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The artice cites WHO preparadness plans and Doctors without Borders as sources of policy on emergency response, in the context of global health. With the rise in infectious disease, there is a risk for "global threat" that is not directly targeted at a group, but rather engineered through social and economic factors. This means that emrgency preparadness is key. However, the article metions the use of Emergency repsonse as a bit of a cop-out. It is much easier to plan for the worst than prevent it from happening. The author states "... measures focused on mitigating potential emergencies are easier to implement rhan longer-term structural interventions." 

The article highlights public health security and "biosecurity" in the context of large scale efforts/interventions in response to public health threats. Various frameworks have been proposed and implemented to analyze and respond to the new range of pathogenic threats. These take form as research groups, global health initiatives, legislation and emergency preparedness plans. The article proposes looking at biosecurity with an STS multidisciplinary approach (though not explicitly stated as such) and has separated biosecurity into four unique domains. These are emerging infection disease, bioterrorism, cutting-edge life-sciences, and food safety. These all overlap throughout the article. The article further highlights the faults of the "public health" approach and emphasized the trend towards a preparadness model.

The rise and emergence of infectious diseases has led to a number of puclic health "scares" over the years. The creation of national and international frameworks, as well as focus groups, has brought the struggle of infectious diseases like AIDS to light. Looking at diseases with the combined inputs of governmental and philanthropic organizations has had a positive influence on the fight against them. In the realm of bioterrorism, many factors are at play. First is the terrorist act itself and the social issues that lead to a terrorist being created. Then there is themethod, which is the numerous diseases that can be weaponized. These diseases are researched at the government level as potential additions to the arsenal of weapons a country has. However, they are also used at the individual level. With highly educated individuals and any number of social ideologies, the risk for bioterrorism increases. By looking at bioterrorism through the lens of both a social expert and scientist, the roots of bioterrorism can be examined. 

The causes for these examinations are events that have had a largescale effect on multiple levels of expertise. These "focusing events" have a lot of factors and players, and thus require a lot of different views to analyze, as the article argues. 

The authors are Stephen Collier, PhD and Andrew Lakoff, PhD. Dr, Collier is an associate professor of international affairs at UC Berkeley. He is an anthropologist by training, and focuses his research on a variety of political schools of thought and their applications. Dr, Lakoff is an associate professor of sociology and focuses his research globalization, biomedical innovation and the history of human sciences.

There was no bibilography within the article

The author used direct quotes from research papers, speeches, and other publications by experts in multiple fields from public health policy to medicine to government relations. These were discussed and examined against others to produce a discussion rather than just an article full of information. 

"'In the globalized world of the 21st Century,'... simply stopping disease at national borders is not adequate"

"Early advocates of such [biodefense] efforts...argued that adequate preparation for a biological attack would require a massive infusion of resources into both biomedical research and public health response capacity" 

"Security experts and some life scientists worry that existing biosafety protocols focused on material controls in laboratories will not be sufficient as techniques of genetic manipulation become more powerful and routine, and as expertise in molecular biology becomes increasingly widespread."

"In all of them, we find that health experts, policy advocates, and politicians have competing visions about how to characterize the problem of biosecurity and about what constitutes the most appropriate response. Thus, the question is not just whether certain events (or potential events) have been characterized as "biosecurity" threats that require attention; we also need to ask what kind of biosecurity problem they are seen to pose, what techniques are used to assess them, and how certain kinds of responses to them are justified"