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This supplementary legal document describes recommendations for storm- and waste-water management improvements for the Formosa petrochemical plant in Calhoun County, Texas. The text is a fairly standard drainage assessment. The author describes non-trivial discharge of pollutants out of the plant’s outfalls, which drain into local waters, and the inability of the plant’s systems to prevent flooding from even small storms. For some context on this, it is pretty standard to design a stormwater system to be able to drain the 100-year storm (that is, the storm with a 1% or less chance of occurring in any given year). Formosa’s Texas plant demonstrated the inability to convey even the 2-year storm.

Emphases are mine:

“Problem areas were identified based on the results from the outfall drainage studies provided by Formosa. Thus, all the results in the OPCC rely on those studies, uncertainities associated with those studies, and the assumptions made for those studies, some of which may or may not be appropriate as I pointed out in Supplement #2 [Page 4]” (3)

“The proposed improvements assume that the conveyance capacity of the problem areas is increased 100%, which would be able to handle twice as much flow that it currently does. The results from the Drainage Study are not conclusive as to what storm event Formosa’s system currently is capable of conveying. The report does mention that the system is not capable of conveying the 2-year storm, and “sometimes” not even the 1-year storm event.” (3)

“A 45% contingency is applied to the OPCC due to the uncertainties associated with underground utilities, likelihood of existence of low road crossings and need to replace those, groundwater impacts, other unknowns, and additional costs associated with engineering, etc. 45% is reasonable and in line with industry practices in my experience, especially given the large amount of unknown information available.” (4) 

“My opinion from my July 9, 2018 report that “there have been and are still pellets and/or plastic materials discharges above trace amounts through Outfall 001” is further supported by the deposition testimony of Lisa Vitale, as representative for Freese & Nichols, Inc, that she and her colleagues have seen floating white pellets or small plastic pieces in Lavaca Bay and in the area near outfall 001 as part of her work on the receiving water monitoring program for Formosa’s TPDES permit...Ms. Vitale also testified that she told John Hyak of Formosa about these sightings as well as has sent him water samples with the pellets about five or six times, including at least one time prior to 2010. This, along with the June 2010 EPA Report I cited in my July Report, demonstrates to me that Formosa was aware of problems related to discharges of plastics from its facility since at least in 2010.” (6)

The film is primarily the narratives of many first responders, so they play a large roll in the meassage being protrayed. They are seen as heros but also paid the price of their decisions through health issues.

The film is geared towards the general public, all medical terms are explained fairly well. No medical or first response background is necessary, and it is fairly educational for viewers.

The real threats of air quality were covered up due to politics and other reasons, wanting to get america back to work. Instead, the reports were edited and people were sent back into the dirty air to clean up the scene or back to office jobs in the area, with contaminated air surrounding everything. Decontanimation efforts did not start until very late in the process. Bush did not wear a mask and the workers were told they didn't need to, so they didn't. As a result, there were severe health problems afterwards.

The first hand interviews from first responders are compiled in a way that goes through the stories of what heppened, how health information was released and changed. The first repsonder stories are intermixed with testimonies from the EPA workers, showing differences in the science that was found and the press releases disclosing the health concerns. Many tear up upon realizing how their health will hurt their families. The doctors in the area caught onto the trends in poor health and started a monitoring program to make sure everyone got the medical screening and help they needed. The lives of all of the first responders and their families were changed drastically from their public service.

First responders share their experiences, how they responded, how they realized there weren't going to be many survivors. Many of them suffered from health issues afterwards. The air was very toxic and led to cancers. It makes you wonder how other safety information is given to first responders. They weren't even doing a rescue mission at the point that asbestos was being hidden in reports, so their lives should not have been risked like that for simply cleaning up rubble. Was it worth it for them to shovel the debris and pull out parts of bodies at that point, while putting their well being and lives at risk? If they had waited a few months for the dust to settle and be cleaned up, would that have saved many of the first responders? Offices in the area and houses nearby weren't inspected until even later. Schools opened as a sign of American strength led to asthma, bronchitis, etc. Are those lives worth the public image?