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“The large question this study addresses is the following: How do people make sense of (and cope with) toxic danger? The Martinezes’ story anticipates the complexity of the answer(s): physical and psychological suffering is compounded by doubts, disagreements, suspicions, fears, and endless waiting.” (4)

‘Flammable is a story of people’s confusion, mistakes and/or blindness regarding the toxicity that surrounds them. Flammable is also a story of silent habituation to contamination and of almost complete absence of mass protest against toxic onslaught’ (4)

“Schoolteachers, journalists, and lawyers are also part and parcel of daily life in Flammable. Together, all these actors contribute to what Flammable residents know about their place. They also influence what they ignore, what they want to know, and what they misrecognize. Government officials, company personnel, physicians, teachers, journalists, and lawyers jointly (but hardly cooperatively, given that their opinions don’t count equally) shape locals’ experiences of contamination and risk. This book examines how and why this production of shared knowledge (or lack thereof ) occurs.” (5)

“All in all, confusions, bewilderments, divisions, rumors, frustrations, and hopes are making Flammable residents wait—they wait for more testing, for further and better knowledge, for relocation, and for the “huge” settlement with one of the “powerful companies” that will, in the words of a neighbor, “allow us to move out.” This waiting is, as we will show, one of the ways in which Flammable residents experience submission.” (6) 

“We did our best to learn how to listen, look, and touch with respect and care, knowing with Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992:28) that “seeing, listening, touching, recording, can be, if done with care and sensitivity, acts of fraternity and sisterhood, acts of solidarity. Above all, they are the work of recognition. Not to look, not to touch, not to record, can be the hostile act, the act of indifference and of turning away.” (14)

‘… the culture of toxic uncertainty is a complex web of meanings and shared understandings’ (108)

Labor of confusion: “During the long period of slowly germinating contamination, the actions of government authorities toward pollution in the neighborhood were less consistent and more contradictory than either the denial or underestimation that has been documented in the existing literature. Those multiple incongruous actions gave shape to what we term, extending the insights of students of ideology and symbolic power (Thompson 1984; Eagleton 1991; Bourdieu 1991), a labor of confusion that has a decisive effect on shared (mis)understandings.” (10)

 Ulrich Beck, social invisibility, lack of “social thinking” about environmental issues (Beck 1992)

Bourdieu, symbolic violence - misrecognition of power structures on part of the oppressed enables domination

Toxic uncertainty: “a way of experiencing toxic suffering that is shaped by what we call, borrowing from Charles Tilly (1996), the interacting “invisible elbows” of external power forces and of everyday routine survival struggles” (6)

Flammable is an account of how people in a particular place make sense of slow, invisible environmental pollution. The people of Flammable live in an Argentinean shantytown located next to petrochemical companies and storage facilities. They have been deeply affected by the rise in unemployment in the 1990s, with most residents subsisting on part-time manual jobs at one of the companies, retirement pensions, state welfare programmes and what else they can find. The area in which these residents live is known and recognized by government experts to be contaminated and unsafe for human habitation–and yet widespread confusion and uncertainty amongst residents and a lack of government actions means that the shantytown continues to exist. Auyero and Swistun explore the multitude of influences that ‘‘shape what people see, what they don’t see, what they know, what they don’t know, and what they would like to know, what they do and what they don’t do’’ (145). They show how residents gradually naturalize their situations, which, combined with the mystification of dominant discourses, contributes to their quiescence in the face of contamination. 

1) "About 2,000 tons of asbestos and 424,000 tons of concrete were used to build the towers, and when they came crashing down they released dust laden with toxins."

2 "But as early as Sept. 13, Mrs. Whitman and the agency put out press releases saying that the air near ground zero was relatively safe and that there were "no significant levels" of asbestos dust in the air. They gave a green light for residents to return to their homes near the trade center site"

The article contains quotations attributed directly to the judge, so I would presume she was either present for the ruling or accessed the case brief. This would also be where Ms. Preston could obtain direct quotations from the plantiff's arguments. Additionally, the article includes statements from the EPA, public officials, and Senator Rodham Clinton; these would either be from official public releases or interviews by government personel. 

The article debriefs a ruling by Federal District Court Judge Deborah A. Batts on a class action lawsuit against the EPA. It details the claims made by the plantiffs' surrounding EPA officials' misconduct after 9/11. Specifically cited are Christie Whitman, who chaired the EPA  during the attacks, and several other EPA officials.

Judge Batts: Deborah A Batts, sitting judge of the Manhattan Federal District Court at the time of these proceedings. She handed down the ruling that allowed the pursuit of the class action lawsuit.

Christie Whitman: Former EPA "leader" (chair) at the time of the 9/11 attacks. She and several other officials (unnamed in this article) are accused of misleading the public about air quality surrounding the tower site.

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency. Federal agency charged with matters pertaining to the environment, particularly those that concern public health. The EPA often aids in creating standards for environmental safety (including pollution and airborne particles).

The article's primary focus is the failure of a government agency in the wake of the 9/11. The EPA's inadequate response to air pollution and subsequent public misguidance led to a multitude of public health issues. While the article does not explicitly detail the issues stated in this lawsuit, it does mention the EPA's failure to properly formulate and enact a plan to clean up materials released into the air.

1) EPA: what are the exact duties and responsibilities of the EPA after a disaster? While we mostly consider it to focus on pollutants and environmental conservation, both this article and FEMA training seem to indicate it holds a much larger role in emergency situations.

2) Christie Whitman: a former governor of New Jersey and Administrator of the EPA from 2001-2003, Whitman served during the 9/11 attacks. Despite pointed personal criticism about her time in the EPA (including legal action), Whitman historical demonstrated a pattern of moderatism, often putting her at odds with the administration she served. It would be interesting to see where in the 9/11 lapse emerged-- whether it be from judgement, misinformation, or disinterest.

3) 9/11 Health Effects: The release of millions of asbestos and concrete particles into the air certainly increases the odds of chronic respiratory issues for NYC populations. I would be interested in whether any other chronic issues or epidemics have been noted as a result of pollution from the Towers' collapse

Preston's article mentions the EPA still had not formulated and enacted a plan for cleanup-- it should be noted the year of publication was 2006. She claims "After an expert panel failed last year to settle on a method for organizing an E.P.A. cleanup, the agency said it would proceed anyway with limited testing and cleaning". Moreover, in the 10 years since publication, several studies have indicated increased public health risks and chronic illness prevalence in populations near the disaster zone. It seems the approach of sit-and-wait did nothing but exacerbate the issue, leading me to believe this will serve as a symbol in any future pollutant-laden disasters.