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As a researcher, I’m interested in the political, ecological, and cultural debates around mosquito-borne diseases and the solutions proposed to mitigate them.

When we received the task, my first impulse was to investigate about the contemporary effects of anthropogenic climate change in mosquito-borne diseases in New Orleans. But I was afraid to make the same mistake that I did in my PhD research. I wrote my PhD proposal while based in the US, more specifically in New England, during the Zika epidemic, and proposed to understand how scientists were studying ecological climate change and mosquitoes in Brazil. However, once I arrived in the country the political climate was a much more pressing issue, with the dismantling of health and scientific institutions.

Thus, after our meeting yesterday, and Jason Ludwig’s reminder that the theme of our Field Campus is the plantation, I decided to focus on how it related to mosquitoes in New Orleans.

The Aedes aegypti mosquito and the yellow fever virus it can transmit are imbricated in the violent histories of settler-colonialism and slavery that define the plantation economy. The mosquito and the virus arrived in the Americas in the same ships that brought enslaved peoples from Africa. The city of New Orleans had its first yellow fever epidemic in 1796, with frequent epidemics happening between 1817 and 1905. What caused New Orleans to be the “City of the Dead,” as Kristin Gupta has indicated, was yellow fever. However, as historian Urmi Engineer Willoughby points out, the slave trade cannot explain alone the spread and persistance of the disease in the region: "Alterations to the landscape, combined with demographic changes resulting from the rise of sugar production, slavery, and urban growth all contributed to the region’s development as a yellow fever zone." For example, sugar cultivation created ideal conditions for mosquito proliferation because of the extensive landscape alteration and ecological instabilities, including heavy deforestation and the construction of drainage ditches and canals.

Historian Kathryn Olivarius examines how for whites "acclimatization" to the disease played a role in hierarchies with “acclimated” (immune) people at the top and a great mass of “unacclimated” (non-immune) people and how for black enslaved people "who were embodied capital, immunity enhanced the value and safety of that capital for their white owners, strengthening the set of racialized assumptions about the black body bolstering racial slavery."

As I continue to think through these topics, I wonder how both the historical materialities of the plantation and the contemporary anthropogenic changes might be influencing mosquito-borne diseases in New Orleans nowadays? And more, how the regions’ histories of race and class might still be shaping the effects of these diseases and how debates about them are framed?

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Aside from being discussed on the Disaster STS Network, this reading has been mentioned other places. For starters, it is a chapter of a larger book, “Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi: Social, Political and Environmental Issues.” This book is a collection of writings by international STS scholars. Additionally, this piece has been referenced in several other writings, including the book “The Fukushima Effect: A New Geopolitical Terrain” and the article “Nuclear disaster in Taiwan: a multidimensional security challenge.” 

There have been a number of controversial events and policies that have affected ARC policy. One of the most notable ones is the controversy in blood donation from gay men. The FDA requires that no blood can be taken from a man who has had sex with anohter man since 1977. The ARC petitioned the FDA in 2006 for the removal of the policy, though nothing has been done to address it yet. 

The artice cites WHO preparadness plans and Doctors without Borders as sources of policy on emergency response, in the context of global health. With the rise in infectious disease, there is a risk for "global threat" that is not directly targeted at a group, but rather engineered through social and economic factors. This means that emrgency preparadness is key. However, the article metions the use of Emergency repsonse as a bit of a cop-out. It is much easier to plan for the worst than prevent it from happening. The author states "... measures focused on mitigating potential emergencies are easier to implement rhan longer-term structural interventions." 

The film would have the most impact on the general population, like something that would be played on a news channel before prime time. The level of emotional appeal and interpersonal drama is enough to keep anyone intersted for the length of the film. The film does however paint the experience in a negative light, which could discourage professionals from pursuin mission worlk. Thats why the general population would be most receptive to the struggles. Its easy for them to say "I would do something like that if...." without having the ability to do anything. 

“In particular, the syndrome articulates the powerful way in which displacement is simultaneously recognized as a cause, symptom, and, ultimately, false cure for disasters. Chronic disaster syndrome represents the health outcome of life in an ongoing state of “disaster” or “emergency” (Agamben 1998; Fassin and Vasquez 2005) that, as in this case, is perpetuated by industries of “disaster” capitalism (Klein 2007; Klinenberg and Frank 2005). The total collapse of infrastructure and social services initiated by storm and floods produced what Naomi Klein calls the perfect conditions of “shock”—a collapse so severe as to authorize a new government arrangement in which the state contracts with private firms to provide services it previously provided”

“One of the recurring themes that we heard from those who were still displaced in trailers or temporary living situations (e.g., with relatives), but more so from those who had returned and were, in a few cases, back in their homes, was that, even if the neighborhoods were being rebuilt, people had lost so much that nothing would never be the same.”

“We were, like I said, we were close. No more. Not anymore. And some of it too is that we got away from one another and we realized how little we got in common. Or else the storm took it away. I don’t know which it is, you know. Cause I’m an analyzing person and I’ll try to figure it all out sooner or later. But it’s either we just really don’t have anything to talk about anymore, or we never did, and we just thought we did. It’s weird. …”

“This chain of events prompted residents to say things like: “We all asked, ‘Who was meaner: Katrina, Rita or FEMA? And everybody’s pointing at FEMA.’ Which is worse— Katrina, Rita or FEMA? FEMA””

“Katrina offered an opportunity for disaster capitalism to become entrenched, supported fully by the U.S. government. But the failure of an effective recovery in New Orleans has created yet another kind of “disaster”—the ongoing disaster. New Orleans offers an example of the perpetuation of a “state of emergency” that was initiated by Katrina but has been sustained by ongoing politicoeconomic machinery—a machinery that ultimately needs to “have a disaster” to justify its existence.”

“Hurricane Katrina was an “event” disaster that mobilized a “state of emergency,” which subsequently led to the authorization of a military response to an “ongoing” disaster that the failure of bureaucratic machinery helped to prolong. The “state” was erased as a functioning buffer for the poorest sectors of the socioeconomic hierarchy, and in its place a “free market” in private-sector development contracts emerged. Just as those citizens who were living paycheck to paycheck or welfare check to welfare check were evicted first by the forces of nature and then by the force of the unfettered free market authorized by the “emergency,” so too were the social programs, previously offered by the government to provide safety nets to these populations, eviscerated”