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Based on what I have found thus far regarding narratives surrounding the socioeconomic state of New Orleans, there are two predominant ones I have come across: New Orleans as the “laggard,” the city of play but not work, of poor educational quality, and the other of New Orleans as a "comeback" city shaping to a knowledge-based economy following Hurricane Katrina. The former reminds me of racist stereotypes typically used to describe groups of people deemed not to fit within the white supremacist narrative of progress. The other, post-Hurricane Katrina narrative, is portrayed in the media as a phoenix rising from the ashes, one of the “most rapid and dramatic economic turnarounds in recent American history.” I felt an almost visceral reaction to the assertion of one article that “It would be wrong to say the hurricane destroyed New Orleans public schools, because there was so little worth saving even before the storm hit.” I cannot help but be reminded of “terra nullius,” the “empty land” narrative implemented by colonial powers to seize and control land, dismissing the people residing on the land as insignificant to their broader aim of economic and political dominance. In place of public schools, charter schools are perceived as an improvement—but what of the people who were displaced due to the storm and long to return, yet cannot afford to send their children to a charter school and would be forced to bus their kids across the city? Many people end up not returning to New Orleans as a result. I find it interesting to compare these pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina narratives of New Orleans with the information I find from sources such as this one: a shrinking African American population, fewer young people, less affordable housing, increased segregation, etcetera. What do these demographic changes in the city imply for the “ecosystem” deemed ideal for Innovation hubs? As this article asserts, “New Orleans is making a big name for itself among innovative industries and entrepreneurs and the city’s unique vibe plays a big role in that.” On the other hand, City Councilmember Kristen Palmer asserts that “People have been consistently pushed out…If we lose our people and our culture, we lose our city.” What implication does this “burst” in innovation in New Orleans have for both the Anthropocenics of the city as well as its culture, a culture that is stereotyped as one long “party” with intermittent “emptiness,” as opposed to the realities of the people who have resided in the city for generations, or even the people who moved away after the Hurricane and long to return but to no avail? I am curious to see how education, job training (or lack thereof), and issues of housing feed into the anthropocenics of the city. How do grassroots, social justice and environmentalist activists and organizations (such as this one) perceive the changes in the city following the Hurricane compared to innovation hub technicians and CEOs? How do the social and environmental outcomes of Hurricane Katrina fit within the history of "natural" disasters and climate change in New Orleans? I think it is important to keep articles such as this one central to our focus as we move forward with this project.

I’m interested in how universities, cities, and corporations develop the physical embodiment of the knowledge economy in U.S. city centers in an attempt to foster global connections, and the effect this tends to have on historically black and brown communities. What I find interesting about New Orleans is the manner in which following Hurricane Katrina (which some allege was a human-made disaster), gentrification of the city was spurred on, particularly as predominantly young, white people seeking to work in tech start-ups and corporations moved in to what is deemed yet another potential site for “Innovation.” This made room for corporations and richer residents to move in at the expense of working-class neighborhoods . As council member James Gray argued, “The area desperately needs activity and development…if the city of New Orleans is going to recover, if the Lower Ninth is going to recover- we need development. We cannot turn it away.” I came across an advertisement for an event hosted by INNO that will be held in New Orleans for a “global innovation conference” whereby innovators can “forge the connections that matter.” While I am in the preliminary stages of my research in Houston regarding the Innovation District being built in Midtown Houston, I see astonishing parallels with New Orleans and similar questions arise. Many of the employees at tech companies I have interviewed thus far speak of the notion of the “ecosystem”: the confluence of higher educational institutions, cities, corporations, and start-ups that provides the ideal environment for businesses to thrive and innovation to flourish. However, who is included in this ecosystem and who is left out? What implications (if any) does the use of such environmental terms (ecosystem) to describe innovation economies have for the anthropocene? What does innovation mean and who does it benefit? How do these innovation districts and corridors potentially exacerbate racial inequity in the city, even as they claim to be working for the benefit of all? How do infrastructural neglect and gentrification contribute to health, educational, economic, and environmental disparities, and will innovation in any way seek to address these issues, or merely perpetuate the status quo?

