Search

META: Water seems to be one important medium through which NOLA envisions the “impacts” of the Anthropocene—scarcity, abundance, temporalities and spatial distributions, management of, and hazards that emerge in its context. Less is said about the causal or attributional aspects of the Anthropocene. How might water function as an entry point into the assemblages of local anthropocenics?

I found the NOLA Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2018, which frames the impacts of the Anthropocene as an intersection of weather extremes amid climate change and evolving vulnerabilities of its people. Four of seven items in the executive summary note water as central to local interventions: flood awareness, flood repair, flood mitigation, flood infrastructure. Too much water or water in the wrong places and the aftereffect of water on infrastructure and lives. One expression, then, is preparedness.

MACRO: Mitigation is an interesting analytic for the Anthropocene. In the US mitigation plans are shaped by the 1988 Stafford Act (which amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act). Constraints on communities come through rules, regulations, policies, (dis)incentives, and surveillance by state and federal authorities. Much of this is bound by economic and administrative discourses.

Goals are set in this document—broken out by timelines, activities, priorities, and capabilities. Another expression is classification of anthropocenics by subfields and accounting metrics. How do we measure progress and what is deferred to the future, 5-10 years out from today, a goal that has no tangible accountability but is named and acknowledged. What are the practices of naming, responsibility, and making (in)visible in the Anthropocene?

BIO: One new initiative, Ready for Rain, in particular is of interest to me as it highlights the more neoliberal vision for how the public should self-regulate risk and mitigate harm. I hear this as an extension of a government agency program to make the nation Weather Ready. Other bullets highlight “green” buildings, energies, and infrastructures. These could be examples of how the city envisions the Anthropocene feedback loop of humans changing/planning for climate alterations, which is a fairly typical lens.

Some questions: What does the water do? What does the water know? If we trace water in all its instantiations (e.g. historical water, flow of water, chemistry of water, application of water, temperature of water), what do we learn about the future imaginaries of what NOLA will / could / ought to become?

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

1) Fukushima's nuclear safe guards followed the current accepted nuclear regulations. In addition to having back-up generators and short-term batteries to support the reactors during power failure, ownership had extensive emergency plans for tsunamis. These were executed and creative solutions were utilized with necessary. This then begs the question as to how such a well-prepared facility experience massive devastation.

2) Japan is known to be a first-world nation constantly innovating and exploring new technology, with an advanced economy and high emphasis on education. Dr. Schmid refers to members of the Japanese government as "scientifically trained, technologically savvy elites." While Dr. Schmid acknowledges nuclear energy to still be a murku field, Japanese officials represent the individuals most capable of making informed, knowledgeable decisions about nuclear facilities. This only further emphasizes her assertion that a set, elite organization needs to be created to handle nuclear emergencies.

3) While several organizations exist to discuss nuclear power on an international level, there is no entity which serves as a governing body over nuclear facilities. Nuclear emergencies very quickly spread from single-nation disasters to international events. Although there are many internationally recognized policies and guidelines, there is no body to ensure these are followed. Moreover, no single nation or organization at the present time has the fiscal capabilities or specialized knowledge to aid during nuclear disasters. 

Currently, BSVAC survives on state and community funding. However, as recently as 2014 the agency was being funded by the Commander's pension and funds from re-mortgaging his home. At present time, BSVAC has also received a check from Councilman Cornegy for their timely, professional response to violent crimes involving police officers and for general service to the community. As it stands, BSVAC runs on a budget of approximately 250,000 per year, mostly through donations and legislative grants. 

When administering healthcare or combating epidemics, there's often an unaddressed social factor. Far more often, the focus remains on the scientific and biological aspects of the disease without delving into the social circumstances surrounding its prevalence. Healthcare typically narrows the scope to just medical intervention, instead of looking at the overarching conditions. Farmer and his colleagues give several examples of successful bio-social interventions; these methods allow physicians and healthcare workers to successfully treat patients in all aspects of the disease. Moreover, they contend that treating epidemics in this way helps to prevent the manifestation of social inequalities in healthcare.

The authors are Stephen Collier, PhD and Andrew Lakoff, PhD. Both hold associate professor positions-- the former at New University in NYC and the latter at USC Dornsife. Lakoff's research and publications seem to focus primarily on public health, global medicine, and medical anthropology. Collier, conversely, seems to primarily work on projects pertaining to government structure and its effects on human life. These include publications on economics, environment, historical, and biopolitics. 

Dr. Knowles discusses the role and nature of investigations after disasters, particularly in regard to engineering and structural aspects. He primarily draws parallels between the delayed and botched engineering investigations after 9/11 and several similar historical disasters. Dr. Knowles contends these investigations can drastically effect how the public interprets disaster response; yet, it is often overlooked by officials until demanded by public outcry.

Didier Fassian is a french anthropologist and sociologist with extensive global field work. He currently teaches as a professor in the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced Study. Fassin, although trained as an internal medicine specialist, focuses the vast body of his publication and research focuses on the intersection of the State, justice, and humanitarianism.

Emily Goldmann, PhD, MPH: current assistant research professor at NYU College of Global Public Health, Dr. Goldmann researches environmental and social determinants of mental health conditions. Formerly employed by NYC department of Health and mental Hygiene in the Bureau of mental Health, Dr. Goldmann focused on surveillance of psychological distress, serious mental illness, and psychiatric hospitalization of New Yorkers following Hurricane Sandy.

Sandro Galea, MD, MPH : a canadian/american board-certified emergency physician, Dr. Galea is currently the Dean of BU School of Public Health and former Chair of the Department of Epidemiology of Columbia University's Mailman School of Global Public Health. His particular research includes social production of health within urban populations, and especially notes psychological and mental health disorder prevalence within vulnerable populations, including mood-anxiety disorders and substance abuse. He also has participated in multiple committees and boards analyzing effects of mass trauma in the wake of international conflicts and disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, Iraq/Afghani wars, 9/11, and sub-Saharan Africa  conflicts.