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“Environmental justice (EJ) scholars and activists see communities’ ability to participate meaningfully in decisions that affect the local environment, including siting decisions for refineries, power plants, waste dumps, and the like, to be integral to the idea of EJ (Cole and Foster 2001; Schlosberg 2007). For some, this explicitly includes the notion of consent: participatory processes are a means through which community members can give their consent (or not) once they fully understand the scope and consequences of a proposal (Shrader-Frechette 2005, 2007).” (252)

“EJ advocates have called attention to siting practices that target communities of color because of their political margin- alization. In order to challenge the siting of hazardous facilities, commu- nities of color have also had to confront exclusionary decision-making processes characterized by unrepresentative local governments, monolingual proceedings, and reliance on technocratic risk assessments, to name a few (Cole and Foster 2001). As a result, one of the Principles of EJ adopted in 1991 by the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit calls explicitly for justice in decision-making practices: ‘‘Environmental Justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making.’’ (254)

“Seeing disclosure as an important element of informed consent provides ethical grounds to excoriate polluting industries for suppressing information, making misleading scientific claims, and intimidating scientists who wish to draw attention to the health risks they pose (see, e.g., Schrader-Frechette 2007, 39-75).” (255)

“Current discussions of procedural justice in the siting of environmentally hazardous facilities are far from na ̈ıve about the limitations of scientific knowledge. EJ advocates have not only criticized industry and government scientists for patently unethical practices like suppressing data (e.g., Shrader-Frechette 2007), they have pointed out the ways that scientific ways of knowing and technocratic modes of decision making can circumscribe community members’ ability to have a say in decisions that will affect their local environments (Guana 1998; Shrader-Frechette 1991); they have also asserted the need for community members’ local knowledge to be recognized as part of just decision-making procedures (Allen 2003; Fischer 2000).” (263)

This text explores some of the current barriers to achieving procedural justice (participation in decision making by those affected by it) based on Science and Technology Studies (STS). Examples of some of these fundamental barriers include (i) lack of disclosure of information from industry, and (ii) lack of information available at the time of decision making (making consent to be subject to environmental hazards difficult or impossible. The author argues for proactive, STS-based knowledge generation to combat this.

Drawing on a long career as a Black critical health equity researcher, Bowleg quotes Black feminist Audre Lorde in arguing that the “master’s tools”—in order words, conventional theories and methods—"will never dismantle the master’s house”—intersectional structures of oppression from which health inequities are produced. Bowleg elaborates by explaining that conventional theories and methods “valorize almost exclusively individualistic and social cognitive approaches (Cochran & Mays, 1993; Weber & Parra-Medina, 2003); ignore the foundational roots of structural and intersectional inequality (Bowleg, 2012, 2020); center White, Western, cisgender male, middle-class, and heterosexual people and their experiences as normative (Henrich et al., 2010); prioritize amelioration, not transformation (Fox et al., 2009a); and view Black people primarily through the lens of deficit or pathology” (237).

Thus Bowleg offers 10 critical lessons for Black and other health equity researchers of color that she links with system and structural-level strategies. Bowleg also cautions that these lessons are risky and could damage one’s academic career—but that it is exactly this kind of risk that is necessary for change. Among these include: embrace critical perspectives, embrace a critical qualitative stance, learn research paradigms (e.g. positivist paradigm = a master’s tool, must learn to counter), foster community-based partnerships and collaborations, and highlight black communities’ strengths, assets, and acts of resistance. Bowledge also encourages researchers to “tell it like it is”: “Epistemological ignorance is one of the master’s most formidable tools. Epistemologies of ignorance refer to the examination of different types of ignorance and their production, maintenance, and functions (Sullivan & Tuana, 2007)” (239). Here, Bowleg emphasizes the importance of language by discussing how it can alternatively reveal or obscure structures of oppression as well as it shapes the nature of research.

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.

1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.

2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU

3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.

“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”

“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””