The reference section of this article tells us about the type and number of sources that information from this article was drawn from. This article's research was drawn from a mix of online and print sources, consisting of international policy, agency reports, previous peer reviewed research articles, and news reports.
This film suggests that physicians should learn to honor and accept that they need to assist terminal patients to accieve their last desires in whatever time they have. It suggests that doctors could learn alot from palliative care practitioners in how they help patients accept their fate and assist them through the dieing process.
Data for this article was gathered from previous studies done by health organizations in Boston, Baltimore, Hati, and Rawanda. He also references peer reviewed publications for more background information, and recent work by the PIH in Rawanda.
The players featured in this article were the following:
The emotionally disturbed patient who was punched multiple times in the face by the cops from the NYPD and ESU
The NYPD 67th precinct: New York Police Department Brooklyn Precinct, four members, including members from the elite Emergency Service Unit, were accused of roughing a combative patient.
FDNY and FDNY EMS: Fire Department, City of New York and their respective EMS branch. The report was filed by members of FDNY EMS who were treating the patient when they were roughed by PD.
The stakeholders discribed in the film was the general population of Liberia. They had shared experiances of seeing the effects of ebola, innitially being in denial of its severity, then finally seeing the entire liberian public health system be overwhelmed and fail by an apparently unstopable and horrifying disease. The people effected needed to make difficult decisions about how to avoid contracting the disease, how to protect their families, and how to deal with the emotional strain placed on them by the epidemic.
The DHS embarked on the process of researching, collecting, and compiling data for this report durring the summer and fall of 2011.
Thus policy is department specific, and while the article does not expressly state it, it was likely drafted and put into place by the Bethel Township Fire Department.
This arguement is supported by looking at 4 specific case histories and examining the factors contributing to the investigations in each.
1. The 1814 Burning of the Capitol Building - Investigation of the disaster conducted by one engineer, B.H. Lathobe, who was given vast resources with very few obsticles, except for financial constraits and an impatient congress, to complete his investigation and reconstruct the building.
2. 1850 Hauge St. Explosion - After a major boiler explosion in Manhattan's Lower East Side, a pannel of "jurrors" and "experts" were called together to complete investigations, bring forth the history of the fauty boiler, and place the blame for the accident in an effort to "memorialize the dead and bring them justice." Because of the way this investigation was conducted, the blame could not be accurately placed so everyone involved was blamed for the failure.
3. 1903 Iroquois Theater Fire - John Ripley Freeman, a fireproof engineering expert and factory inspector, was brought in to complete a report and provided one of the first "modern" scientific disaster investigations. He utilized a new network of investigators, engineers, insurance companies, testing labs, and inter-industry coordination that characterizes modern disaster investigation.
The program is funded in most part by Brown University, and research funding is suplimented by various grants applied for by individual researchers.
This article focuses on "chronic disaster syndrome," a condition that arises in the aftermath of a large scale disaster where factors from the disaster lead to perminant changes in the lives of those effected. These changes include physical and mental health crises, geographic displacement, loss of life, family, community, jobs, and property, and societal instability. The causes of these conditions are not only limited to the disaster itself but they are also by the how goverments and private sector institiutions either support recovery or put up road blocks to prevent a return to normal, perpetuating the emergency into the future.