I'm also interested in the narratives that arise surrounding natural disasters, particularly the linear fashion in which events are described. There is a beginning, middle, and end supposedly: but what about before and after, and what about the reoccurence of these disasters? In what ways do these narratives leave out the stories of people who did not get to see the "silver lining" of a disaster? Who did not get to witness the rebuilding of the city? Many of those people moved to Houston and went through another hurricane, Hurricane Harvey. It would be interesting to trace the connections between these two cities. 

Finally, in relation to the topic of slavery, I am interested in the surge of conversations surrounding reparations, particularly in New Orleans and Houston in light of the uneven effects of hurricanes on certain populations. I am intrigued both by memorialization of slavery as well as attempts by elected officials such as Representative Sheila Jackson Lee of Houston and celebrities such as Danny Glover to conduct research (bill H.R. 40) on how to compensate for the U.S.'s history and presence of slavery and racism.

There were several professional design teams a part of reaching a solution to make Newark more resilient to hurricanes. Among these groups, there was a group of students that had helped in planning. One of the teacher's in charge of a design group from NJIT had been teaching a master’s class in infrastructure planning. There were 15 students in the class that had helped her in her design strategies. After being into seven different teams, the students went out and did research in towns that were deeply affected by Hurricane Sandy. There were a range of majors among the students, from architecture to design or planning. Each student used his or her own knowledge and separate disciplines to come up with ideas to aid areas that were affected by Sandy.

Flooding is a major vulnerability of the Greater Newark area. There are large portions of the area that are extremely vulnerable to flooding, and have suffered substantial damage in the past, and to this day. Notably, the Ironbound and Airport/Port areas of Newark sustained a lot of flooding during the recent hurricanes and major storms.

Both the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Red Cross helped during this natural disaster. Also, New Jersey had sent out several sotrm warning and procedures on what to do if stuck in a troubling situation during the sotrm. New Jersey also sent out shelter locations to go to if necessary. In Newark, the public safety sent out several tips and methods to prevent any internal damage, such as flooding, in housing and what to store during the super storm.

The main point of this article was to illustrate the severity of the super storm Irene. It shows the stressed and frantic thought process and procedures before the storm. In addition, it shows the aftereffects of the storm and how many different places and people were affected greatly thoughout the East coast. These points are supported by quotes, statistics and overall analysis of the super storm itself.

A year after Hurricane Sandy, ten different design groups, filled with designers, architects, planners and engineers, decided to gather at NJIT to discuss ways on how to make Newark less vulnerable to hurricanes and other natural disasters. One team was lead by a professor at NJIT, who had four different proposals that will protect a wide portion of the coasts of New Jersey. Each of the teams came up with several ideas on how to make Newark more resilient to natural disasters.

There were several forms of resilience int eh article. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were preparing several emergency personnel are preparing all along the coast. In addition to this, there were several shelters open, one specfically at the John F. Kennedy Recreation Center. Many of the shelters had also teamed up with Red Cross to help during the storm.

The author of the article took several quotes from government officials to depict the severity of the situation: mainly taking quotes from governors and even the president to illustrate how the hurricane affected the surrounding communities and mentalities of those living in such towns. In addition, the author added statistics of the support relief and the number of deceased due to the storm. The author also discussed the background of many of the public transportation work shifts, such as airlfight and train systems: they were down becuase of the storm.

The largest risk at hand would be how the nautral disaster, Hurricane Sandy, affected the beaches of New Jersey, causing some the beaches to lose a significant amount of sand; this becomes a risk because the beaches weren't available to use. The beaches of New Jersey make most of the profit in tourism: the shore gaining $35.5 billion for tourism locations. This became a risk becuase there was money lost during and after the storm, as groups tried to repair the shores. In addition, the cost to repair the shores were extremely costly. Another group that received risks and hazards were the communities near the shores: they had to change their entire lifestyle when the beaches were destroyed after the storm. Those communities had to learn how to live without the beaches' resources and had to get accustomed to not going down to the shores while the beaches were being restored.