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I published this news article about a hunger strike against Formosa Plastics that occurred in Texas this fall. Despite the extremity of a 30-day hunger strike, the protesting tactic has not gained attention from national media outlets. At the time I published this article, two small environmental organizations had announced the beginning of the strike, but none continued to cover the event in the unfolding weeks. While activists are driven to take on dangerous protest tactics, little communication of these tactics has carried across mass media.

The article itself introduces Formosa Plastics through its reputation as a "serial offender" of environmental and workplace safety regulations. I list several statistics on legal fines that Formosa Plastics has accumulated overtime, using these quantities to demonstrate the scale of their harm to environmental and human health. An important limitation of this storytelling strategy, however, is that many of Formosa Plastics' actions go undocumented, and even when documented, do not lead to legal consequences. Furthermore, we should still strive to acknowledge the harms committed by Formosa Plastics that are technically within legal limits.

This supplementary legal document describes recommendations for storm- and waste-water management improvements for the Formosa petrochemical plant in Calhoun County, Texas. The text is a fairly standard drainage assessment. The author describes non-trivial discharge of pollutants out of the plant’s outfalls, which drain into local waters, and the inability of the plant’s systems to prevent flooding from even small storms. For some context on this, it is pretty standard to design a stormwater system to be able to drain the 100-year storm (that is, the storm with a 1% or less chance of occurring in any given year). Formosa’s Texas plant demonstrated the inability to convey even the 2-year storm.

Emphases are mine:

“Problem areas were identified based on the results from the outfall drainage studies provided by Formosa. Thus, all the results in the OPCC rely on those studies, uncertainities associated with those studies, and the assumptions made for those studies, some of which may or may not be appropriate as I pointed out in Supplement #2 [Page 4]” (3)

“The proposed improvements assume that the conveyance capacity of the problem areas is increased 100%, which would be able to handle twice as much flow that it currently does. The results from the Drainage Study are not conclusive as to what storm event Formosa’s system currently is capable of conveying. The report does mention that the system is not capable of conveying the 2-year storm, and “sometimes” not even the 1-year storm event.” (3)

“A 45% contingency is applied to the OPCC due to the uncertainties associated with underground utilities, likelihood of existence of low road crossings and need to replace those, groundwater impacts, other unknowns, and additional costs associated with engineering, etc. 45% is reasonable and in line with industry practices in my experience, especially given the large amount of unknown information available.” (4) 

“My opinion from my July 9, 2018 report that “there have been and are still pellets and/or plastic materials discharges above trace amounts through Outfall 001” is further supported by the deposition testimony of Lisa Vitale, as representative for Freese & Nichols, Inc, that she and her colleagues have seen floating white pellets or small plastic pieces in Lavaca Bay and in the area near outfall 001 as part of her work on the receiving water monitoring program for Formosa’s TPDES permit...Ms. Vitale also testified that she told John Hyak of Formosa about these sightings as well as has sent him water samples with the pellets about five or six times, including at least one time prior to 2010. This, along with the June 2010 EPA Report I cited in my July Report, demonstrates to me that Formosa was aware of problems related to discharges of plastics from its facility since at least in 2010.” (6)

According to Google Scholar, this article has only been cited once. The publication's name is "Documenting Attacks on Health Workers and Facilities in Armed Conflicts." This publication discusses attacks on health facilities and workers in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

The article's bibliography contains many references including the WHO, the Red Cross, and other organizations, as well as many other experts and professionals in the field. 

The authors range from a variety of institutions including: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, Karolinska Institute in Sweden, Fafo Research Institute in Norway, and King's College London in the UK. The main author, Ludvig Foghammar, seems to have a lot of knowledge in economics, political science, and global health (according to his LinkedIn). He has served as Officer for European Affairs for the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, and a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 

The methods used in this paper include interviews from 11 different representatives of organizations working in complex security environments, information from research workshops that included researchers and practitioners in the fields of health and humanitarian aid delivery and policy, and overall analysis of organizational efforts made to address this type of violence.

They also use many examples of situations in which violence against humanitarian workers and facilities occurred. 

The authors discuss that there is little information regarding this topic because there is a lack of research. This is pointed out by the fact that they could only find 38 articles that related to this topic. They also point out that there is an urgency for an analysis regarding the impact of this violence on the facilities, organizations, and on the populations that benefitted from the humanitarian presence. 

The argument is supported through examples of violence, interviews, and insight into the ways in which research is lacking in this field.