Search

vvv

nnnn

BBBBBBBBBB

When I read the commentary on COVID-19 and Higher Education, it reminded me an article published in the early days of the transition to online teaching. In this article entitled "The Difference Between Emergency Remote Teaching and Online Learning," the authors emphasize the importance of naming (what we regularly refer as) online teaching as "emergency remote teaching": 

"Online learning carries a stigma of being lower quality than face-to-face learning, despite research showing otherwise. These hurried moves online by so many institutions at once could seal the perception of online learning as a weak option, when in truth nobody making the transition to online teaching under these circumstances will truly be designing to take full advantage of the affordances and possibilities of the online format."

"Researchers in educational technology, specifically in the subdiscipline of online and distance learning, have carefully defined terms over the years to distinguish between the highly variable design solutions that have been developed and implemented: distance learning, distributed learning, blended learning, online learning, mobile learning, and others. Yet an understanding of the important differences has mostly not diffused beyond the insular world of educational technology and instructional design researchers and professionals. Here, we want to offer an important discussion around the terminology and formally propose a specific term for the type of instruction being delivered in these pressing circumstances: emergency remote teaching."

Let's re-read a quote in the commentary by Robert Pose in the light of above notes: 

"The sudden brutal switch to online learning is the most obvious consequence for higher education of the pandemic. Everyone now accepts online teaching because everyone regards it as necessary to reduce serious health hazards. But after the pandemic recedes, it is likely economic forces will seek to keep online learning in place, because it is far cheaper than education before the pandemic."

I think we need much more nuanced and careful approach to the possibility of continuing online teaching in the aftermath of COVID-19 without reducing the discussion to the terms of economics. Since many universities have shifted to emergency remote teaching without necesarily having the required experience and infrastructure in online teaching, there appear many concerns beyond economics, at least in my university, e.g., the lack of regular communication between students and educators appear as a concern of the authorities beyond of teachers.  

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.