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The authors researched previoud research papers, articles, or speeches to gather data that was used to create a discussion.

The argument is supported through examples of violence, interviews, and insight into the ways in which research is lacking in this field.

1) early on the article, Dr. Good discuses how individuals would use the word "fainting" to described their tonic-clonic seizure episodes. This was quite divergent from the word "epilepsy" in Turkish, thus allowing the patient to distance themselves from the well-stigmatized diagnosis of epilepsy. It also served as a point of reference for what linguistic nuances could be expected during the course of the interview, as these can play a great deal into the narrative.

2) Dr. Good also discusses the work of Dr. Evelyn Early, who interviewed members of the Turkish female population. His description of Dr. Early's work states these narratives “allow the women she studied to develop an interpretation of the illness in relation to a local explanatory logic and the biographic context of the illness, to negotiate right action in the face of uncertainty, and to justify actions taken, thus embedding the illness and therapeutic efforts within local moral norms".

3) Dr. Good includes the story of Zeki Bey, an individual with generalized seizures for 15 years at the time of interaction. Dr. Good describes his narrative of his illness as being "[told with] immediacy, drama, and poignancy... His illness had a powerful and meaningful beginning, which gave shape and coherence to the larger narrative."

This article discusses how 9/11 can be compared to other disasters in US history such as the burning of the US Capitol Building in 1814 or the Iroquois Theater Fire in Chicago that occurred in 1903. These comparisons highlight how disaster investigations in the US have changed over time, which shows how political and societal norms of the time affected the investigation and reaction. He highlights how responsibility for disasters and authority is often an issue. 

"Unfortunately, 'normal' in Haiti includes perpetual political turmoil... That kind of political morass is one big reason-- though by no means the only one-- why the billions in relief and recovery aid haven't been enough to rescue Haiti from the disaster that fate keeps flinging its way."

"A growing reliance on U.S. and other international contractors helps explain why the payoff of foreign aid in Haiti often seems so low."

""International companies had to fly in, rent hotels and cars, and spend USAID allowances for food and cost­of­living expenses," Johnston wrote in the Boston Review last year. So­called danger pay and hardship pay inflated salaries by more than 50 percent"

Emergency response itself is not particularly addressed; the article, instead, focuses on the humanitarian efforts that typically spawn from multi-week and month long conflicts. These are not necessarily the first-line individuals, but rather the workers (such as MSF) which come in to provide aid in the middle, late, or final stages of a conflict. The report delves into the responsibilities and hurdles of dealing with sexual violence in humanitarian efforts, which includes both emergent and non-emergent care.  

The author is Didier Fassin. He is a French anthropologist and sociologist who has conducted fieldwork in Senegal, Ecuador, South Africa, and France. He currently works at the Institute for Advanced Study as a professor of Social Science. He is a trained physician in internal medicine and public health. He works with Doctors Without Borders and focused his early research on medical anthropology, the AIDS epidemic, mortality disparities, and global health. He has received many awards and has been an author on many publications, including several of his own books. His current work focuses on punishment, asylum, inequality, and politics of life. He also studies justice and prison systems. 

The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.

This article examines the gaps in research concerning health care workers in "complex security environments". These work areas contain some sort of conflict, poverty or environmental issues, particularly those that are humanitarian or crisis settings, and are characterized by civil unrest. This, in turn, leads to an involvement of aid personnel-- this report primarily focuses on violence towards health care workers within these settings and the lack of information on this issue. It pays particular attention to discrepancies between peer-reviewed, academic research and general media commentary or articles.