Facilities and enforcement case searches can both easily be limited by geography (EPA region, city, state, zip code, county, proximity to national border, and watershed). The tool also automatically produces maps that allow users to see the distribution of facilities across space.
This database uses a broad variety of data. Most of the data is collected by the EPA itself. Users are able to search for facilities regulated under the following systems:
When looking at individual facilities, the database provides detailed facility reports, enforcement case reports (civil and criminal), air pollutant reports, effluent charts, pollutant loading reports, effluent limit exceedances reports, CWA program area reports, permit limits reports, and other facility documents as available. The database provides easy ways to download and map the data. The database also allows users to narrow facilities searches using demographic data from EJScreen (also maintained by the EPA), the U.S. Census, and tribal land data.
Users can also look for information on federal administrative and judicial enforcement actions through an enforcement case search.
ECHO is maintained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Its purpose is to provide comprehensive information about all of the facilities regulated by the EPA. It is connected directly to the EPA's internal enforcement record system, so information is currrent.
The Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) Database, maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) Database. 2022. Available online: https://echo.epa.gov/ (accessed on 17 March 2022).
The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.
FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.
NYPD - New York City Police Department.
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.
PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey.
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.
This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.
“A sixmonth examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”
''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a nobrainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''
The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.
1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.
2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU
3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.