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1) Fukushima proved current standard ineffective. Fukushima was the worst nuclear accident since the Chernobyl incident over 25 years ago. Hundreds of thousands of people had to be relocated due to the radiation leaks—many to this day. The effects of the hundreds of thousands of gallons of radiation contaminated water released into the ocean are still not fully known.

                2) International groups called for agency to enforce as no current candidate is feasible. IAEA is large enough but not fully trusted to be the host as it promotes nuclear use and appeared to praise TEPCO and the handling of the Fukushima incident. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is a better candidate but still faces the problem of appearing as a secretive organization keeping its member companies confidential. WANO also currently lacks the size and resources to build an international nuclear disaster strike team.

                3) The author stresses that good communication and cooperation are required for success of such an organization. For a response team to work at the international level, sharing of different countries’ reactor designs and other various trade secrets would be crucial. The expertise from operators, responders, and other professionals who have had hands-on experience from Fukushima and other nuclear disasters. It would take a sizable amount of funding for such an organization and maintain the capabilities as the author described. 

1) “Repeatedly, I have been surprised by the impact that even lightly sketched case histories can have on readers.”

2) “But even the manifesto conceded that less formal expertise would remain important in the areas of practice that had not been subject to high-level testing. THAT confession covers much of the territory.”

The IAEA is based in Vienna, Austria. It is comprised of six main departments: Department of Nuclear Energy, Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications, Department of Technical Cooperation, Department of Safeguards, Department of Management, and Department of Safety and Security. The IAEA employs over 2200 staff throughout the world. It has offices in Toronto and Tokyo and also holds research facilities in Monaco, Austria, and Seibersdorf. The main resource the IAEA provides to its member is nuclear knowledge and expertise in its various departments though countless publications.

Miriam Ticktin is an associate Anthropology professor at The New School. She graduated with a PhD from Stanford University in 2002. “Miriam works at the intersections of the anthropology of medicine and science, law, and transnational and postcolonial feminist theory. Her research has focused in the broadest sense on what it means to make political claims in the name of a universal humanity: she has been interested in what these claims tell us about universalisms and difference, about who can be a political subject, on what basis people are included and excluded from communities, and how inequalities get instituted or perpetuated in this process. She is the author of Casualties of Care: Immigration and the Politics of Immigration and Humanitarianism in France (UC Press, 2011), co-editor of In the Name of Humanity: the Government of Threat and Care (with Ilana Feldman, Duke UP 2010), and a founding co-editor of the journal Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development.” (from her profile from The New School).

There are several ways that this study can benefit technical professionals. By knowing the factors for the highest risk for communicable diseases, resources can be directed to mitigate the effects of a disaster. The more aware technical professionals are of the risks of communicable diseases, the more likely they will be able to identify when these situations are likely and prevent them from happening.

This act was a win for all individuals in EMS as no EMT, nurse, or doctor would have to send a patient in critical need away because there was no one to foot the bill. This was a horrible position that put medical workers in the position of moral culpability for policy formed by higher-ups who never had to deal with the reality of their decisions.