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COVID-19 Rapid Student Interview Project

COVID-19 Rapid Student Interview Collection Form

This project aims to provide an engaging project for post-secondary students (undergraduate and graduate) to gain experience with qualitative research methodology  while contributing to public

(Non)Sharing Economies

mwenda

I am interested in the Macro scale and the macro effects evident at a city-scale level. I remember visiting New Orleans in 2016 and vividly remember seeing several signs with a large 'No' symbol drawn and the text  "neighbors not tourists" printed on the sign. Recently, as part of my research into New Orleans, I stumbled on this piece by the Guardian on how short-term rentals through platforms such as Airbnb are leading to gentrification in New Orleans. Highlighted in the article is how several Airbnb hosts do not reside on the listed premises. I remember the place we stayed, as we were a large party, having a 617 prefix number.  The prefix stood out as I knew the code 617 represented Boston and was curious what someone with ties to Boston doing in New Orleans as a host. In a similar vein, the article also highlights the problem of absentee hosts, hosts who acquire property for the sole purpose of setting up the property as an Airbnb site.

To tackle the problem, one councilwoman passed a law that required any Airbnb hosts in residential zones to have a homestead exemption verifying they live on site. In this case, a city-wide measure was taken and passed into law affecting the micro. It is common to have one host having several properties in different residential areas in New Orleans. From a technical standpoint, it could be viewed that Airbnb as technology is developed and presented as a scalable product. With no limits to reproducibility. Meanwhile, real-life discontinuities exist in the form of such homestead laws. It is impossible to live in more than one homestead at the same time. In other words, the concept of the human is not scalable.
Likewise, neither is cultural heritage. The city of New Orleans positions its self as a city with great cultural heritage. It is through this heritage that they seek to draw more and more tourists. How do cities think of scaling up successful initiatives and how do they navigate the political, social, ecological, or economic entanglements. At what point is downscaling necessary? Is culture scalable?

[1]https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/13/new-orleans-airbnb-trem…

QUOTIDIAN ANTHROPOCENES: NEW ORLEANS

mwenda

I am currently a Ph.D. student interested in exploring the entanglements of scale, especially in the context of environmental sensing.  My primary research seeks to engage in discourse around the value of scalability that is presented as inherent in computation. While the term scale-up is almost synonymous with computation, sustainability; on the other hand, is known as a problem of scale. Take for example, the discourse on climate change where the actions required to combat climate change requires interventions at different scales. In this context, demanding changes at individual scales while no corresponding changes happen at larger scales would not yield much.

In looking at New Orleans, I came across a video on IoT cameras developed by Cisco, the networking giant. What struck me other than the apparent rise of surveillance capitalism was the narrative of one of the police officers highlighted in the video. The officer mentions that it is not feasible for the city to place police officers on every corner. In the context of scale, the police officer is implying that cameras are useful as they extend the police officer's ability to surveil the city. In other words, cameras and the networks help scale up the police officer, making it possible for them to cover a larger scale than before.

One of the police officers, in the video, also mentions that New Orleans is a tourist and hospitable town. Which brings up the question at any given period, what scale of visitors can New Orleans support without stretching the city's resources? Several other cities in the world have made efforts to limit visitors, in order not stretch city resources. The recent crisis at Mount Everest is an excellent example of what happens when resources are stretched to accommodate the increasing number of local visitors. How could something of this nature similarly impact New Orleans?

At the communication center where the video feed is analyzed, the IT manager provides reasons as to why they chose Cisco as their vendor. One of the reasons he gives was that the system is easily expandable, allowing the ability to scale out/up the network.

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seanw146

            This past spring break (2016), on a Monday night while at home, I responded to a motor vehicle accident as a Good Samaritan. The accident happened at approximately 19:00 hours on my street in Blackstone, Massachusetts. My father was on our front porch when he heard a car barreling down our back country road which has a long straight away before taking a sharp turn. Before the impact he knew that the driver would not anticipate the curve fast enough at the speed he was traveling. Sure enough, there was a loud bang and the sound of a car rolling over, which I could hear from inside the house (approximately ¼ mile from crash).

I grabbed both of my personal first aid kits and a flashlight while my father called emergency services. I walked to scene with my father and younger brother. I sped walked and arrived at the crash site first.

The vehicle was a ‘90s sedan that went straight into a telephone pole, which broke like a toothpick, and rebounded backwards and flipped 90 degrees on its left side. Parts of the car, tools, and glass were on ground, airbags deployed. There was a car seat in back, and for a moment I thought a child but it was just clothing. Front right tire was up inside front passenger compartment. Hazards flashing. Driver window was rolled down. No people in the car.

My brother and father directed traffic on either end of the crash site. They almost certainly prevented at another crash by a car who didn’t see the accident but saw my brother flag them down with his light.

I saw man standing 20’ from crash site, talking to people in a gold SUV. When I arrived I start asking medical questions and the people in the SUV leave – they were by standards who pulled up but left after I started taking over. The man in question appeared to be a lower/middle class white/Hispanic, male in his 30s. He was driving an older car with lots of tools in the back which were now all over the road. Our neighborhood is a small country community and I know he was not from our neighborhood. I assumed he was some kind of mechanic, bases on tools in car. He was wearing dirty jeans and stained hoodie. He was definitely a blue-collar worker. He may have been from downtown Blackstone which is largely lower middle class and blue collar, or he may have been from Woonsocket, Rhode Island, which is known as “the Detroit of Rhode Island”.

