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Residents of Love Canal, in the Niagara Falls region of Western New York, were alerted to signs of a toxic waste crisis involving the lethal chemical byproduct dioxin in the late 1970s. Residents learned about the crisis through news media, community activism and research, and their own visceral experiences – they could smell noxious fumes, noticed black sludge seeping into their basements, and saw children falling ill. Activists and academics carried out community-based research to survey the area in an effort to understand the extent of the hazard and its effects – data that they saw as missing, at the time – in turn generating evidence of changes in health and pregnancy abnormalities. In doing so, members of the community aimed to hold corporate and government stakeholders accountable to evacuate residents, organize remediation, and strengthen scientific studies and interventions to care for residents. Regional health authorities, however, dismissed community-based studies as “useless housewife data”. Activists responded by scrutinizing government and scientific studies, critiquing a lack of ecological validity and trustworthiness. Residents and community groups’ advocacy contributed to their exercise of epistemic authority, the creation of archival records and initiatives tracking the crisis over the last five decades, and wider public attention to Love Canal and other sites like it.

Image Description and Source: "Map showing distribution of symptoms believed to be caused by Love Canal pollutants," Digital Collections - University at Buffalo Libraries, May 1982.

Shankar, Saguna. 2023. "What's the Use of Data? Epistemic Authority and Environmental Injustice at Love Canal." In 4S Paraconference X EiJ: Building a Global Record, curated by Misria Shaik Ali. Kim Fortun, Phillio Baum and Prerna Srigyvan. Annual Meeting of the Society for Social Studies of Science. Honolulu, Hawaiti, Nov 8-11.

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.

1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.

2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU

3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.

“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”

“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””

Research for this article comprised of interviews and recorded statements of dozens of police and fire personnel present at the towers and other officials who were tasked with investigating the response.

The main argument of this article is that the emergency response to 9/11 could have been more efficient and effective. The article cites a lack of communication between fire chiefs and firefighters in the towers, minimal cooperation between police and fire, as well as the determination of responding units to save as many people as possible even against orders to evacuate.