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1) "The most bizarre, and perhaps most telling, moment in the hearing occurred when Rep Anthony D. Weiner of New York, addressing the panel of experts, asked for the person in charge of the investigation to raise his hand. When three hands went up..."

2) "Clashes over authority among powerful institutions both public and private, competition among rival experts for influence, inquiry into a disaster elevated to the status of a memorial for the dead: these are the base elements of the World Trade Center investigation. And yet, even a brief historical review shows us that these elements are not unique."

3) "They were not reassuring, or especially enlightening answers. Some things were already known."

1) NIST: The National Institute of Standards and Technology, a federal agency primarily charged with promoting innovation and industrial competitiveness. In the wake of 9/11, FEMA chose this institution as the leading body in the investigation. This choice seems odd, as NIST is not a regulatory agency; what this agency exactly accomplishes would be interesting to know.

2) ASCE: Prior to reading this article, I had never heard of the ASCE. It serves as a representation of Civil Engineering for American engineers. I'd be intrigued to know their role in worldwide disasters. 

3) War of 1812: Nobody knows what happened during this war; literally the most misunderstood war in American history, yet it serves as a main point of contrast for this article.

Dr Knowles examines three historical structural disasters: the burning of the Capital Building (1814), the Hague Street boiler explosion (1850), and the Chicago Iroquois Theater fire (1903). The Capital Building burning (henceforth noted as CBB), and the subsequent investigation by engineer Benjamin Latrobe provided numerous insights into the disaster. These are discussed, but Dr. Knowles pays particular attention to the major scrutiny endured by Latrobe. As a major player during the planning and building of the Capital Building, the CBB was painted as his failure (despite indications otherwise). More than anything, the report highlights Latrobe's inability to prevent and evaluate disaster; although an employee directly of the president and senate, he was powerless to enact change. Similarly, the Hague street boiler seemed to be fraught with issues. Yet, those who came to present in the ensuing investigation had no true standing to alter future events. It  again follows this pattern of disaster, difficult investigation, and minimal substantial response by those in power. The Iroquois Theater Fire investigation seemed to finally deviate from this norm. Multiple fire experts, engineers, and public officials involved themselves in the case. However, ultimately, the investigation's findings were not put to use. Some advances occurred, yet so many other technical progressions were ignored.

Many of the sources cited in the bibliography seem to be from various news sources. This includes New York Times, New York Daily Tribune, Chicago Daily Tribune, and Chicago Chronicle, to name a few. There are also several historical reports or accounts of the events described by Dr. Knowles. This indicates a focus on primary literature and sources when describing the historical disasters. There also appear to be several transcripts of federal agency or committee interactions and reports. 

Dr. Knowles discusses the role and nature of investigations after disasters, particularly in regard to engineering and structural aspects. He primarily draws parallels between the delayed and botched engineering investigations after 9/11 and several similar historical disasters. Dr. Knowles contends these investigations can drastically effect how the public interprets disaster response; yet, it is often overlooked by officials until demanded by public outcry.

This article seems to be primarily cited by other articles concerning historical disasters. It appears, for the most part, to be very under-cited by the research community. This may be due to its nature as a primarily historical analysis of a very under represented issue. Many competing articles seem to focus on more substantial issues with direct effects on communities or directly point out failures that led to significant reduction in response capability. As argued in the article, it can be very difficult to press issues without public encouragement for the topic. 

Scott G. Knowles: Department of History Head, Associate Professor in the Center for Science, Technology, and Society at Drexel University. Dr. Knowles specifically focuses on disaster, risk, and technological history. Multiple publications also extend into public policy, modern disaster response, and future risks.

This article particularly focuses on analysis in the aftermath of emergencies. Specifically, in the investigative processes of structural disasters. It highlights the awkward melding of various agencies in the face of public demand for answers. More than anything, it presents this instability in the investigative processes surrounding many emergencies; understanding the logistics of a building's collapse or how a fire rapidly spread only furthers comprehension of the disaster as a whole. Moreover, findings from this analysis could provide strategies for avoiding future emergencies of a similar nature. The article opens investigations for scrutiny, asking why such an integral part of the post-disaster process often gets swept aside.

Several sources are utilized in compiling Dr. Knowles' argument. Much of the historical information comes from first-hand accounts provided at the time and compiled for posterity. A good portion of information also emerges from news articles produced in the wake of the event. This includes interviews and press releases. Historical court documentation and correspondences between parties are used for depiction of events and subsequent investigations. Several aanalysis pieces by historians also appear to be used. When discussing the parallels between scenarios, Dr. Knowles relies on his own logic to fully connect the events.