The article seems to be primarily composed of thoughts from the author supported by evidence from historical, well-known occurrences. Moreover, both authors seem to have personal research in the fields identified here, making many of their arguments based on field experiences. There are cited reports and publications, but there does not appear to be an associated "Works Cited" page provided.
1) The article begins by articulating the four domains that "biosecurity" supposedly encompasses. Yet, even just by looking at these four domains with a basic knowledge of current events, one can understand these are all far from having any sense of stability. Just recently, more reports emerged of use of chlorine gas and other agents against citizens in Syria. Reluctance to vaccination has led to a re-emergence of measles and pertussis across the US.
2) Increase awareness and attention does not always result in cooperative and cohesive actions. While there may be movement to address certain issues, this does not always encompass details of how to attack certain public concerns. One of the main examples cited in the article was a small pox scenario termed "Dark Winter". Here, officials struggled to gauge the possibility of a small pox bioterrorism attack with the cost and effect of the small pox vaccine-- which can result in death. The conflicting results of the scenario between healthcare personnel "on the ground", government officials, and the CDC's difficulty in gauging a credible threat level led to a dismissal of the program.
3) Many of the approaches by global agencies touted as medical agencies primarily center on emergency response protocols. This modality prepares them for quick, short responses to emergency problems, while neglecting long-term intervention. The article argues this approach is preferred because of the galvanizing, global responses emergencies have-- they garner attention and resources quickly, while long-term problems do not. Additionally, short-term presence is far easier to prepare for than implementing long-term solutions to medical scenarios.
1) "Approaches based on preparedness may not be guided by rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Rather, they are aimed at developing the capability to respond to various types of potentially catastrophic biological events"
2) "This analytical approach, when turned to the field of biosecurity, makes neither broad prescriptions for the improvement of health and security, nor blanket denunciations of new biosecurity interventions. Rather, it examines how policymakers, scientists, and security planners have constituted potential future events as biosecurity threats, and have responded by criticizing, redeploying, or reworking existing apparatuses"
3) "But increased attention and funding to health preparedness by no means implies consensus around a single approach. The existing institutions of public health are not easily reconciled with the new demands and norms of health preparedness and there is considerable disagreement about the appropriate way to achieve preparedness."
1) DOTs: I chose to look into the TB-control program cited by Paul Farmer and several other global health experts. While this is a minute detail, it seems to be a program which encompasses everything wrong with our current model of biosecurity.
2) Doctors without Borders: Despite reading about this organization multiple times, I've yet to do in-depth research on its goals and capabilities. Recent information seems to indicate DWB (or MSF) struggles to be effective in a long-term way in many of its projects.
3) BSE and food safety: It's been quite a while since mad cow disease has reared its misfolded protein head, but it remains a speck on the public health radar. How agencies balance BSE outbreaks and public opinion can often indicate their level of success, both in terms of job fulfillment and ability to minimize public panic.
The article primarily argues that, although there are interventions and steps in place, "biosecurity" is not currently a viable or stable entity. The four main areas stated in this article (emerging infectious disease, bioterrorism, cutting-edge life sciences, and food safety) are not formerly understood or controlled enough to make a feasible and honest plan that ensures safety. While steps can be taken and measures used, the dynamic nature of these fields and the human condition prevents us from establishing a truly flawless safety net at this time. One only has to look at the re-emergence of previously extinct diseases such as measles, the prevalence of pertussis, or the assertion of chemotherapy's deadliness to see we do not have a full handle on any of these fields.
There have been 28 citations at this time, most concerning the concept of biosecurity. Many of them also focus on elements of governing bodies and their respective management of risks and emergency plans.
The authors are Stephen Collier, PhD and Andrew Lakoff, PhD. Both hold associate professor positions-- the former at New University in NYC and the latter at USC Dornsife. Lakoff's research and publications seem to focus primarily on public health, global medicine, and medical anthropology. Collier, conversely, seems to primarily work on projects pertaining to government structure and its effects on human life. These include publications on economics, environment, historical, and biopolitics.
This article seems to focus more on the overarching theme of global medicine. This does include aspects of emergency response (such as discussing how various agencies respond to emergencies or how they formulate protocols) as biosecurity seeks to minimize or eradicate health emergencies. However, as the article contends, biosecurity is not a functional ideal at this time; it primarily contends that our current models of biosecurity are undermined by several factors, leaving them as simply emergency responses.