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Place-making practices refer to the ways in which people create and define physical spaces as meaningful and significant through their everyday activities and social interactions.[1] In Ethnography, the study of these practices is often referred to as ‘ethnography as place-making,’ which involves the exploration of the cultural meanings and practices that shape the physical and social environments in which people live. This can include examining how people create and maintain social boundaries, how they express their identities and values through the built environment,[2] and how they negotiate power and control over the spaces they inhabit.

This place in Gröpelingen is made a place through the interaction of the people tending to the urban gardening project. 

1. Pink 2008, 178ff. 

2. See: urbanization 

3. Pink 2008, 190. 

"What does the lack in prominence of environmental coverage in German TV tell us about the general state of environmental journalism in Germany? It is almost impossible to draw con- clusions based on hard facts and numbers.There is no national organization of professionals in the media dealing with this topic like the Society of Environmental Journalists in the USA, for instance.That means there are also no statistics about how many editors, reporters, or producers would count themselves as environmental journalists; nobody is keeping track. Communications scholars, when asked about the number of environmental journalists in Germany, reply with: “That’s something I would also like to know; tell me if you find out.”There is no formal educa- tion, and only a few training opportunities are offered for established writers and editors who want to specialize in the field. In recent years, some well-qualified and experienced reporters on newspapers with influential voices have departed (or been made to depart) the publishing houses or even journalism per se, leaving a noticeable gap." (Schrader 2020)

"Summarizing, environmental journalism in Germany appears to be in a transition phase. Many traditional media and press outlets are struggling to keep their business model or find a new one. And reporting on air quality, biodiversity, or the climate beyond their often-superficial implications for national politics is not high on the list of priorities. Much of the work might be shifting to online publishing in new contexts and organizations, but those are still forming and far from settled."

The main point of this article is to look at the shortcomings of the response to the World Trade Center on 9/11/01 by the NYPD, PAPD, and FDNY. The article shows that the response was plauged by communication breakdowns between fire companies and commanders, a complete lack of communication between fire and law enforcement agencies with heavy roots in the history of the two departments, and an uncoordinated response by off duty firefighters, who swarmed the area after the attacks. The article discusses various improvements that could have been made after the 1993 bombing and would have significantly effected response on 9/11 such as the improvement and standardization of radio hardware and channels between departments, joint training drills, more rigid command durring response, and the adoption of the FEMA incident command system.

FDNY, Fire Department, City of New York
-composed of individual Engine, Truck, Ladder, Rescue, HazMat, and EMS companies, as well as other specialized units which handle most of the city's emergencies that could cause dammage to life and property. The FDNY was technically the agency in command of the response at the WTC site.

NYPD - New York City Police Department. 
-Provides law enforcement for the NYC. Police Emergency Service Units are also mentioned. These are groups which share some of the responsibilities and training of firefighters, and are familuar with technical rescue equiptment.

PAPDNYNJ - Port Authority Police Department of New York and New Jersey. 
-Responsible for providing protection at all of the major ports and entrances to NYC, incluing bus terminals, shipping docks and ports, train stations, rail yards, bridges, tunnels, and other commuter and shipping hubs.

This article is entirely about the shortcomings of emergency response, and how the history and traditions of the FDNY and NYPD got in the way of an effective response, resulting in communication barriers, an uncoordinated response, unknown and unaccounted responders, and even possibly avoidable deaths. Public health was not explicitly mentioned, as this article focused more on the efficacy of the multi-agency response itself.

“A six­month examination by The Times found that the rescuers' ability to save themselves and others was hobbled by technical difficulties, a history of tribal feuding and management lapses that have been part of the emergency response culture in New York City and other regions for years.”

''It's a disgrace,'' he said. ''The police are talking to each other. It's a no­brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?''

The author of this article drew on first hand accounts of the WTC attacks from fire, police, and EMS personel, as well as witnesses to reconstruct the events that transpired on the morning of 9/11/01 with regards to the response. The author also conducted and cited interviews with high ranking active and retired members of the Police and Fire Departments, such as FDNY Chiefs and officers and NYPD Commissioners. Based on this, the author examines specific shortcomings, such as lack of coordination between Fire and Police, comminication barriers, and the overwhelming and uncoordinated response by both on and off-duty firefighters.

1. I tried to find more information on the current radio system that the FDNY and NYPD employ to see how they would facilitate interagency communication and communication with mutual aid from departments in surrounding counties.

2. I did more research into the NYPD ESU

3. I attempted to find more information on any FDNY response policies developed after 9/11/01 to limit and coordinate response to major disasters to avoid the confustion found at the WTC response.

“Those who responded [off duty] were upholding the Fire Department’s finest tradition: the selfless struggle to save the endangered. But they were also rushing to fight a fire that department officials had already decided was unfightable. And they did so in such numbers, with so little coordination, that some fire officials are now questioning whether the department known as the Bravest acted too bravely that day.”

“Chief Baccellieri recalled seeing “at least 100 of them.” When he shouted that rescuers were evacuating, no one moved. “They said, We’ll come down in a few minutes,’” Chief Baccellieri said. “These firemen had no idea that the south tower collapsed.””

Research for this article comprised of interviews and recorded statements of dozens of police and fire personnel present at the towers and other officials who were tasked with investigating the response.