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They could have discussed logistics on transport and mass treatments more, but overall they did a good job.

The number of emergency workers lost during 9/11:

343 Fire Fighters - http://nyfd.com/9_11_wtc.html

60 Police Officers

8 EMTs and Paramedics - http://www.world-memorial.org/Tribute/EMS/medics.html

EMS Lesson's Learned from 9/11

http://www.jems.com/articles/2006/08/lessons-learned-911.html

Changes were made to the mutual aid system. Resources that had, in the event, run out or were needed sooner than they were used are now better stocked and available. Some new trainings were implemented.

More stories from 9/11 by EMS

http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/mck_report/ems_response.pdf

Scott Gabriel Knowles is the head of the Department of History at the University of Drexel College of Arts and Sciences. His work focuses on risk and disaster, with particular interest in modern cities, technology and public policy. He is a research fellow at the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware, and has been a member of the Fukishima Forum collaborative research community since its inception in 2011. His work on public policy in relation to disaster-preparedness is focused on his home city of Philidelphia, and has written extensively on how to better prepare the city and preserve its legacy.

Investigation after large-scale national tragedy is often contaminated with the many factors that surround that event. Since the attack on the World Trade Center was so deeply rooted in politics, culture, international relations and emotional connections, the investigation following the attacks failed to result in a dispassionate, scientific verdict. Instead, it became muddled in the many conflicting and intertwining interests that came with the attack. 

This article discusses several disasters that resulted in major loss of human life in the US; it examines the similarities and differences between them, and how they've evolved through the years. The first disaster that was discussed was the burning of the US Capitol Building in 1814. The article then moves on to discuss the Hague Street boiler explosion and building collapse in New York in 1850, the Iroquois Theater FIre in Chicago in 1903, and finally, the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. This article points out that in the first two investigations, there was a lot of finger pointing that took place when the government (both federal and local) and private individuals investigated the aftermath. Moving into investigating the more recent two incidents, individuals and organizations may have finger-pointed, but they also conducted thorough investigations that resulted in recommendations for change to save life and property in the future.

-          The article describes Dr. Astaneh-Asl, a Berkeley Professor sent by the ASCE to investigate and determine the structural causes of the collapse of the World Trade Center, and his search for answers. When he arrived in NYC, he finds his evidence he was hoping to investigate, the 310,000 tons of debris, had been sent by the city to be scrapped and recycled.

-          The article goes on to explain the challenges faced by the three organizations presiding over the investigation, FEMA, ASCE and NIST, not being permitted access to documentation, records, or witness testimonies. From these problems arose inter-agency conflict and dischord, as the three failed to work together cohesively with clear goals and purpose. There was a clear lack of leadership, made apparent when Rep. Anthony Weiner asked “Whoever is in charge of this investigation, please raise your hand,” which was met with three people claiming leadership.

-          Knowles goes on to state that these problems and conflicts in the wake of the attack were not unique to the World Trade Center attack. He goes through a number of national tragedies, comparing and contrasting the investigation process of each, explaining the hurdles faced by investigators. This drives home how, over centuries, this is a reoccurring issue.

-The “disaster investigation,” far from proving itself the dispassionate, scientific verdict on causality and blame, actually emerges as a hard-fought contest to define the moment in politics and society, in technology and culture.

-Investigators had no power to protest the decision. In fact, their initial request to inspect the steel had been lost in the confusion by city officials still pressed with the responsibility of looking for bodies.

-Clashes over authority among powerful institutions both public and private, competition among rival experts for influence, inquiry into a disaster elevated to the status of a memorial for the dead: these are the base elements of the World Trade Center investigation. And yet, give a brief historical review shows us these elements are not unique.

This report was produce by compiling historical events and vignettes of the investigation process following several prolific tragedies. They are compared, and conclusions are drawn about similar aspects that muddle investigation following one of these tragedies.

This article covers the investigation procedure following a tragedy, and how the outcomes of these investigations tend to be muddled due to factors outside of logic and reason. These influencing factors make it difficult to draw conclusions as to what contributing factors were most significant in the damage sustained during the tragedy, and how to best avoid them in the future. For this reason, it addresses how difficult it is to improve disaster-response when so little useful information can be gleaned from the modern investigatory procedure. 

It has been cited 5 times, in three papers (The World Trade Center Analyses: Case Study of Ethics, Public Policy and the Engineering Profession; Engineering Risk and Disaster: Disaster-STS and the American History of technology; Making Sense of Disaster) and two books (Expanding the Criminological Imagination: Critical Readings in Crimonology; The Martians Have Landed!: A history of Media-Driven Panics and Hoaxes).