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Overview of Formosa Drainage Study

annika

This supplementary legal document describes recommendations for storm- and waste-water management improvements for the Formosa petrochemical plant in Calhoun County, Texas. The text is a fairly standard drainage assessment. The author describes non-trivial discharge of pollutants out of the plant’s outfalls, which drain into local waters, and the inability of the plant’s systems to prevent flooding from even small storms. For some context on this, it is pretty standard to design a stormwater system to be able to drain the 100-year storm (that is, the storm with a 1% or less chance of occurring in any given year). Formosa’s Texas plant demonstrated the inability to convey even the 2-year storm.

Formosa Drainage Study

annika

Emphases are mine:

Problem areas were identified based on the results from the outfall drainage studies provided by Formosa. Thus, all the results in the OPCC rely on those studies, uncertainities associated with those studies, and the assumptions made for those studies, some of which may or may not be appropriate as I pointed out in Supplement #2 [Page 4]” (3)

“The proposed improvements assume that the conveyance capacity of the problem areas is increased 100%, which would be able to handle twice as much flow that it currently does. The results from the Drainage Study are not conclusive as to what storm event Formosa’s system currently is capable of conveying. The report does mention that the system is not capable of conveying the 2-year storm, and “sometimes” not even the 1-year storm event. (3)

“A 45% contingency is applied to the OPCC due to the uncertainties associated with underground utilities, likelihood of existence of low road crossings and need to replace those, groundwater impacts, other unknowns, and additional costs associated with engineering, etc. 45% is reasonable and in line with industry practices in my experience, especially given the large amount of unknown information available.” (4) 

“My opinion from my July 9, 2018 report that “there have been and are still pellets and/or plastic materials discharges above trace amounts through Outfall 001” is further supported by the deposition testimony of Lisa Vitale, as representative for Freese & Nichols, Inc, that she and her colleagues have seen floating white pellets or small plastic pieces in Lavaca Bay and in the area near outfall 001 as part of her work on the receiving water monitoring program for Formosa’s TPDES permit...Ms. Vitale also testified that she told John Hyak of Formosa about these sightings as well as has sent him water samples with the pellets about five or six times, including at least one time prior to 2010. This, along with the June 2010 EPA Report I cited in my July Report, demonstrates to me that Formosa was aware of problems related to discharges of plastics from its facility since at least in 2010.” (6)

 

Harvard Business Review Re: CSR & COVID-19

lucypei

This concluding quote really summarizes the position of this article: "No one expects or requires major companies to take extraordinary measures to help their many stakeholders, but the bold and creative steps they take today to deliver immediate assistance will define their legacy tomorrow."

The author is managing director of FSG, a global social-impact consulting firm. He is lauding how acts of un-mandated CSR like Johnson & Johnson's pulling Tylenol off shelves or his own company's sliding-scale pay-cuts instead of layoffs are still talked about and used as cases in business school. He is using the "business case for CSR" line of argument to encourage companies to take steps such as giving their employees loans at a lower or no-interest rate, or doing the equivalent of "buying gift cards" from small suppliers. These actions, which don't even require any loss from the corporation, are portrayed as providing a huge boon to the company's reputation and employee loyalty, and still being above and beyond what is expected or mandated of corporations. 

The author opens with stating that the government's stimulus package is too little too late, which unfortunately is true, and then saying that the only option is for corporations to voluntarily engage in these primarily loan-based forms of assistance. 

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Alexi Martin

The components of the report was medical care (how adequate/inadequate overall care was), shelter and housing( or lack there of) logistics and constracting, charitable organizations and an overall conclusion of the report that described the failure of initative.

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Alexi Martin

The report addresses matters of disaster and health through describing the failures that the government and other organizations had on the people. Hospital's refused to evacuate (executives) leaving people stranded without power (poor planning, generators were located below sea level), and medicines. It tak=lks about the failure to evacuate and help people who have disabilities and/or who have medical problems. This led to people dying for preventable reasons. Health preperations were delayed due to the governent not allowing food and medical supplies to be delievered on time creating a discrepancy and improper treatment of people/ The shealthers that they provided were also inadequate, water systems were nonexistent after the power went out, there was rationing- the people rioted.

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Alexi Martin

The implications this report has for technical professions is the report is an example of what should not occur, more proper prep should have occured. The government distrubted food should have been protected and been on site for the incoming storms. Hospital's should have been evacuated days earlier, the report serves as a warning of what not to do if a storm this stron occurs again. Technical professionals should use this report as advice on what to do in the future. The impact of the healthcare professionals was good, they used their knowledge to the best of their ability-they determined the resources needed to increase.