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The article refers to dozens of police and fire officers, including Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer the first chief at the towers, Assistant Chiefs Callan and Burns who faced radio communication issues, and Lt. Dan Williams form Ladder Company 16 where off duty firefighters disobeyed his direct orders to go home. Many other officers are quoted in the article. Two of the significant actors included are Thomas Von Essen, the fire commissioner and Police Commissioner Kelly, who acted as the public faces of the departments during the subsequent interviews and investigation.

The article discusses the response to 9/11, focusing on the many issues that prevented hundreds of firefighters from evacuating when the towers fell. Although the article states that cooperation and even the firefighters desire to help more people can be blamed for the tragedy, the article presents communication as the primary reason so many firefighters failed to evacuate. The radio issues that prevented the evacuation order from being heard were well known, and the repeater that was installed to solve those issues did not function properly. While technical issues cannot always be anticipated and remain a potential problem, the lack of communication between police and fire prevented the police from passing information to firefighters who did not hear the evacuation order. The incident command system has been created and modified several times to create a system of cooperation between responding units, which will hopefully prevent such communication issues in the future.

The article mentioned a database the Times was using to track the location of firefighters throughout the incident, I looked at that system. It is not publicly available but was interesting in that it entirely depended on the news footage, personal videos and eyewitness accounts.

The article mentioned helicopters were being considered for rooftop evacuation, which surprised me due to the smoke. I looked into the visibility in the airspace directly surrounding the World Trade Center, while the smoke was so severe as to be captured by the International Space Station the wind did clear the smoke sufficiently for a clear line of sight between the helicopters and portions of the towers.

The firefighters were climbing the stairs, and reportedly would take hours to reach the top. The article also mentioned several groups of resting firefighters, so I researched the weight each firefighter would have been carrying which added up to 45 pounds of gear and at least an additional 20-30 pounds of tools.

1) “From the first moments to the last, however, their efforts were plagued by failures of communication, command and control.”

2) ''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no-brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

3) “Throughout the crisis, the two largest emergency departments, Police and Fire, barely spoke to coordinate strategy or to share intelligence about building conditions.”

The New York Times conducted over 100 Interviews over 6 months with police officers, firefighters, government workers, and witnesses.

“Those interviews were supplemented by reviews of 1,000 pages of oral histories collected by the Fire Department, 20 hours of police and fire radio transmissions and 4,000 pages of city records, and by creating a database that tracked 2,500 eyewitness reports of sightings of fire companies, individual firefighters and other rescue personnel that morning.”

 “From the first moments to the last, however, their efforts were plagued by failures of communication, command and control.” This main point is supported in several ways. The police helicopters said that the collapse of the towers was “imminent” a full 20 minutes before the south tower fell and an hour and 29 minutes before the north tower. Most firefighters in the north tower did not even know that the south tower had fallen. Most fighter fighters did not recall ever hearing the dispatch to evacuate the north tower despite multiple broadcasts. The chain of command and orderly response also failed. First responders ignored and disobeyed orders to wait to respond until called upon. Some self-dispatched taking taxis, driving themselves, and hoping on other departments’ rigs. “Discipline Broke Down In Eagerness to Help”. The police commissioner, Bernard B. Kerik, did not even know that there were any serious communication issues between the agencies. Assistant Chief Joseph Callan ordered an evacuation of the north tower at 9:32 am, almost a full hour before it fell, but few ever received this command. These failures resulted in the needless loss of life and a response that could have been far better.

Actors reffered to:

Firefights:

                Thomas Von Essen was the city's fire commissioner.

                Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer was the first fire chief to begin operations on 9/11. He sent companies into the towers but found he was unable to properly communicate with them.

                Deputy Assistant Chief Albert J. Turi was one of the firefighters in the towers that day who was unable to send and receive communications.

                Assistant Chief Joseph Callan was in the north tower and ordered an evacuation order after felling the floor shifting. His order was largely unheard.

                Assistant Chief Donald J. Burns was at both the 1993 bombings as well as the 9/11 attacks on the towers. On 9/11 he died leading operations in tower 2.

                Mr. Modica, a firefighter, could not reach a friend who was a few floors above him with his radio equipment over any of the channels.

                Mr. Campagna, a Firefighter, remembers getting out just before his tower fell.

Police:

                Police Commissioner (at time of article’s writting) Kelly stated that there was no link between the various first response agencies on the day.

                Bernard B. Kerik was the police commissioner on the day of the attack. He claimed that he was unaware of any communication issues during the incident.

                Sergeant Moscola was a police officer.

Government:

                Rudolph W. Giuliani was the mayor of NYC.

                Richard J. Sheirer was the former director of the city's Office of Emergency Management and a fire dispatcher when speaking of the first responder’s communication equipment he said: “We're dinosaurs”.

                Naval War College helped do and self-examination of the fire department’s command and control after the disaster.

                James Ellson was a former deputy in the city's Office of Emergency Management

Civilians:

Ms. Frederick was a civilian who barely got clear of the towers in time. She credits a firefighter for saving her life saying: “He stayed there because there were more people behind us''.

David Rosensweig was the president of the fire alarm dispatchers' union.

Sharon Premoli was an executive vice president of Beast Financial Systems.

                This article focuses on the importance of good command systems like NIMS, the vital role of communication within and inter agency, and the necessity for good planning and fixing issues that are found beforehand. The issues described in support of the main point of the article, show how the failure of command, communication, and planning resulting in hundreds of civilians and first responders needlessly dying. Because of other's poor performace and preparation, others had to pay the ultimate price.

 I researched more into why the fire department’s Radios were having difficulties and issues, especially on the higher floors. First, the agency primarily used VHF (very high frequency) radios which are better for long distance when there is line-of-sight form point-to-point with minimal obstructions. UHF operates on a higher frequency and thus transmits with shorter wave-lengths which is better for object penetration. There are many challenges with radio communications in a city like NYC, starting with the sheer fact that to transmit directly from the ground to the top requires going through over a hundred stories of steel and concrete.

The repeaters worked to an extent. We know that they were operational and working, at least partly, as they recorded the relayed transmissions. The police used a separate but almost identical repeater as the fire department with mostly success. The NYFD experienced more issues. I found reports that claimed from fire fighters in the towers that while the transmissions were getting through, they were not understood due to the loud working environment and congested radio traffic.

The Incident Command System was largely ineffective. The only agency that was properly trained in ICS was the fire department which made inter-agency command and control through ICS moot. It was because of the events on 9/11/2001 that resulted in the development of the Nation Incident Management System, by the Department of Homeland Security, which encompasses ICS and more. Federal funding for emergencies now requires that NIMS be used as well as all first responders that respond to hazardous materials incidents be trained in the ICS.