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Engaged scholars as knowledge curators

tschuetz

In her article, Scharenberg (2023) provides methodological reflections on politically engaged or militant social science research. In one section, she discusses the challenge that social movements act as knowledge producers in their own right, often working independent from or outside of academic institutions (2023, 15). This raises questions about what social scientiss add to the mix. I've had similar questions working with and alongside activists in the global anti-plastics movement. Building on Casa-Cortes, Osterweil, and Powell (2013), Scharenberg points out that one response for scholars is to act as "editors" or "curators" of collective knowledge. This argument resonates with the way that I and other collaborators have thought about the engaged ethnographic archive projects:

Activist ethnographers thus become editors of collective knowledges rather than the sole producers of scientific theory. Like a literary editor, the ethnographer works from a position, which does not create knowledges from scratch, but collects the perspectives of others and assembles them with reference to the given context. In this view, objectivity might be achieved, to borrow an expression from Haraway, by assembling “partial views and halting voices” into what she calls a “collective subject position” (1988: 590). Alternatively, we might think of the editor-ethnographer as Berger’s “clerk of the records” (Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 419) who compiles the history of a group of people. Scheper-Hughes understands this position as a kind of witness. (Scharenberg 2023, 16). 

How do research alliances run parallel to activist alliances?

zoefriese

During my thesis project, Tim has served as a collaborator and mentor while he studied data use among activists opposing Formosa Plastics Group (FPG). In addition to connecting me with activists and interview candidates, he also introduced me to a small network of American and Taiwanese students in Taiwan and the United States studying FPG. This community can share resources and knowledge to further our individual studies. Could this academic network serve as a parallel to the transnational activist alliances I am studying? Are the strengths and barriers of research alliances reminiscent of the strengths and barriers of activist alliances?

Overview of Formosa Drainage Study

annika

This supplementary legal document describes recommendations for storm- and waste-water management improvements for the Formosa petrochemical plant in Calhoun County, Texas. The text is a fairly standard drainage assessment. The author describes non-trivial discharge of pollutants out of the plant’s outfalls, which drain into local waters, and the inability of the plant’s systems to prevent flooding from even small storms. For some context on this, it is pretty standard to design a stormwater system to be able to drain the 100-year storm (that is, the storm with a 1% or less chance of occurring in any given year). Formosa’s Texas plant demonstrated the inability to convey even the 2-year storm.

Formosa Drainage Study

annika

Emphases are mine:

Problem areas were identified based on the results from the outfall drainage studies provided by Formosa. Thus, all the results in the OPCC rely on those studies, uncertainities associated with those studies, and the assumptions made for those studies, some of which may or may not be appropriate as I pointed out in Supplement #2 [Page 4]” (3)

“The proposed improvements assume that the conveyance capacity of the problem areas is increased 100%, which would be able to handle twice as much flow that it currently does. The results from the Drainage Study are not conclusive as to what storm event Formosa’s system currently is capable of conveying. The report does mention that the system is not capable of conveying the 2-year storm, and “sometimes” not even the 1-year storm event. (3)

“A 45% contingency is applied to the OPCC due to the uncertainties associated with underground utilities, likelihood of existence of low road crossings and need to replace those, groundwater impacts, other unknowns, and additional costs associated with engineering, etc. 45% is reasonable and in line with industry practices in my experience, especially given the large amount of unknown information available.” (4) 

“My opinion from my July 9, 2018 report that “there have been and are still pellets and/or plastic materials discharges above trace amounts through Outfall 001” is further supported by the deposition testimony of Lisa Vitale, as representative for Freese & Nichols, Inc, that she and her colleagues have seen floating white pellets or small plastic pieces in Lavaca Bay and in the area near outfall 001 as part of her work on the receiving water monitoring program for Formosa’s TPDES permit...Ms. Vitale also testified that she told John Hyak of Formosa about these sightings as well as has sent him water samples with the pellets about five or six times, including at least one time prior to 2010. This, along with the June 2010 EPA Report I cited in my July Report, demonstrates to me that Formosa was aware of problems related to discharges of plastics from its facility since at least in 2010.” (6)

 

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Sara.Till

The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.

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Sara.Till

Several leaders from various New York State agencies convened to outline plans for this policy. This included Governor Andrew M Cuomo, State Health Commissioner Dr. Howard Zucker, State Police Superintendent Joseph D'Amico, Port Authority Executive Director Pat Foye, and representatives from health care centers and agencies around the state.

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Sara.Till

The policy applies to New York state citizens, health care workers, EMS personnel, and leadership within health care centers. Additionally, the policy has parts that effect transportation agencies and their employees. In many ways, due to Ebola's nature and the nature of New York as a major metropolitan area, these policies will also have a global effect.

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Sara.Till

As described by Governor Cuomo, Dallas was the first major US city to see an Ebola case. This, in turn, allowed New York leadership to have some semblance of what methods did or did not work when trying to contain the disease. Moreover, the policy was implemented in response to the major Ebola outbreaks occurring at this time. This included those within Africa, Europe, and cases seen in Dallas. Moreover, the policy follows the city's "Safe-than-sorry" methodology discussed by Governor Cuomo; he, along with other state and city leaders, believed assuming an Ebola outbreak would occur within the state would give them the best chance of mitigating its effects and minimizing disease spread.

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Sara.Till

The Ebola outbreak is, by its very definition, a matter of public health. The outbreak presented a danger to the global health community and resulting policies dealing with this epidemic were public health policies. That being said, the policy in place mostly served as a protocol mostly for agencies of New York in the event the epidemic spread. It focused on standardizing the practices of health, transport, and government agencies in the event of an outbreak; it did not focus on individuals already effected with the disease, but more so on preventing the spread of the epidemic. 

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Sara.Till

The policy does not make any specific mentions of how to deal with vulnerable populations. However, if one were to consider the nature of New York, it can be argued that the city's entire population is vulnerable to outbreak. As a hub of trade, finance, travel, and business, New York is at a considerably higher risk than a city without this high metropolitan activity. The policy does include measures on how to treat individuals who show signs and symptoms in public locations, but does not mandate testing or health checks for individuals involved in transport, travel, or who have limited access to health care (the homeless).