This article has been referenced in several other works concerning the Fukushima plant disaster, such as “The Fukushima Effect: Traversing a New Geopolitical Terrain” by Hindmarch and Priestley, where it was quoted for its opinion that an international group would be needed to overcome bias that may be present in national regulatory agencies.
This article has been referenced and discussed at nuclear response seminars and as a resource for why these teams are needed in the first place.
The author Sonja D. Schmid is an assistant professor at Virginia Tech, she has expertise in the history of national energy policies looking at the risk associated with the nuclear industry. She has written several papers on the Soviet nuclear industry as well as policies and political controversies surrounding the nuclear industry and its potential military uses.
The article focuses on the inherent necessity for emergency response to include community education, risk assessment, and premade policies that designate decision making authority in the event of a disaster, while also acknowledging the inherent unpredictability of emergencies that require flexible response plans. Emphasis is placed on the need for rapid response, and the importance of safeguarding expertise through training and records.
Emergency response is discussed in the article through being prepared for nuclear disasters. An international response team responds to nuclear disasters, how to be prepared, what to be prepared for, having it be in all different languages,etc.
" But with every explosion that shook the Japanese plant it became clear: there was nobody- not in Japan, nor Russia, nor the United States- who had the relevant know-how, equipment, and strategy to handle a nuclear disaster."
"To move forward with maximum efficiency, an international nuclear response group needs to operationalize realtive experiece from international disaster relief organizations."
"If an international nuclear response group is a worthwhile goal (and it certainly appears to be) we need to define realistic tasks."
A method used to support the claim is to relate the potential future disasters in the nuclear industry to historical examples which gives credence to the claims in the article and provide relatable evidence to the reader as to the risks associated with not only the nuclear industry but also a lack of preparedness for nuclear disasters. Data used to support the claim includes case studies that the author analyzed as a part of the article, and several other works were cited.
Methods, tools/data used to produce the arguments made in the article was information or nuclear summits in the past (various countries), first hand news tv experience. Also past knowledge of the author. Review of past nuclear disasters and the affects globally-discussions made internationally.
This argument is supported through discussion of Soviet Russia and how Chernobyl was handled and the legislation that came after the disaster to prevent/treat further meltdowns. Through discussion of Fukishima and how no one knew what to do (the US, Russia or Japan) despite that people in all these countries have experienced nuclear disasters in the past. The discrepancy of international discussions of safety, security and education, but lack of preparation if something would happen. Discussion of doing this internationally has been talked about, but no steps have been made to accomplish this goal.
“Within the nuclear industry, an almost exclusive emphasis on accident avoidance has given way to a new strategy of accident preparedness.” (Schmid 207)
“…creating a group or agency that is both capable of assembling the needed expertise for effective emergency response, and that also is accepted as legitimate by the broader public.” (Schmid, 195)
“...an emergency response requires…expertise, trust, legitimacy, as well as public engagement as part of that response” (Schmid 195)