The authors, Andrew Lakoff and Stephen Collier both study anthropology. They have written several papers together focusing on the social and cultural types of knowledge concerning health and medicine. Lakoff works at the University of Southern California and Collier is the Director of Anthropology for the New School.
The authors argue that while recent changes in health security have led to a modern knowledge base and understanding of health threats these new systems are still forming and adapting as the health problems faced change.
The main argument is supported primarily through policy changes that show a changing approach to public health safety in the government and private organizations, with specific examples such as changes to the US government funding for biodefense research in the early twenty-first century. The paper also includes examples of changing scientific knowledge during the later twentieth century, referencing studies and reports that highlight the changing opinions of the scientific community. Finally, the authors divide the paper into several sections each outlining a specific type of problem and the practices devised as a solution, this format clarifies the main argument and aids the reader in understanding the authors views.
“There is no such thing as being “too secure.” Living with risk, by contrast, acknowledges a more complex calculus. It requires new forms of political and ethical reasoning that take into account questions that are often only implicit in discussions of biosecurity interventions.” (Lakoff 28)
“On the one hand, they examine the different political and normative frameworks through which the problem of biosecurity is approached: national defense, public health, and humanitarianism, for example. On the other hand, they examine the styles of reasoning through which uncertain threats to health are transformed into risks that can be known and acted upon” (Lakoff 12)
“These initiatives build on a growing perception among diverse actors—life scientists and public health officials, policymakers and security analysts—that new biological threats challenge existing ways of understanding and managing collective health and security. From the vantage point of such actors, the global scale of these threats crosses and confounds the boundaries of existing regulatory jurisdictions. Moreover, their pathogenicity and mutability pushes the limits of current technical capacities to detect and treat disease” (Lakoff 8)