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META: Water seems to be one important medium through which NOLA envisions the “impacts” of the Anthropocene—scarcity, abundance, temporalities and spatial distributions, management of, and hazards that emerge in its context. Less is said about the causal or attributional aspects of the Anthropocene. How might water function as an entry point into the assemblages of local anthropocenics?

I found the NOLA Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2018, which frames the impacts of the Anthropocene as an intersection of weather extremes amid climate change and evolving vulnerabilities of its people. Four of seven items in the executive summary note water as central to local interventions: flood awareness, flood repair, flood mitigation, flood infrastructure. Too much water or water in the wrong places and the aftereffect of water on infrastructure and lives. One expression, then, is preparedness.

MACRO: Mitigation is an interesting analytic for the Anthropocene. In the US mitigation plans are shaped by the 1988 Stafford Act (which amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act). Constraints on communities come through rules, regulations, policies, (dis)incentives, and surveillance by state and federal authorities. Much of this is bound by economic and administrative discourses.

Goals are set in this document—broken out by timelines, activities, priorities, and capabilities. Another expression is classification of anthropocenics by subfields and accounting metrics. How do we measure progress and what is deferred to the future, 5-10 years out from today, a goal that has no tangible accountability but is named and acknowledged. What are the practices of naming, responsibility, and making (in)visible in the Anthropocene?

BIO: One new initiative, Ready for Rain, in particular is of interest to me as it highlights the more neoliberal vision for how the public should self-regulate risk and mitigate harm. I hear this as an extension of a government agency program to make the nation Weather Ready. Other bullets highlight “green” buildings, energies, and infrastructures. These could be examples of how the city envisions the Anthropocene feedback loop of humans changing/planning for climate alterations, which is a fairly typical lens.

Some questions: What does the water do? What does the water know? If we trace water in all its instantiations (e.g. historical water, flow of water, chemistry of water, application of water, temperature of water), what do we learn about the future imaginaries of what NOLA will / could / ought to become?

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

This was an excerpt from a book entitled "Medicine, rationality, and experience" by Byron J. Good. This book has been cited in 16 different papers and works. Many of the works it has been cited in include anthropology of the Middle East, global health, Nurse and lay community members and other topics associated with anthropology and cultural communication.

1)      How is Ebola best contained? From a report studying how Ebola was handled in Nigeria, there were several practices that were credited with its relatively quick eradication.  "The dense population and overburdened infrastructure create an environment where diseases can be easily transmitted and transmission sustained" (cdc.gov). In Nigeria, all 900 or so people who came in contact with the original patient zero were identified and monitored in isolation. The Nigerian CDC made over 18 thousand visits to screen suspected patients who would be moved to isolated treatment centers if highly suspect. Nigeria also holds a virology laboratory in Lagos University Teaching Hospital which allowed for quick and accurate testing. (http://www.livescience.com/48359-nigeria-how-ebola-was-contained.html)

2)      I also investigated the shooting of the boy who died, and why they shot him and what the circumstances were. I found that the boy, Shakie Kamara, was with a group of people trying to leave the neighborhood— against the government directive quarantine. The soldiers who fired on him and two other men were trying to prevent them from leaving. (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/africa/liberian-boy-dies-after-being-shot-during-clash-over-ebola-quarantine.html)

3)      The last point I investigated further was why it took international aid so long to arrive in West Africa (almost six months). The main reason for the long delay was due to logistics. Sites need to be located to store supplies and medical equipment which has to be transported to their sites in West Africa via underdeveloped roads. Just the transportation alone, mind sake organizing the manpower to run it, is an enormous task. Trying to find trucks, helicopters, and ambulances to move gear and get them in place takes time on the logistics end. "I need everything. I need it everywhere. And I need it super-fast." (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29654974)

Paul Farmer cites this paper in some of his other studies and articles written after this. The article has also been cited in a book entitled "Social Medicine in the 21st Century" by Samuel Barrack. This article has also been cited in: 

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10612556/3585352.pdf;sequen…

http://opensample.info/blindness-survey-methods-response-from-sudan-stu…;

This policy greatly helped sculpt emergency medicine and public health. By giving the right to the patient to have emergency medical treatment required without proof of insurance or payment, astronomically influenced the amount of patients being turned away and their possibilty of developing worse illnesses or dying. In a paper I read, a young doctor in the late 70s and early 80s remembers watching a woman in labor give birth in the doorway of the hospital and proceed to borht her child in the parking lot after being turned away for not having insurance. By requiring hospitals and doctors to see that all ED patients get care, no patient was at risk of dying or complicating their baby's health and birth due to a lack of insurance, ultimately increasing public health efforts. Not all hospitals turned away their patients, but enough did to make it a public health concern and get Congress involved. EMTALA changed emergency medicine protocols but also public health expectations and actions.

http://www.hhnmag.com/articles/5010-the-law-that-changed-everything-and…

1) “Hailey-Means’ mental and physical health quickly deteriorated. Her treatment by guards and the intolerable conditions in solitary… led Candie to try to take her own life.”

2) “What they’re calling for instead is a divestment from mass incarceration, along with an end to bail, and an investment in health care, living wage jobs, and mental health treatment that would lead to safer communities.”

There were numerous people invested in this situation and effected by the repercussions of it. The main focus is on the citizens of Liberia. The film shows their account of what happened, in terms of the severe amount of deaths and deplorable conditions in which they lived in. There was a complete lack of health care and public health or awareness, as well as resources such as food and supplies. Citizens were at first not taking the situation as seriously as it should have been, not heeding the warnings from doctors, convinced the government was exaggerating. Yet, once the turmoil and panic of officials was displayed, citizens soon began to worry. There were issues and decisions made involving protecting themselves from the disease as well as their families. Those infected also faced many issues. There was a complete lack of resources for those separated from the population due to infection. There were scarce amounts of food, water, supplies and medical attention. Fear, death and disease spread fast throughout the population. Decisions about not only quarantine and families had to be made, but also decision of whether leaving the country was a good choice, as seen by the main family in the documentary. Other stakeholders include health care officials as well as government employees. There were many decisions made by them in terms of allocating resources, as well as informing citizens about the situation. 

This paper has been cited and discussed in 7 different articles according to Google Scholar. Many of the papers it has been cited in have to do with the effects of social media on opinions of opioid use, gun violence, vaccination rates and more. The papers all have to do with public perception and education on certain topics, very similar to this study.