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This report has been cited by 22 other works-- including articles, books, reports, reviews, and studies. This includes several these, book chapters, and dissertations. It appears mostly in anthropological and STSS works, indicating it has yet to move from these social sciences into the realms of policy. 

"Unfortunately, 'normal' in Haiti includes perpetual political turmoil... That kind of political morass is one big reason-- though by no means the only one-- why the billions in relief and recovery aid haven't been enough to rescue Haiti from the disaster that fate keeps flinging its way."

"A growing reliance on U.S. and other international contractors helps explain why the payoff of foreign aid in Haiti often seems so low."

""International companies had to fly in, rent hotels and cars, and spend USAID allowances for food and cost­of­living expenses," Johnston wrote in the Boston Review last year. So­called danger pay and hardship pay inflated salaries by more than 50 percent"

1) "On an individual level, disagreements over treatment can arise when there are competing ideas about the cause and most appropriate treatment of disease. The weak and sometimes nonfunctioning health systems that often characterize complex security environments can compound these challenges and contribute to a milieu of mistrust that sets the stage for violence against health workers, facilities and transportation"

2) "There are also often inconsistencies in the categories used to describe perpetrators e e.g. terrorist, state actors, non-state actor e and these categories have legal ramifications under both International Humanitarian Law and in national legal frameworks. Although a standardizing of terminology and scope of study would be welcome, this has proven difficult."

3) "Although violence directly affecting health service delivery in complex security environments has received a great deal of media attention, there is very little publically available research, particularly peer-reviewed, original research. Only thirty-eight articles met the original search criteria outlined in the methods section, of which only eleven contained original research; a further citation search yielded another four original research articles."

The policy was the multi-tiered approach designed by New York City officials in the event of an Ebola case. This included designation of eight hospitals as being care centers for Ebola cases, teaching non-designated hospitals or care centers how to identify Ebola candidates, communication with transportation services (both EMS and non-EMS), and running unscheduled drills to practice handling scenes with an Ebola candidate (the example given was someone falling ill in a subway car). The poly aimed to standardize the approaches and protocols used when dealing with a possible Ebola case. It focused on minimizing the excessive risk to citizens, EMS personnel, and healthcare workers in the event of a patient with Ebola. The policy also sought to train and drill these protocols, including unscheduled calls (mentioned above) and continued inspections to ensure preparedness. The obvious end goal was to minimize the possibility of wide-spread infection, either through improper handling or failed detection of an Ebola case.