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seanw146The article spends a portion of its time looking at the effects on those who were first responders to the scene who were the most severely affected, many receiving over the lethal dose of radiation.
The article spends a portion of its time looking at the effects on those who were first responders to the scene who were the most severely affected, many receiving over the lethal dose of radiation.
This act provides ongoing support to the first responders and other professionals involved in the rescue efforts of 9/11/2001. The adverse health affects are still being discovered 15 years after the attacks, and the EMS community is still in need of the support provided. This policy also outlines a precedent for future attacks. In the event of another large-scale act of terrorism, the responders would likely receive similar support and "compensation" for the affects that might have them.
Actors reffered to:
Firefights:
Thomas Von Essen was the city's fire commissioner.
Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer was the first fire chief to begin operations on 9/11. He sent companies into the towers but found he was unable to properly communicate with them.
Deputy Assistant Chief Albert J. Turi was one of the firefighters in the towers that day who was unable to send and receive communications.
Assistant Chief Joseph Callan was in the north tower and ordered an evacuation order after felling the floor shifting. His order was largely unheard.
Assistant Chief Donald J. Burns was at both the 1993 bombings as well as the 9/11 attacks on the towers. On 9/11 he died leading operations in tower 2.
Mr. Modica, a firefighter, could not reach a friend who was a few floors above him with his radio equipment over any of the channels.
Mr. Campagna, a Firefighter, remembers getting out just before his tower fell.
Police:
Police Commissioner (at time of article’s writting) Kelly stated that there was no link between the various first response agencies on the day.
Bernard B. Kerik was the police commissioner on the day of the attack. He claimed that he was unaware of any communication issues during the incident.
Sergeant Moscola was a police officer.
Government:
Rudolph W. Giuliani was the mayor of NYC.
Richard J. Sheirer was the former director of the city's Office of Emergency Management and a fire dispatcher when speaking of the first responder’s communication equipment he said: “We're dinosaurs”.
Naval War College helped do and self-examination of the fire department’s command and control after the disaster.
James Ellson was a former deputy in the city's Office of Emergency Management
Civilians:
Ms. Frederick was a civilian who barely got clear of the towers in time. She credits a firefighter for saving her life saying: “He stayed there because there were more people behind us''.
David Rosensweig was the president of the fire alarm dispatchers' union.
Sharon Premoli was an executive vice president of Beast Financial Systems.
The author addresses public health by making the case that “evidence based medicine” is not always there for every type of case nor is it always infallible. This effects emergency response where there are so many variables and there are no datasets, protocols, or studies for some cases.
The main theme of this article is the conditions leading up to, during, and following a policy passed in France in 1998. The policy allowed residency to "any foreigner habitually resident in France and suffering from a serious medical condition requiring medical treatment, and for whom deportation would result in exceptionally serious consequences, provided that he or she would be unable to receive appropriate treatment in the country to which he or she is returned" The author likens the poicy to "compassion protocol" or palliative care. The law should only apply in extreme circumstances and is based on an emotional response to pain/suffering.
This policy had good intentions, but led to a number of resulting issues, such as disparity in care due to ambiguity in the law. For the enforcers of the law, there was much interpretation which allowed for individuals to exercise "humanitarian reason" and decide what conditions were a "serious medical condition" and what was not. This politicized medical care for foreigners/immigrants, as medical proffessionals no longer diagnosed based on symptoms, but socioeconomic status as well.
This article relates to public health as the conditions of the island prison are a health concern of themselves and other conditions exacerbate existing health issues of inmates there. It also addresses the issues with healthcare, housing, and financial stability after release from the system.
The majority of the facts originated from MSF (also known as Doctors Without Borders) essays/studies/experiences as well as several other outside works as cited.
This article presents some statistics on common psychological issues post- disaster. PTSD and Major Depression are the two most commonly studied issues in realtion to post-disaster. A realtively new term "resilience" has been brought to the table, defining the ability of people to "bounce-back" after disasters. Substance abuse is another studied issue, with some reporting an increase in substance use following disasters. However, it is noted that the post-disaster abuse of substances is highest in those already using or abusing these ubstances. Other conditions such as generalized anxiety disorder, phobias, and other stress disorders are studied and have links to disaster experience.
The article also discusses some risk factors for post-disaster psychological disorders. Prior to disasters, women tend to be less resilient, and more suscpetible to disorders, excepting substance abuse. Children are especially vulnerable to issues. Socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and community support are also factors in the outcome of a person's mental state post-disaster. During a disaster, the degree of exposure to the incident is the greatest factor in outcome. After a disaster, support network and ongoing life stressors play a large rold in the outcome. The biggests steps to preventing poor outcome post-disaster are prepartion and anticipation of the disaster, and recognition/prevention of mental illness.
Generally, only a small percentage of victims seek help from services provided for mental health disorders. This makes it difficult to accurately research the affects and prevalence of mental health disorders.
Community leaders and professionals across various countries and communities to prepare them to lead their communities during disaster management.