergency preparedness and response has hardly gained traction." pg 200

1. I looked into the concept of 'atomic priests' mentioned on page 196 that was proposed in the 70s and 80s. I thought it was interesting when I saw it in the title of this report, and was interested to learn more about what it was. 

2. I looked on the website for IEAE, since Schmid mentioned them for a while. 

3. I also looked into the organization Spetsatom, since it sounded as if they may have had the right idea about emergency response, but the website is in Russian, so it was hard to understand. 

1. Schmid discusses the aftermath of Fukushima and how the workers at the plant lacked expertise in handling this type of disaster, and as a result, retreated. This is an example of the lack of knowledge among workers and lack of an action plan in case a disaster such as the one that occured happens.

2. Schmid points out how world leaders are recognizing the need for a unified and consice nuclear emergency response plan. One of the leaders include Russian nuclear operator, who suggested that international law should force countries operating nuclear plants to abide by international safety standards. 

3. She also points out how executives in the nuclear industry create many rules in order to control the workers. They don't necessarily analyze when, why, and by whom rules are broken, but instead implement more rules. When rule-beinding or judgement calls are made, executives try to conceal them instead of learn from them, which is part of the issue at hand. Improvisation is very important. Especially when it emphasizes the expertise of the executives. During an emergency, improvisation would show what experts have experienced and how well they can lead and cooperate.