Search

"Unfortunately, 'normal' in Haiti includes perpetual political turmoil... That kind of political morass is one big reason-- though by no means the only one-- why the billions in relief and recovery aid haven't been enough to rescue Haiti from the disaster that fate keeps flinging its way."

"A growing reliance on U.S. and other international contractors helps explain why the payoff of foreign aid in Haiti often seems so low."

""International companies had to fly in, rent hotels and cars, and spend USAID allowances for food and cost­of­living expenses," Johnston wrote in the Boston Review last year. So­called danger pay and hardship pay inflated salaries by more than 50 percent"

1) "On an individual level, disagreements over treatment can arise when there are competing ideas about the cause and most appropriate treatment of disease. The weak and sometimes nonfunctioning health systems that often characterize complex security environments can compound these challenges and contribute to a milieu of mistrust that sets the stage for violence against health workers, facilities and transportation"

2) "There are also often inconsistencies in the categories used to describe perpetrators e e.g. terrorist, state actors, non-state actor e and these categories have legal ramifications under both International Humanitarian Law and in national legal frameworks. Although a standardizing of terminology and scope of study would be welcome, this has proven difficult."

3) "Although violence directly affecting health service delivery in complex security environments has received a great deal of media attention, there is very little publically available research, particularly peer-reviewed, original research. Only thirty-eight articles met the original search criteria outlined in the methods section, of which only eleven contained original research; a further citation search yielded another four original research articles."

The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.

1) "About 2,000 tons of asbestos and 424,000 tons of concrete were used to build the towers, and when they came crashing down they released dust laden with toxins."

2 "But as early as Sept. 13, Mrs. Whitman and the agency put out press releases saying that the air near ground zero was relatively safe and that there were "no significant levels" of asbestos dust in the air. They gave a green light for residents to return to their homes near the trade center site"

The Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights believes that failings within public health systems indirectly contributed to the high incarceration rates in America. The program seeks to advocate and educate in order to better the health and human rights of incarcerated populations. It appears to be focusing on educating the public, law/policy makers, and students about issues facing prison populations. It also seeks to address health care issues within the prison systems itself, as many offenders struggle with issues tied to mental health (drug and alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, mental illness, ect.); limited treatment options and prison conditions can often compound these issues, creating a vicious cycle for incarcerated individuals.

The creators of the platform and film are part of a C3 non-profit called NOVAC-- New Orleans Video Access Center. There are several organizational partners that work on the ground accomplishing the organization's goals. These partners also provide a measure of funding; as a non-profit, most of the support comes from outside donations, either to the organization or through one of their proxy groups.

1) PFA: the article currently contends that most governmental agencies use this 3-pronged approach to mitigate effects after a disaster. I'd be interested in learning which agencies do not use this approach and what their alternative strategies may be.

2) Resilience: this is a term specifically described in the article, detailing the phenomena of how some individuals manage to survive horrific disasters but are devoid of psychological symptoms after. As a relatively new concept, not much is understood at this time. However, much of PTSD, MDD, and other post-traumatic mood disorders focus on traits predisposing an individual to develop the disorder-- I'd be intrigued to know what traits (if any) predisposed resilience.

3) Cocoanut Grove night club fire: a disaster event I had never heard of, was the deadliest nightclub fire in American history. Almost 500 perished, and hundreds more were injured. This, apparently, led to a huge tightening of fire and safety protocols throughout the US