Here is a ProPublic historical outline of DEQ legacy, including officials and their contributions as serving as secretary of the LDEQ https://www.propublica.org/article/how-an-environmental-regulator-became-known-for-protecting-industry
The agency is widely criticized as biased by environmental groups within the Parishes. Conflicts of interest have been cited due to the way in which the department generates funds and can expedite permit approvals. In ProPublica articles, the DEQ has been criticized for non-enforcement against polluting industries and doubting EPAs monitoring. https://www.propublica.org/article/in-cancer-alley-toxic-polluters-face-little-oversight-from-environmental-regulators#:~:text=Series%3A%20Polluter's%20Paradise-,In%20%E2%80%9CCancer%20Alley%2C%E2%80%9D%20Toxic%20Polluters%20Face%20Little%20Oversight%20From,the%20chemical%20industry%20it%20regulates..
Most recently, the EPA is pursuing litigation against LDEQ and Louisiana Department of Health alleging that the LDEQ discriminates on the basis of race, violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Complaints filed on behalf of the Sierra Club, Concerned Citizens of St. Johns, Rise St. James, Louisiana Bucket Brigade and others are in regards to the LDEQ air pollution control programs and permitting that subjects residents on the basis of race, and that the failures to protect the health, disproportionately impact the minority communities, subjecting them to adverse health and environmental impacts.
The LDEQ has been critized for favoring industry, economic and business interests over public welfare. The DEQ has been cited as weighing the creation of jobs and land development over the air and communities being polluted.
Conflicts of interests have been noted through the DEQ expidited permit reviewal process that approves the siting of petrochemical facitilies. If companies want to expidite the permitting process they must pay the DEQ employees overtime. Conflicts of interest have been noted in the structural process of permitting approvals in which the companies pay the regulators that approve them.
The LDEQ consists of five major offices: Office of the Secretary, Office of Management and Finance, Office of Environmental Services, Office of Environmental Compliance, and Office of Environmental Assessment. The Office of Environmental Services is in charge of Air, Waste and water permits. The Office of Environmental Compliance works on surveillance and enforcement. There are multiple regional offices, 8 (shown below in added image), that serve the Parishes. Currently, as of April 2022, Chuck Carr Brown Serves as Secretary.
The LDEQ in recent years is underfunded and understaffed compared to previous years. Budget cuts and employee cutbacks are shown through the Environmental Integrity Project Report: During a Time of Cutbacks at EPA, 30 States Also Slashed Funding for State Environmental Agencies. Images below show Louisiana DEQ cutbacks. Red signifies the most cut backs while blue siginifies increased spending or employment by state.
According to the LDEQ Website, “The mission of the Department of Environmental Quality is to provide service to the people of Louisiana through comprehensive environmental protection in order to promote and protect health, safety and welfare while considering sound policies that are consistent with statutory mandates.”
Project managers at the Army Corps of Engineers are not concerned with the Anthropocene. Their job at SLAPS and other FUSRAP sites revolves around a different contestable term: remediation. What exactly does Anthropocenic remediation look like in St. Louis? As the ACoE project managers informed us, remediation consists of removing contimated soil and shipping it to approved waste management sites in Michigan, Kentucky and Ohio. It would be interesting to further investigate how ACoE practices of remediation have historically been shaped.
The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.
FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.
NYPD - New York City Police Department.
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.
PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey.
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.
This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.
“A sixmonth examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”
''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a nobrainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''