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I published this news article about a hunger strike against Formosa Plastics that occurred in Texas this fall. Despite the extremity of a 30-day hunger strike, the protesting tactic has not gained attention from national media outlets. At the time I published this article, two small environmental organizations had announced the beginning of the strike, but none continued to cover the event in the unfolding weeks. While activists are driven to take on dangerous protest tactics, little communication of these tactics has carried across mass media.

The article itself introduces Formosa Plastics through its reputation as a "serial offender" of environmental and workplace safety regulations. I list several statistics on legal fines that Formosa Plastics has accumulated overtime, using these quantities to demonstrate the scale of their harm to environmental and human health. An important limitation of this storytelling strategy, however, is that many of Formosa Plastics' actions go undocumented, and even when documented, do not lead to legal consequences. Furthermore, we should still strive to acknowledge the harms committed by Formosa Plastics that are technically within legal limits.

This study examined the risk of acquiring Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) by healthcare workers in the setting of general hospitals and isolation units. By looking retrospectively at the Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone, the relative levels of risk to healthcare workers were computed and compared. The reasoning for these levels was also examined through interviews of surviving workers and the families/associates/colleagues of the deceased workers. The interviews reviewed common actions (and lack there of) for affected workers. This revealed certain themes that should be visited when reveising/creating hospital infection prevention and control policies.

In the case of this study, the vulnerable population examined was healthcare workers in Sierra Leone during the outbreak. These workers were found to be at a significant level of risk for transmission for a number of reasons. These include proximity to the virus (due to the occupation), lack of training in the area of infection control, and cultural factors (such as prevalence of self-medication and home management of illness). Nurses as a whole were most affected, with over half of the infected members. 

The data acquired in this study can be used not only for improvement in policies and training for healthcare workers, but also to examine the risk factors for the disease. One example is the age and gender disparities in those nfected. These could be explained by the typical age and gender of healthcare workers, but could also show a trend in risk when coupled with patient data. The data on the districts and their infection rates can be used to help pinpoint the origin of infection. 

The study was published in BMC Infectious Diseases, a peer-reviewed journal on the prevention, diagnoisis, and management of infectious disease. The journal seems to be genrally well respected.

This was a retrospective study. While not the most accurate and well supported way to conduct a study, due to the effects of recall bias, it was really the only way to gain the data that was presented in the report. There isn't really anything new about the style of research. 

At least one further study has been conducted using this data. A more focussed paper on the Kenema District in Sierra Leone was written, addressing the staggering number of cases with infected healthcare workers. The paper is titled "Facors Underlying Ebola Virus Infection Among healthcare Workers, Kenema, Sierra Leone, 2014-2015."  The paper reached similar conlusions as the original one, with a need for better practices in infection control and prevention. 

The study was funded by the WHO Country Office for Sierra leone.

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.