As I tried to obtain basic medical information from the patient, it was apparent he had an altered mental status, and did not appear to understand fully what was going on. I am not certain if it was alcohol and/or drugs as for safety reasons I did not get close enough to the patient/suspect to tell. He was ambulatory and verbal. The interesting part of our conversation was to the best of my ability as follows:

“Are you sure you’re okay? Umm yeah. Are you hurt anywhere? I’m fine. [I did visual inspection of patient using flashlight which revealed no major injuries other than minor cuts from airbag]. [He starts to edge away from scene]. You should wait for ems to check you out. Wait, you’re right! I might die?! You appear to be okay externally but things like internal bleeding, and a full assessment could reveal other problems. Naaaa [turns and starts to walk away down street]”

I attempted to convince the patient to wait on scene but he was going through several mode swings during my interactions with him from fear, anxiety, agitation, and anger. While I was talking to the patient, the first officer from the neighboring town arrived on a motor cycle. I informed the officer at the scene of the situation about the patient/suspect fleeing the scene. The officer took note of it and continued to work to secure the crash site. Another officer arrive from my town from the west. I informed the same and he stated that he would need me to make a witness statement and proceeded to the crash site. A third and fourth officer arrived together the same time as two ambulances (indicated because of rollover) from the east. One of them told me again that they would need a witness statement.

I met back up with my dad and brother who were no longer needed to control traffic with law enforcement on scene. Neighbors had started coming out to see the commotion. We were all talking near the scene while waiting for officers. Finally one of the officers asked another officer if he should go look for the suspect. He left approximately 20 minutes after my last contact. I never spoke with the arriving EMS as they came from the east and I was on the west of the accident but officers told them that the patient was missing. Eventually multiple officers and cars were out looking for patient/suspect but was not found as far as I am aware. I finally was given the chance to give my testimony which, to the best of my knowledge, mirrors this report. After reading out loud in front of the officer and my father and brother to confirm accuracy, the officer asked me something very strange. First, he asked me to add what the suspect was wearing (which I had forget to include), but then he also asked me to state that I saw the suspect drive into the telephone pole and that I smelled alcohol on the patients breath. Neither of these things were what I told any of the officers and ran counter to my testimony as written. I include the suspect’s clothing description but I did not add the second mention and stated that I had not witnessed those things. After my report I left the scene with my brother and father.

Some of the policies and procedures relevant to this case were: scene safety, dealing with aggressive/combative patients, and HIPPA did not apply to me as a bystander so I gave full testimony including medical status to the officers.

After reflecting on the education I received and didn't receive, there are a few things that would have allowed me to be better prepared for this incident. How do I convince patients to stay on scene? When do you give up? I wish my EMT class was a little better scene on safety training. Being distracted by the emergency at hand, I did not truly take into account the fact that the power lines were live and drooping with half of the telephone poll pulling on them. Only supported by the next and previous poll but not drooping more than 3’ from normal, more than 15’ from ground, and 10’ above vehicle. Reflecting on it, I did not really consider the threat as I should have, and neither did the officers on scene. I don’t understand why it took so long for police to search for the suspect who could have had major medical issues. Should I have followed suspect/patient alone? When is a citizen arrest allowed/appropriate? Should I have asked for the badge number of the officer who asked me to misrepresent the truth on an eye witness testimony? What is the process to do that anyway? If I had the answers to these questions I feel I may have been able to provide better assistance, but then again perhaps not.

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seanw146

Actors reffered to:

Firefights:

                Thomas Von Essen was the city's fire commissioner.

                Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer was the first fire chief to begin operations on 9/11. He sent companies into the towers but found he was unable to properly communicate with them.

                Deputy Assistant Chief Albert J. Turi was one of the firefighters in the towers that day who was unable to send and receive communications.

                Assistant Chief Joseph Callan was in the north tower and ordered an evacuation order after felling the floor shifting. His order was largely unheard.

                Assistant Chief Donald J. Burns was at both the 1993 bombings as well as the 9/11 attacks on the towers. On 9/11 he died leading operations in tower 2.

                Mr. Modica, a firefighter, could not reach a friend who was a few floors above him with his radio equipment over any of the channels.

                Mr. Campagna, a Firefighter, remembers getting out just before his tower fell.

 

Police:

                Police Commissioner (at time of article’s writting) Kelly stated that there was no link between the various first response agencies on the day.

                Bernard B. Kerik was the police commissioner on the day of the attack. He claimed that he was unaware of any communication issues during the incident.

                Sergeant Moscola was a police officer.

Government:

                Rudolph W. Giuliani was the mayor of NYC.

                Richard J. Sheirer was the former director of the city's Office of Emergency Management and a fire dispatcher when speaking of the first responder’s communication equipment he said: “We're dinosaurs”.

                Naval War College helped do and self-examination of the fire department’s command and control after the disaster.

                James Ellson was a former deputy in the city's Office of Emergency Management

Civilians:

Ms. Frederick was a civilian who barely got clear of the towers in time. She credits a firefighter for saving her life saying: “He stayed there because there were more people behind us''.

David Rosensweig was the president of the fire alarm dispatchers' union.

Sharon Premoli was an executive vice president of Beast Financial Systems.

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seanw146
Annotation of

The platforms provides online video sessions with healthcare professionals as well as quick assessments that can be taken anytime, anywhere as well as sensors that can be worn. These assessments are tracked (privately) and turned into graphical data that can be easily analyzed by both the patient and the provider.

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seanw146

The author of this article is Sonja D. Schmid.  Sonja has degrees in science, technology and society (STS) as well as experience in organizational theory, disaster social issues, and studied risk in relation to different societies and cultures throughout the world.