This article has been referenced in several articles, although due to the number of scientific articles written about the World Trade Center Collapse there are likely more. One such article is “Dealing with Disaster: The Politics of Catastrophe in the United States, 1789-1861”.
Dr Knowles examines three historical structural disasters: the burning of the Capital Building (1814), the Hague Street boiler explosion (1850), and the Chicago Iroquois Theater fire (1903). The Capital Building burning (henceforth noted as CBB), and the subsequent investigation by engineer Benjamin Latrobe provided numerous insights into the disaster. These are discussed, but Dr. Knowles pays particular attention to the major scrutiny endured by Latrobe. As a major player during the planning and building of the Capital Building, the CBB was painted as his failure (despite indications otherwise). More than anything, the report highlights Latrobe's inability to prevent and evaluate disaster; although an employee directly of the president and senate, he was powerless to enact change. Similarly, the Hague street boiler seemed to be fraught with issues. Yet, those who came to present in the ensuing investigation had no true standing to alter future events. It again follows this pattern of disaster, difficult investigation, and minimal substantial response by those in power. The Iroquois Theater Fire investigation seemed to finally deviate from this norm. Multiple fire experts, engineers, and public officials involved themselves in the case. However, ultimately, the investigation's findings were not put to use. Some advances occurred, yet so many other technical progressions were ignored.
Scott Gabriel Knowles is an expert in disaster and risk, he has written several papers and books on the cause of disasters and the risks found in the modern industrial era. He currently works as a professor at Drexel university and is a member of the Fukushima Forum collaborative research community.
Many of the sources cited in the bibliography seem to be from various news sources. This includes New York Times, New York Daily Tribune, Chicago Daily Tribune, and Chicago Chronicle, to name a few. There are also several historical reports or accounts of the events described by Dr. Knowles. This indicates a focus on primary literature and sources when describing the historical disasters. There also appear to be several transcripts of federal agency or committee interactions and reports.
Emergency response is not addressed in terms of the immediate response. The article focuses instead on the aftermath of the incident on Sept. 11th, dealing primarily with the cleanup efforts and investigation that followed in an effort to provide closure to the public and resume the regular business of the city, both important steps in recovering from a disaster.
Dr. Knowles discusses the role and nature of investigations after disasters, particularly in regard to engineering and structural aspects. He primarily draws parallels between the delayed and botched engineering investigations after 9/11 and several similar historical disasters. Dr. Knowles contends these investigations can drastically effect how the public interprets disaster response; yet, it is often overlooked by officials until demanded by public outcry.
This article seems to be primarily cited by other articles concerning historical disasters. It appears, for the most part, to be very under-cited by the research community. This may be due to its nature as a primarily historical analysis of a very under represented issue. Many competing articles seem to focus on more substantial issues with direct effects on communities or directly point out failures that led to significant reduction in response capability. As argued in the article, it can be very difficult to press issues without public encouragement for the topic.
Several historical examples are used including the burning of the US Capital in 1814, the Hague St. explosion in 1850, and the Iroquois theater fire in 1903. The article uses examples that were in the public awareness at the time of the disaster in order to exemplify the many agents pressuring investigators to make a rapid and acceptable decision including the public, the government, and the businesses effected.
Scott G. Knowles: Department of History Head, Associate Professor in the Center for Science, Technology, and Society at Drexel University. Dr. Knowles specifically focuses on disaster, risk, and technological history. Multiple publications also extend into public policy, modern disaster response, and future risks.
This article particularly focuses on analysis in the aftermath of emergencies. Specifically, in the investigative processes of structural disasters. It highlights the awkward melding of various agencies in the face of public demand for answers. More than anything, it presents this instability in the investigative processes surrounding many emergencies; understanding the logistics of a building's collapse or how a fire rapidly spread only furthers comprehension of the disaster as a whole. Moreover, findings from this analysis could provide strategies for avoiding future emergencies of a similar nature. The article opens investigations for scrutiny, asking why such an integral part of the post-disaster process often gets swept aside.