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Interviews, data analysis, outside studies and research are all used to formulate the arguments in this article.

1) “When tuberculosis treatment fails. A social behavioral account of patient adherence.” By Sumartojo E. Describes the demographic and cultural factors in monitoring and improving adherence to TB regiments.

2) “Racial differences in the use of drug therapy for HIV disease in an urban community.” By Moore RD, Stanton D, Gopalan R, Chaisson RE. Blacks were found to be less likely to receive therapy than whites even when gender, social status, age, and place of residence had no effect on variation in treatment. In emergency response, a similar issue is possible.

3) “Women's voices rise as Rwanda reinvents itself” by Lacey M. This article helps in understanding the long term effects emergencies leave on a country, namely the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. 

This policy applies to all persons residing (regardless of legal status) in the U.S. and any of its territories as well as the District of Columbia who require medical screening examinations as outlined in the act or treatment for an emergency medical condition. 

1) Culling animals to control disease outbreak. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D2704.PDF)

2) Main bio-threats to US national security. Department of Homeland Security (DHS): (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_biological_fact_sheet.pdf)

3) Main bio-threats to developing countries. The National Academies Press: (https://www.nap.edu/read/12596/chapter/5#48)

 “From the first moments to the last, however, their efforts were plagued by failures of communication, command and control.” This main point is supported in several ways. The police helicopters said that the collapse of the towers was “imminent” a full 20 minutes before the south tower fell and an hour and 29 minutes before the north tower. Most firefighters in the north tower did not even know that the south tower had fallen. Most fighter fighters did not recall ever hearing the dispatch to evacuate the north tower despite multiple broadcasts. The chain of command and orderly response also failed. First responders ignored and disobeyed orders to wait to respond until called upon. Some self-dispatched taking taxis, driving themselves, and hoping on other departments’ rigs. “Discipline Broke Down In Eagerness to Help”. The police commissioner, Bernard B. Kerik, did not even know that there were any serious communication issues between the agencies. Assistant Chief Joseph Callan ordered an evacuation of the north tower at 9:32 am, almost a full hour before it fell, but few ever received this command. These failures resulted in the needless loss of life and a response that could have been far better.